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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction regarding this matter pursuant to Utah Code
§78A-4-103(2).
REFERENCES TO THE PARTIES
Petitioners/Appellants:
Certified Building Maintenance ("CBM")
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company ("State Farm")
Respondents/Appellees:
Enrique Antonio ("Antonio")
Workers Compensation Fund ("WCF")
Utah Labor Commission ("Commission")
Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission ("Board")
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Did the Board err in affirming the order of the Administrative Law
Judge ("ALJ") which required CBM and State Farm to pay medical
benefits for Antonio's left knee condition because the ALJ's August 25,
2010 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Interim Order were
insufficient?
Standard of Review: substantial evidence [Martinez v. Media-Paymaster
Plus, 164 P.3d 384, 390-91 (Utah 2007); Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v.
Board ofReview, 839 P.2d 841, 843-44 (Utah App. 1992)].
Preservation of Issue: Objections to Medical Panel Report dated January
19, 2011 (R., pages 129-144); Reply to WCF's Response to Objections
dated February 7, 2011 (R., pages 147-149); Motion for Review dated
March 24, 2011 (R., pages 158-173); Reply to WCF's Response to Motion
for Review dated April 25, 2011 (R., pages 178-180); Order on Motion for
Review dated May 31,2011 (R., pages 181-185)
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Did the Board err in affirming the ALJ's order which required CBM
and State Farm to pay medical benefits for Antonio's left knee condition
because the ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Interim
Order dated August 25, 2010 which failed to provide the Medical Panel
("Panel") complete factual findings were inconsistent with her
determination in her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
dated February 23, 2011 that the Panel had been provided all the
factual findings for consideration in rendering their opinion thereby
abdicating her responsibility as fact-finder to the Panel?
Standard of Review: correction of error [Olsen v. Labor Commission, 249
P.3d 586, 590 (Utah App. 2011); Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 4-5
Utah App. 1991); Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 731 P.2d
1079 (Utah 1986)]
Preservation of Issue: Objections to Medical Panel Report dated January
19, 2011 (R., pages 129-144); Reply to WCF's Response to Objections
dated February 7, 2011 (R., pages 147-149); Motion for Review dated
March 24, 2011 (R., pages 158-173); Reply to WCF's Response to Motion
for Review dated April 25, 2011 (R., pages 178-180); Order on Motion for
Review dated May 31,2011 (R., pages 181-185)
Did the Board err in affirming the AU's order which required CBM
and State Farm to pay medical benefits for Antonio's left knee condition
because the ALJ abused her discretion by overruling CBM/State
Farm's objections to the Medical Panel Report dated December 10,
2010?
Standard of Review: reasonableness [Salt Lake County v. Labor
Commission, 208 P.3d 1087, 1090 (Utah App. 2009); AE Clevite, Inc. v.
Labor Commission, 996 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah App. 2000)]
Preservation of Issue: Objections to Medical Panel Report dated January
19, 2011 (R., pages 129-144); Reply to WCF's Response to Objections
dated February 7, 2011 (R., pages 147-149); Motion for Review dated
March 24, 2011 (R., pages 158-173); Reply to WCF's Response to Motion
for Review dated April 25, 2011 (R., pages 178-180); Order on Motion for
Review dated May 31,2011 (R., pages 181-185)
Did the Board err in affirming the ALJ's order which required CBM
and State Farm to pay medical benefits for Antonio's left knee condition
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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because the ALJ violated CBM/State Farm's due process rights by
overruling their objections to the Medical Panel Report dated December
10,2010?
Standard of Review: correction of error [Olson v. Labor Commission, 249
P.3d 586, 590 (Utah App. 2011); Color Country Management v. Labor
Commission, 38 P.3d 969, 972 (Utah App. 2001)]
Preservation of Issue: Objections to Medical Panel Report dated January
19, 2011 (R., pages 129-144); Reply to WCF's Response to Objections
dated February 7, 2011 (R., pages 147-149); Motion for Review dated
March 24, 2011 (R., pages 158-173); Reply to WCF's Response to Motion
for Review dated April 25, 2011 (R., pages 178-180); Order on Motion for
Review dated May 31,2011 (R., pages 181-185)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
On October 5, 2009, Antonio filed an Application for Hearing with the
Commission regarding his worker's compensation claim. R., pages 1-6. The
Commission issued its Notice of Formal Adjudicative Proceedings and Order for
Answer on October 6, 2009. R., pages 7-8. CBM and State Farm filed their
Answer on November 5, 2009 and their First Amended Answer on July 2, 2010.
R., pages 11-14, 93-103.

A hearing was held on August 16, 2010 before ALJ

Debbie L. Harm to adjudicate Antonio's claim.
On August 25, 2010, the ALJ issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Interim Order in which the ALJ found that there were conflicting medical
opinions related to causation of the injury and referred the matter to the Panel for
review. R., pages 113-117.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Panel issued its report dated December 10, 2010 and the ALJ sent this
report to the parties on December 30, 2010. R., pages 123-128. In her Notice to
the Parties dated December 30,2010, the ALJ allowed the parties 20 calendar days
from the date of the notice to file objections, and she also indicated that if no
written objections were timely filed, then the Medical Panel Report would be
deemed admitted into evidence. R., page 123. CBM and State Farm timely filed
their Objections to Medical Panel Report on January 19, 2011 alleging, among
other things, that key pieces of unrefuted evidence were not considered by the
Panel. R., pages 129-144. WCF filed their Response to CBM/State Farm's
objections on January 31, 2011 and CBM/State Farm filed their Reply to WCF's
Response on February 7,2011. R., pages 145-149.
On February 23, 2011, the ALJ issued her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order in which she overruled CBM/State Farm's objections to the
Medical Panel Report, admitted the report into evidence, and, relying upon this
report, ordered that CBM and State Farm must pay Antonio's medical expenses for
the work injury pursuant to the fee schedule with interest. R., pages 150-157. She
also ordered CBM and State Farm to pay add-on attorney's fees. R., page 155.
CBM and State Farm filed their Motion for Review on March 24, 2011. R.,
pages 158-173. The Board issued their Order on Motion for Review and Order of
Remand on May 31, 2011. R., pages 181-185. In their Order, the Board affirmed
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the ALJ's award of medical benefits, but set aside and remanded the portion of the
ALJ's order which awarded add-on attorney's fees. Id. On June 28, 2011, CBM
and State Farm filed their Petition for Review seeking review by this court of the
portion of the Board's Order which affirmed the ALJ's award of medical benefits.
Statement of the Relevant Facts
Antonio claims that he injured his left knee while working for CBM on
January 20, 2008 when he slipped on ice. This claim was insured by State Farm.
Following this injury, Antonio underwent left knee arthroscopic surgery on
September 4, 2008 conducted by Nicholas R. Goucher, M.D., his treating
physician. R., page 186, Joint Medical Record Exhibits, Exhibit 6, page 52.
Antonio further alleged that he injured his left knee on February 12, 2009 while
working for CBM when he slipped and fell on ice. This claim was insured by
WCF. These two injuries were the subject of the hearing on August 16,2010.
On February 9, 2009, Antonio sought medical treatment with Dr. Goucher.
R., page 186, Joint Medical Record Exhibits, Exhibit 6, page 57.

Dr. Goucher

provided an injection to Antonio's left knee. Id. Antonio testified at hearing that
he had no pain in his left knee the day following this injection and leading up to the
date of the February 12, 2009 work injury, and that when the February 12, 2009
incident occurred, his left knee pain increased from zero to 7-8 on a pain scale of
0-10. The testimony in this regard was as follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Mr. Sanchez:
Antonio:

After this incident with the oil and carpet, when
was the next time you saw Dr. Groucher (sic) after
that?
I can't remember when it was.

Antonio:

Was it before the incident that occurred on
February 12th, 2009?
Yes, I think so.

Mr. Sanchez:
Antonio:

What did Dr. Groucher (sic) recommend?
He gave me an injection in my knee of steroids.

Mr. Sanchez:
Antonio:

Did that help you?
He said that in two weeks, I will not feel pain but
after those 2 weeks if I feel pain, he gave me
another appointment to come back.

Mr. Sanchez:

R., page 187, Hearing Transcript, page 36, lines 10-23.
Mr. Francis:
Antonio:
Mr. Francis:
Antonio:
Mr. Francis:
Antonio:
Mr. Francis:
Antonio:
Mr. Francis:
Antonio:

Dr. Groucher (sic) also gave you an injection into
your left knee; is that right?
Yeah, he gave me an injection.
And the injection was—to help reduce the pain in
your left knee; is that right?
He said that in two weeks-the pain was going to
go away for two weeks.
For two weeks after the injection was given to
you?
Yes.
Now, this injection happened on February 9, 2009.
Does that sound about right?
I cannot remember the date.
If Dr. Groucher's (sic) medical records indicate
that it occurred on February 9, 2009, you don't
disagree with that, do you?
No.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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R., page 187, Hearing Transcript, page 56, lines 13-25; page 57, lines 1-5.
Mr. Francis:
Antonio:
Mr. Francis:
Antonio:
Mr. Francis:
Antonio:
Mr. Francis:
Antonio:
Mr. Francis:

Antonio:
Mr. Francis:
Antonio:
Mr. Francis:
Antonio:
Mr. Francis:

When he gave you the injection, did the pain go
down at that time?
Not at that time. But I can't remember how long
time had passed, but it went away.
Did it go away ~ can you remember that it went
away pretty quickly after the injection?
Probably the next day I didn't have pain anymore.
All right. So by the next day after the injection
occurred you had zero pain in your left knee, is
that right?
Yes, I didn't have pain.
Would you agree then that the pain was staying
away for at least three or four days after that
injection happened?
Yes, I didn't have pain.
All right...you have indicated in response to your
attorney's questions that you then had another
accident on February 12th, 2009. Does that sound
right?
Yes.
Right before this February 12th, 2009 accident
happened you had already had the injection by Dr.
Groucher (sic), would you agree?
Yes.
Leading up to that February 12th, 2009 injury, the
injection had reduced your pain to zero, would you
agree?
Yes. It did get ~ it went away.
Therefore, so we're clear, just before the February
12th, 2009 accident happened, you weren't feeling
any pain in your left knee, right?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Antonio:

I didn't have any — I cannot remember exactly if it
was that, but I was always using my knee
protector.

Mr. Francis:

All right. But you weren't feeling pain after
because you had had that injection right before the
February 12th, 2009 accident, correct?
Yes, I didn't have pain.

Antonio:

R., page 187, Hearing Transcript, page 57, lines 13-25; page 58, lines 1-25; page
59, lines 1-2.
Mr. Francis:

Antonio:
Mr. Francis:
Antonio:
Mr. Francis:
Antonio:

When you fell on February 12th, 2009, using that
zero to ten scale of pain, the pain level in your left
knee at that moment increased to about 7 or 8,
would you agree?
In that moment, yeah, it hurt.
So therefore, as we talked about earlier, your pain
level right before that happened was zero, right?
Yes, I didn't have pain.
So at the moment it happened on February 12th,
2009, your pain level in your left knee went from
zero to about seven to eight?
In that moment, yes, it hurt.

R., page 187, Hearing Transcript, page 64, lines 20-25; page 65, lines 1-7.
After the February 12, 2009 incident occurred, Dr. Goucher met with
Antonio on March 4, 2009. R., page 186, Joint Medical Record Exhibits, Exhibit
6, page 58. Noting that Antonio "slipped again 3 weeks ago," Dr. Goucher
indicated that "the injection we gave him worked for about a week. He was feeling
really good but then slowly started to get bad over the last couple of weeks." Id.
WCF retained Stephen P. Marble, M.D. to perform an examination of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
8 may contain errors.
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Antonio's left knee on June 28, 2010. R., page 186, Joint Medical Record
Exhibits, Exhibit 10, pages 69-76. In his report, Dr. Marble reviewed Antonio's
deposition and Dr. Goucher's March 9, 2010 report and concluded that the
mechanism of injury on February 12, 2009 was "benign." R., page 186, Joint
Medical Record Exhibits, Exhibit 10, pages 69, 71, 75. In his conclusion, he
opined that Antonio at worst experienced a temporary aggravation on February 12,
2009, but that "he returned to preinjury status within a week or less." Id. at 75.
In her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Interim Order dated August
25, 2010, the ALJ found only the following facts with regard to Dr. Goucher's left
knee injection on February 9, 2009 and concerning the description of the February
12,2009 incident:
Dr. Gouchner (sic) gave (Antonio) an injection in his knee (on
February 9, 2009). (Antonio) had no pain in his knee the day
following the injection although he continued to use his knee brace at
work.
On February 12, 2009, (Antonio) was carrying gallon cans of
chemicals in each hand from one building to another at work when he
slipped on ice, landing on his buttocks with his knees bent and feet on
the ground in front of him and then his legs went straight out in front
after his buttocks hit the ground. (Antonio) had increased left knee
pain.
R., page 114.
The Medical Panel Report dated December 10, 2010 referred to Dr.
Goucher's February 9, 2009 injection and the ensuing February 12, 2009 incident
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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as follows:
(Antonio) was seen again by Dr. Goucher on 2/9/09 because of knee
pain. "He had been doing very well but then started getting some pain
again in his knee." Dr. Goucher described a slip at work that occurred
in December which might have reinjured the knee. An injection of
cortisone and Marcaine was given into the knee. A recurrent tear of
the meniscus was suspected.
The Findings of Fact describe an injury that occurred on 2/12/09 when
(Antonio) again slipped on ice carrying gallons of chemicals, falling
and landing on his buttocks with his knees bent. There was some
increased left knee pain.
R., page 125.
The Panel went on to describe Antonio's "current symptoms" as they
pertained to the February 12,2009 incident in the following manner:
(Antonio) described the February 2009 incident as being minor. He
described having increased pain for perhaps 15 minutes after which it
subsided and returned to the baseline.
R., page 126.
In concluding that there was no causal connection between the February 12,
2009 industrial accident and Antonio's left knee condition after February 12, 2009,
the Panel indicated in their report the following:
We are basing this opinion on the information we obtained during our
interview. We did not find (Antonio's) responses to be ambiguous.
He clearly indicated there was continued knee pain which increased
over time following his arthroscopy. It was this continued and
increasing pain interfering with work and his quality of life that
caused him to seek further medical attention. He indicated that the
incidents of December 2008 and February 12, 2009 while causing
some increased pain, represented temporary aggravations that returned
10
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to baseline. It was the baseline that was causally related to the
1/20/08 work accident.
R., page 127.

.

When CBM and State Farm filed their Objections to Medical Panel Report
on January 19, 2011, they included a medical report from Terry A. Brown, M.D.
R., pages 134-136. In this report, Dr. Brown noted that Antonio had an increase in
pain from zero to 7-8 when the February 12,2009 incident occurred. R., page 136.
In part, this evidence supported his opinion that Antonio's left knee problems and
need for treatment were caused by the February 12,2009 incident.
In her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated February 23,
2011, the AU overruled CBM/State Farm's objections to the Medical Panel
Report and indicated that CBM/State Farm's "objection goes to the weight the
report should be given rather than its admission into the record for which the
objection allows and forms no basis for excluding the report from the record.
There is nothing contained within (CBM/State Farm's) objection which would
prevent the panel's report from being entered into the

evidentiary

record...(CBM/State Farm) also submitted excerpts from (Antonio's) deposition.
However, the time to address such issues was at the evidentiary hearing when
(Antonio) gave testimony if it was inconsistent with his hearing testimony. Thus,
(Antonio's) deposition testimony is not dispositive of the medical issues in this
case." R., page 151. The ALJ further determined that, in addition to the medical
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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records, "the panel also had all the factual finding(s) to consider in rendering their
opinion so (they) could consider the mechanism of injury of all the accidents to
render their opinion. The panel also took time to ensure (Antonio) understood the
questions being posed through the translator so that a thorough examination was
performed." R., page 153.
As a result, the ALJ determined that Antonio's "left knee condition after
February 12, 2009 is medically caused by the January 20, 2008 industrial
accident." R., page 154. Because of this, she ordered that CBM and State Farm
were responsible for Antonio's necessary and ongoing medical expenses to treat
his left knee. R., page 155.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
By ostensibly limiting Antonio's left knee pain relief to the day following
the injection as described in her insufficient Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Interim Order dated August 25, 2010, the ALJ severely prejudiced CBM and
State Farm because she failed to provide key evidence to the Panel that Antonio's
left knee pain completely subsided following the February 9, 2009 injection by Dr.
Goucher up to the time of the February 12, 2009 incident with a significant
increase in pain at the time of the February 12, 2009 incident. As it turned out, the
Panel was left with this impression and based their opinion on the ALJ's
incomplete rendition of the evidence along with Antonio's inconsistent history
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reported to them. Despite CBM/State Farm's objections to the Panel's deficient
report, the ALJ persisted in her narrow view of the evidence and refused to strike
the Panel's report or provide further information to the Panel so that they could
render an opinion based on a thorough assessment of the evidence presented at
hearing. In doing so, the ALJ issued an inconsistent ruling that the Panel had been
provided "all the factual findings" necessary to render an opinion, and based on the
deficient report issued by the Panel, she awarded medical benefits against CBM
and State Farm. In the process, CBM/State Farm's due process rights were
violated.
ARGUMENTS
I.

The Board erred in affirming the ALJ's order which required CBM
and State Farm to pay medical benefits for Antonio's left knee condition
because the ALJ's August 25, 2010 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Interim Order were insufficient.
In order to successfully challenge an agency's factual findings, "the party

must marshal all of the evidence supporting thefindingsand show that despite the
supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the
findings are not supported by substantial evidence.. .The reviewing court, however,
retains discretion to consider independently the whole record and determine if the
decision below has adequate factual support." Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus,
164 P.3d 384, 390-91 (Utah 2007).
On the face of the ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Interim
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Order dated August 25, 2010, the ALJ clearly neglected to include the unrefuted
evidence that Antonio's level of pain was at zero leading up to the moment of the
February 12, 2009 incident with a significant increase in pain at the time of the
February 12, 2009 incident. This was done despite closing argument by counsel
for CBM and State Farm requesting the ALJ to consider this omitted evidence. R.,
page 187, Hearing Transcript, page 82, lines 16-25; page 83, lines 1-21. While the
ALJ mentioned that Antonio "had no pain in his knee the day following the
injection," she did not provide the additional evidence that Antonio continued to
have no pain in his left knee up to the time of the February 12,2009 incident with a
significant increase in pain at the time of the February 12, 2009 incident. This
additional evidence omitted by the ALJ was not specifically mentioned in any
medical records, but was presented by Antonio in his hearing testimony and was
unrefuted. It is the fact that this hearing testimony presented by Antonio himself
was unrefuted which makes the ALJ's omission so significant, and which causes
the ALJ's failure to include it in her findings of fact to be erroneous.
Dr. Goucher's March 4, 2009 report does not lead to a contrary conclusion.
In his report, Dr. Goucher noted that Antonio had "slipped again 3 weeks ago." R.,
page 186, Joint Medical Record Exhibits, Exhibit 6, page 58. This was an apparent
reference to the February 12,2009 incident. In light of this reference, Dr. Goucher
also stated that "the injection (on February 9,2009) we gave him worked for about
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

a week. He was feeling really good but then slowly started to get bad over the last
couple of weeks." [emphasis supplied]

Id.

The problem with this piece of

evidence is that it gives the impression that the February 9, 2009 injection
continued to provide Antonio relief from his left knee pain even at the time of the
February 12, 2009 incident and for about a week after the February 12, 2009
incident.

Likewise, Dr. Marble's conclusions that the mechanism of injury on

February 12, 2009 was "benign," and that Antonio at worst suffered a temporary
aggravation on February 12, 2009, but "returned to preinjury status within a week
or less" were clearly made without knowing about or considering Antonio's
hearing testimony. Indeed, Dr. Marble's review of Antonio's deposition does not
express any awareness or consideration of the numbing effect of the February 9,
2009 injection on Antonio's left knee leading up to the February 12, 2009 with a
significant increase in left knee pain at the time of the February 12, 2009 incident,
once again leaving the Panel with no understanding of this evidence other than Dr.
Goucher's confusing and contrary history. All of this portrays a very different
picture than the unrefuted testimony provided by Antonio at hearing. By omitting
the full extent of Antonio's unrebutted testimony in her findings of fact, the ALJ
left out a key piece of evidence, thereby rendering her findings of fact insufficient
for the Panel's review and in arriving at her ultimate order.
As noted in Adams v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 821
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P.2d 1, 5 (Colo. App. 1991), "an administrative agency cannot discharge its
statutory responsibilities without making findings of fact on all necessary ultimate
issues under the governing statutory standards.

It is also essential that [an

administrative agency] make subsidiary findings in sufficient detail that the critical
subordinate factual issues are highlighted and resolved in such a fashion as to
demonstrate that there is a logical and legal basis for the ultimate conclusions. The
importance of complete, accurate, and consistent findings of fact is essential to a
proper determination by an administrative agency. To that end, findings should be
sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which the ultimate factual conclusions,
or conclusions of mixed fact and law, are reached." [emphasis supplied]
The ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Interim Order dated
August 25, 2010 were insufficient (by leaving out significant evidence that
Antonio had no left knee pain leading up to the February 12, 2009 incident with a
significant increase of pain at the time of the February 12, 2009 incident). These
findings of fact fall short of the ALJ's responsibility to provide "complete,
accurate, and consistent findings of fact (which is) essential to a proper
determination by an administrative agency." Adams, supra. The incompleteness
of the ALJ's August 25, 2010 findings of fact was made apparent when the Panel
determined that Antonio was experiencing "continued knee pain which increased
over time following his arthroscopy," believed that the February 12, 2009 incident
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was "minor," based their "opinion on the information (they) obtained during (their)
interview, and "did not find (Antonio's) responses to be ambiguous." [emphasis
supplied] Given Antonio's testimony, his left knee pain was hardly continuous and
increasing following the February 9,2009 injection, the February 12,2009 incident
was not "minor" considering his pain level soared from zero to 7-8, and his
responses to the Panel were in no way unambiguous when compared to his omitted
hearing testimony.

Ultimately, the ALJ based on her Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Order dated February 23, 2011 largely on this deficient
Medical Panel Report resulting from the insufficient findings of fact provided in
her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated August 25, 2010 to the
Panel.
For these reasons, CBM and State Farm request that the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order dated February 23, 2011 be set aside, that
CBM/State Farm's objections to the Medical Panel Report dated December 10,
2010 be sustained, that the ALJ's order requiring CBM and State Farm to pay for
Antonio's medical expenses with interest be reversed, that a hearing be ordered to
clarify the Medical Panel Report dated December 10, 2010, and/or that further
evidence as requested herein be submitted to the Panel for consideration and
clarification.
II.

The Board erred in affirming the ALJ's order which required CBM
and State Farm to pay medical benefits for Antonio's left knee condition
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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because the ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Interim
Order dated August 25,2010 which failed to provide the Panel complete
factual findings were inconsistent with her determination in her
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated February 23,
2011 that the Panel had been provided all the factual findings for
consideration in rendering their opinion thereby abdicating her
responsibility as fact-finder to the Panel.
Incorrectly, the ALJ determined in her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order dated February 23, 2011 that, in addition to the medical records, "the
panel also had all the factual finding(s) to consider in rendering their opinion so
(they) could consider the mechanism of injury of all the accidents to render their
opinion." [emphasis supplied] R., page 153.
According to Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Utah App. 1991),
the Commission's "findings must be sufficiently detailed and include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each
factual issue was reached. The failure of an agency to make adequate findings of
fact in material issues renders it findings arbitrary and capricious unless the
evidence is clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one conclusion...A finding
may be implied if it is clear from the record, and therefore apparent upon review,
that the finding was actually made as part of the tribunal's decision. We may not
merely assume, however, that an undisclosed finding was in fact made. The party
wishing to defend an agency decision must carry it burden of showing that the
undisclosed finding was actually made." [emphasis supplied]
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In this case, the ALJ's Finding of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Interim
Order dated August 25, 2010 only indicated that Antonio "had no pain in his knee
the day following the injection," but did not explain that Antonio continued to have
no pain in his left knee leading up to the time of the February 12, 2009 incident
with a significant increase in pain at the time of the February 12, 2009 incident as
presented by Antonio in his unrefuted hearing testimony.
In this way, the ALJ's determination in her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order dated February 23, 2011 that "the panel also had all the factual
finding(s) to consider in rendering their opinion so (they) could consider the
mechanism of injury of all the accidents to render their opinion" is inconsistent
with the deficient findings of fact in her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Interim Order dated August 25,2010.
This inconsistency is self-evident in the Panel's report because the Panel
makes no mention of the omitted evidence. Given that the ALJ did not provide
this information to the Panel and because Antonio apparently did not tell them, the
Panel was left to gather additional facts, and ultimately rendered their opinion
without understanding this important evidence. Indeed, the Panel inaccurately
noted that Antonio "clearly indicated there was continued knee pain which
increased over time following his arthroscopy.

It was this continued and

increasing pain interfering with work and his quality of life that caused him to seek
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further medical attention." R., page 127.

In their Objections to Medical Panel

Report, CBM and State Farm pointed out this discrepancy and proffered medical
evidence (Dr. Brown's January 16, 2011 report) supporting the significance of this
omission.
In addition, the effect of the ALJ's failure to provide complete findings of
fact to the Panel was to abdicate to the Panel the ALJ's role as fact-finder. The
ALJ (acting on behalf of the Commission) is always the ultimate fact-finder "even
when a medical panel is convened...Thus while the ALJ/Commission may
convene a medical panel to review applicant's medical condition, the
ALJ/Commission may not abdicate its fact-finding responsibility to the medical
panel." Speirs v. Southern Utah University, 60 P.3d 42, 44 (Utah App. 2002).
Indeed, "it is not the role of the medical panel to resolve conflicts in the factual
evidence regarding the injured party's activities.

(The statute) places that

responsibility solely on the Commission...The medical panel strays beyond its
province when it attempts to resolve factual disputes, and the administrative law
judge improperly abdicates his function if he permits the panel to so act." Price
River Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 731 P.2d 1079, 1084 (Utah 1986).
Here, the ALJ relinquished her fact-finding responsibility to the Panel by
determining that the Panel had all the factual findings to consider in rendering their
opinion even though this was not the case. Her limited portrayal of Antonio's left
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knee condition leading up to the February 12, 2009 incident failed to provide the
Panel the entire picture. Because of this, the Panel was required to collect further
facts from Antonio and ended up with Antonio's report to them that the February
12, 2009 incident was "minor" coupled with the misconception that the injection
on February 9, 2009 only provided pain relief the day after it was administered (as
narrowly revealed by the ALJ).

This version is substantially different than

Antonio's testimony that the February 9, 2009 injection caused a reduction in his
left knee pain to zero up to the time of the February 12, 2009 incident, and that
Antonio's pain significantly increased to a pain level of 7-8 (despite the numbing
effect of the injection) when the February 12, 2009 incident occurred.

Had the

Panel known the complete story (as was the ALJ's responsibility to provide), they
may have reached the different opinion that Antonio suffered a new injury on
February 12, 2009.
In turning over the fact-finding responsibility to the Panel, the ALJ
apparently assumed that the Panel would obtain any additional facts (such as
Antonio's lack of left knee pain leading up to the February 12, 2009 incident)
which she did not provide in her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Interim
Order dated August 25, 2010. This assumption on the part of the ALJ was evident
when she noted in her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated
February 23, 2011 that "the panel also took time to ensure (Antonio) understood
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the questions being posed through the translator so that a thorough examination
was performed." R., page 153. This is not the Panel's role, and it was error for the
ALJ to proceed otherwise.
Because the ALJ had in actuality not provided the Panel "all the factual
finding(s)" and because the Panel failed to collect all necessary facts in arriving at
their conclusions, the ALJ erroneously based her ultimate conclusions in her
February 23, 2011 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order upon the
deficient Medical Panel Report which was predicated on inadequate findings of
fact (by leaving out Antonio's unrefuted testimony that he had no left knee pain
leading up to the February 12, 2009 incident with a significant increase in pain at
the time of the February 12,2009 incident).
For these reasons, CBM and State Farm request that the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order dated February 23, 2011 be set aside, that
CBM/State Farm's objections to the Medical Panel Report dated December 10,
2010 be sustained, that the ALJ's order requiring CBM and State Farm to pay for
Antonio's medical expenses with interest be reversed, that a hearing be ordered to
clarify the Medical Panel Report dated December 10, 2010, and/or that further
evidence as requested herein be submitted to the Panel for consideration and
clarification.
III.

The Board erred in affirming the ALJ's order which required CBM
and State Farm to pay medical benefits for Antonio's left knee condition
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because the ALJ abused her discretion by overruling CBM/State
Farm's objections to the Medical Panel Report dated December 10,
2010.
In the ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated
February 23, 2011, the ALJ agreed that "a significant medical issue existed as to
the medical cause of (Antonio's) left knee condition requiring referral to a
Commission medical panel for evaluation." R., page 153. As a result, CBM/State
Farm's objections to the Medical Panel Report were directed at the heart of the
principal evidence upon which the ALJ based her decision.
When CBM and State Farm objected to the Medical Panel Report, they
pointed out that the Panel's report did not contain any reference to the unrefuted,
significant evidence regarding Antonio's lack of left knee pain leading up to the
February 12, 2009 incident (as backed by Dr. Brown's January 16, 2011 report and
Antonio's testimony). As noted above, this occurred because the ALJ failed to
provide this pivotal information to the Panel in her Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Interim Order dated August 25, 2010. For this reason, CBM and State
Farm argued that the Panel's report did not constitute relevant, reliable and
probable medical evidence and because it assumed facts not in evidence and lacked
foundation.
As noted in Hymas v. Labor Commission, 200 P.3d 218, 220 (Utah App.
2008), the Commission's determination constitutes an abuse of discretion if it
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"exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Also see Salt Lake County
v. Labor Commission, 208 P.3d 1087, 1090 (Utah App. 2009). "The court's
discretion is not unlimited," and "a court's ruling must be based on adequate
findings of fact and on the law." Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277, 279 (Utah 2000).
Here, the ALJ overruled CBM/State Farm's objections to the Medical Panel
Report and specifically found that "the panel also had all the factual finding(s) to
consider in rendering their opinion so (they) could consider the mechanism of
injury of all the accidents to render their opinion." R., page 153. In her Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated February 23, 2011, the ALJ
dismissed CBM/State Farm's objections by noting that "(CBM/State Farm) also
submitted excerpts from (Antonio's) deposition. However, the time to address
such issues was at the evidentiary hearing when (Antonio) gave testimony if it was
inconsistent with his hearing testimony." R., page 151. Clearly, CBM and State
Farm addressed these issues at the hearing with Antonio's hearing testimony. See
excerpts of Antonio's hearing testimony, supra. Antonio's deposition testimony
was completely consistent with his hearing testimony. Therefore, CBM and State
Farm did not need to submit his deposition testimony at the hearing, and the ALJ
already had this evidence available to her for inclusion in her findings of fact to
provide to the Panel. CBM/State Farm's submission of Antonio's deposition
testimony in their objection was simply illustrative of the unrefiited nature of
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Antonio's testimony at hearing.
Instead of sustaining the objection, the ALJ used the Panel's report in
determining that the January 20, 2008 work injury (and not the February 12, 2009
industrial accident) was the cause of Antonio's left knee condition after February
12, 2009. At a minimum, the ALJ should have scheduled a hearing to clarify the
Panel's report or submit the omitted evidence to the Panel for consideration and
clarification as allowed under Utah Code §34A-2-601(l)(f)(i) and R602-2-2(B).
Instead, she accepted the deficient Medical Panel Report and, predicating her order
predominately on this report, ruled that the February 12, 2009 incident did not
cause Antonio's continuing left knee problems. By overruling CBM/State Farm's
objections and by primarily utilizing the Panel's report to support her February 23,
2011 order, the ALJ's ultimate determination that CBM and State Farm were
responsible for Antonio's medical treatment was clearly flawed.
In overruling CBM/State Farm's objections to the Medical Panel Report in
this manner, the ALJ exceeded the bounds of reasonableness and rationality
thereby abusing her discretion in this regard because the evidence she refused to
provide to the Panel was unrefuted hearing testimony presented by Antonio
himself

The ALJ's abuse of her discretion was prejudicial to CBM and State

Farm because the Panel may have reached a different decision had the ALJ
provided all of the information to the Panel as noted in the objections to the
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Medical Panel Report. Because the ALJ admitted the Panel's report without
supplementing the evidence provided to the Panel as allowed by Utah Code §34A2-601(l)(f)(i) and R602-2-2(B), the ALJ largely predicated her ultimate award of
medical benefits against CBM and State Farm on an incomplete analysis by the
Panel.
For these reasons, CBM and State Farm request that the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order dated February 23, 2011 be set aside, that
CBM/State Farm's objections to the Medical Panel Report dated December 10,
2010 be sustained, that the ALJ's order requiring CBM and State Farm to pay for
Antonio's medical expenses with interest be reversed, that a hearing be ordered to
clarify the Medical Panel Report dated December 10, 2010, and/or that further
evidence as requested herein be submitted to the Panel for consideration and
clarification.
IV.

The Board erred in affirming the ALJ's order which required CBM
and State Farm to pay medical benefits for Antonio's left knee condition
because the ALJ violated State Farm/CBM's due process rights by
overruling their objections to the Medical Panel Report dated December
10,2010.
In Color Country Management v. Labor Commission, 38 P.3d 969 (Utah

App. 2001), the court instituted a three factor analysis in determining whether a
party's due process rights had been violated by the Commission's actions. These
three factors involved an analysis of: 1) the private interest affected by the official
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action; 2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest by the procedures used
and the probable value of additional or substitute procedural protections; 3) the
governmental interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens of additional or substitute procedures. Id. at 976.
Regarding the first factor, the court in Color Country Management reasoned
that, because the private interest affected by the official action involved the
employer/insurer who had "a vested right in property it already holds, not merely
an expectation of being able to receive something in the future," this factor applied.
Id. at 977. Like the employer/insurer in Color Country Management, CBM/State
Farm hold such a vested right (in the benefits ordered by the ALJ to be paid by
CBM/State Farm), and therefore, the first factor is satisfied in this case.
The second factor deals with "procedures that are available to ensure
accurate decision making by the Commission." Id. These include: a requirement
that the Commission afford parties the opportunity to present evidence, argue,
respond, conduct cross-examination, submit rebuttal evidence, present recorded
testimony under oath, engage in discovery, and receive written orders with findings
of fact, conclusions of law, agency review, agency reconsideration, appellate
judicial review, and the right to seek a stay of orders. Id. Because the ALJ, after
overruling CBM/State Farm's objections to the Medical Panel Report, failed to
order a hearing to clarify the Medical Panel Report dated December 10, 2010
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and/or submit further evidence to the Panel for consideration and clarification [as
allowed by Utah Code §34A-2-601(l)(f)(i) and Rule 602-2-2(B)], CBM and State
Farm were directly deprived of their opportunity to present evidence, argue,
respond, conduct cross-examination, submit rebuttal evidence, present recorded
testimony under oath, engage in discovery, and receive written orders with findings
of fact, conclusions of law, agency review, agency reconsideration, appellate
judicial review, and the right to seek a stay of orders regarding the merits of
Antonio's claim. Here, there was erroneous deprivation of these procedures, and
the value of a further hearing on the merits concerning the Panel's report and/or
presentation for further evidence to the Panel is clear. In the absence of the full
adversarial process, "accurate decision making by the Commission" was surely
compromised. As a result, the second factor applies in this matter.
As for the third factor, the benefit of safeguarding CBM and State Farm who
were adversely affected by the ALJ's decision to overrule their objections to the
Medical Panel Report dated December 10, 2010 without ordering a hearing to
clarify the Medical Panel Report and/or submitting further evidence to the Panel
for consideration and clarification [as allowed by Utah Code §34A-2-601(l)(f)(i)
and Rule 602-2-2(B)] is not outweighed by the cost of requiring further
administrative proceedings. In this case, CBM and State Farm were completely
deprived of their ability to present legitimate, unrefuted evidence to the Panel in
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the face of the ALJ's determination that "the panel also had all the factual
finding(s) to consider in rendering their opinion so (they) could consider the
mechanism of injury of all the accidents to render their opinion."

This

determination was simply not accurate and could have been suitably remedied by
providing to the Panel the complete information as provided by Antonio in his
unrefuted hearing testimony. As it stands, the Panel was left with the impression
as stated in their report that the February 12, 2009 incident was "minor" and that
the injection on February 9, 2009 provided pain relief the day after it was
administered. This is a far cryfromAntonio's unrefuted hearing testimony that the
February 9,2009 injection caused his left knee pain to completely go away leading
up to the time of the February 12, 2009 incident, and that when the February 12,
2009 incident occurred, Antonio's pain significantly increased to a pain level of 78. Based on this highly important evidence, the impact of the incident on February
12, 2009 on Antonio's left knee was so pronounced that Antonio suffered an
increase of pain level from zero to 7-8 despite the injection's absolute numbing
effect. If the Panel had been fairly and accurately apprised of this information,
then they may not have concluded that the February 12, 2009 incident was minor
and only a temporary exacerbation, and may have reasonably determined that
Antonio experienced a new injury to his left knee on February 12, 2009. The ALJ
should have given the Panel the opportunity to consider this. By failing to allow
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this, the ALJ substantially prejudiced CBM and State Farm by her erroneous
application of the law. Olson v. Labor Commission, 249 P.3d 586, 590 (Utah App.
2011); Color County Management, supra at 972.
Consequently, CBM and State Farm's due process rights have been violated
by the ALJ's decision to overrule their objections to the Medical Panel Report
dated December 10, 2010 without ordering a hearing to clarify the Medical Panel
Report and/or submitting further evidence to the Panel for consideration and
clarification [as allowed by Utah Code §34A-2-601(l)(f)(i) and Rule 602-2-2(B)].
For these reasons, CBM and State Farm request that the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order dated February 23, 2011 be set aside, that
CBM/State Farm's objections to the Medical Panel Report dated December 10,
2010 be sustained, that the ALJ's order requiring CBM and State Farm to pay for
Antonio's medical expenses with interest be reversed, that a hearing be ordered to
clarify the Medical Panel Report dated December 10, 2010, and/or that further
evidence as requested herein be submitted to the Panel for consideration and
clarification.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, CBM and State Farm request that the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated February 23, 2011 be set aside, that the
ALJ's order requiring CBM and State Farm to pay for Antonio's medical expenses
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with interest be reversed, that CBM/State Farm's objections to the Medical Panel
Report dated December 10, 2010 be sustained, that a hearing be ordered to clarify
the Medical Panel Report dated December 10,2010, and/or that further evidence as
requested herein be submitted to the Panel for consideration and clarification.
Respectfully submitted this L\~~ day of December, 2011.
RUEGSEGGER SIMONS SMITH & STERN, LLC

Jeff Francis, (#11370)
743 Horizon Court, Suite 103
Grand Junction, CO 81506
Telephone: 970.263.0500
Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellants
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FILED

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

UTAH APPELLATE COURT

JAN - 3 2012
CERTIFIED BUILDING
MAINTENANCE and STATE
FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY
COMPANY,
Petitioners/Appellants,
SUPPLEMENT TO BRIEF OF THE
APPELLANTS

vs.
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION,
APPEALS BOARD OF THE UTAH
LABOR COMMISSION, ENRIQUE
ANTONIO, and WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND,

Appellate Case No. 20110549-CA
Agency Decision No. 09-0811
Carrier No. 44-W200-227

Respondents/Appellees.

Petitioners/Appellants Certified Building Maintenance and State Farm Fire
and Casualty Company, by their attorneys, Ruegsegger Simons Smith & Stern,
LLC, file their Supplement to Brief of the Appellants as follows:
1.

On December 29, 2011, Petitioners/Appellants Certified Building

Maintenance ("CBM") and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company ("State Farm")
mailed their Brief of the Appellants in Support of Petition for Review to the Utah
Court of Appeals and all parties. The Utah Court of Appeals and the parties
received the Brief of the Appellants on December 30, 2011. The filing deadline
for the Brief of the Appellants is January 3,2012.
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2.

In the Conclusion sections of the Brief of the Appellants on pages 17,

22, 26, 30, and 31, CBM and State Farm ask, in addition to the relief requested for
all issues, that the portion of the Order on Motion for Review and Order of
Remand of the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission dated May 31, 2011
(R., pages 181-185) which affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's award of
medical benefits against CBM and State Farm be reversed for all of the reasons
provided in the Brief of the Appellants.
3.

CBM and State Farm incorporate this Supplement to Brief of the

Appellants as part of their Brief of the Appellants.
4.

This Supplement adds 501 words to the Brief of the Appellants for a

total of 8,604 words and otherwise complies with Rule 24(f)(1).
Respectfully submitted this J°

day of December, 2011.

RUEGSEGGER SIMONS SMITH & STERN, LLC

BV:<|ft3Sr;

^

Jeff Francis, (#11370)
743 Horizon Court, Suite 103
Grand Junction, CO 81506
Telephone: (970) 263-0500
Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have served the foregoing SUPPLEMENT TO
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANTS by overnight mail, regular mail, and/or
facsimile on this 3^>^day of December, 2011, addressed to the following:
Utah Court of Appeals
1 Ryan L. Andrus, Esq.
Workers Compensation Fund
Appellate Clerks' Office
450 South State, Fifth Floor
100 West Towne Ridge Parkway
Sandy, UT 84070
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230
Via facsimile: 385.351.8038
Via facsimile: 801.578.3999
Via overnight mail (original and 7 Via overnight mail (2 copies)
copies)
1 Alan Hennebold, Esq.
Utah Labor Commission
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
P.O. Box 146600
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6600
Via facsimile: 801.530.6390
Via overnight mail (2 copies)

Ms. Rhonda Norris
1
State Farm Fire and Casualty
Company
P.O. Box 339410
Greeley, CO 80633
Via facsimile: 800.811.2358
Via regular mail

1 Mark J. Sanchez, Esq.
4543 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Via facsimile: 801.303.7330
Via overnight mail (2 copies)

Mr. Jason Moyes
Certified Building Maintenance
27 S. Main Street
Layton, UT 84041
Via facsimile: 801.546.8238
Via regular mail
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have served the foregoing BRIEF OF THE
APPELLANTS IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REVIEW WITH
ADDENDUM by overnight or regular mail on this 9 ^ ^ a v of December, 2011,
addressed to the following:
Utah Court of Appeals
Appellate Clerks' Office
450 South State, Fifth Floor
1 Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230
Via overnight mail (original and 7
copies)

Ryan L. Andrus, Esq.
Workers Compensation Fund
100 West Towne Ridge Parkway
Sandy, UT 84070
Via overnight mail (2 copies)

Alan Hennebold, Esq.
Utah Labor Commission
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
P.O. Box 146600
1 Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6600
Via overnight mail (2 copies)

Ms. Rhonda Norris
State Farm Fire
Company
P.O. Box 339410
Greeley, CO 80633
Via regular mail

Mark J. Sanchez, Esq.
4543 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Via overnight mail (2 copies)

and Casualty

Mr. Jason Moyes
Certified Building Maintenance
27 S. Main Street
Layton, UT 84041
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Westlaw.
Page 1
821 P.2d 1
(Cite as: 821 P.2d 1)

Court of Appeals of Utah.
Roberta N. ADAMS, Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW OF the INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION, Workers' Compensation Fund of
Utah, and Unicorp, Respondents.
No. 900597-CA.
Nov. 5,1991.
Workers' compensation claimant sought judicial review of decision of Industrial Commission
denying her benefits as result of her alleged repetitive motion syndrome. The Court of Appeals, Bench
, P.J., held that Industrial Commission did not sufficiently indicate factual basis for its decision merely
by summarizing contradictory evidence presented,
without in any way indicating which evidence it
found to be more credible, and stating in conclusory
terms that preponderance of medical evidence established that claimants symptoms were not work
related.
Vacated and remanded.
West Headnotes

required no deference to Commission. U.C.A.1953,
63-46b-16(4).
[2] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A € ^
486
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative Agencies, Officers and Agents
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications
15Ak484 Findings
15Ak486 k. Sufficiency. Most Cited
Cases
Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 0^*488
15 A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative Agencies, Officers and Agents
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications
15Ak488 L Conclusions. Most Cited Cases
Administrative agency must make findings of
fact and conclusions of law that are adequately detailed to permit meaningful appellate review.
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[3] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A C ^
486

II] Workers' Compensation 413 ©^>1939.1
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact,
Findings, and Verdict
413kl939 Review of Decision of Department, Commission, Board, Officer, or Arbitrator
413kl939.1 k. In General; Questions of Law or Fact. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 413kl939)
Question of whether Industrial Commission's
findings were sufficiently detailed to permit meaningful appellate review was legal determination that

15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative Agencies, Officers and Agents
15A1V(D) Hearings and Adjudications
15 Ak484 Findings
15Ak486 k. Sufficiency. Most Cited
Cases
Administrative agency's failure to disclose specific subsidiary finding may or may not be fatal to
agency's decision, where agency's findings reveal
steps taken by agency in reaching its decision.
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
14] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A C^?
484,1
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15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative Agencies, Officers and Agents
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications
15Ak484 Findings
15Ak484.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 15Ak484)
Administrative finding may be implied if it is
clear from record on review that finding was actually made as part of administrative tribunal's decision; however, reviewing court may not simply
assume that any undisclosed finding was in fact
made. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[5] Administrative Law and Procedure ISA €=>
750
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(D) Scope of Review in General
15Ak750 k. Burden of Showing Error.
Most Cited Cases
Party wishing to defend administrative
agency's decision must carry burden of showing
that any undisclosed findings were actually made.
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[6] Workers' Compensation 413 €^>1741
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial
413XVI(P)6 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by Board, Commission, or Court
413kl737 Form, Contents, and Sufficiency
413kl741 k. Recital of Evidence.
Most Cited Cases
Industrial Commission did not satisfy its obligation to make sufficiently detailed findings of fact
to permit meaningful appellate review, where Commission merely set forth competing diagnoses
without in any way indicating which diagnoses it
found to be more credible and stated in conclusory

terms that preponderance of medical evidence did
not establish that claimant's symptoms were causally connected to job. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[7] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A £=>
486
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15A1V Powers and Proceedings of Administrative Agencies, Officers and Agents
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications
15Ak484 Findings
15Ak486 k. Sufficiency. Most Cited
Cases
Administrative bodies may not rely upon findings that contain only ultimate conclusions.
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[8] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A €=^
486
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative Agencies, Officers and Agents
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications
15 Ak484 Findings
15Ak486 k. Sufficiency. Most Cited
Cases
Mere summary of contradictory evidence
presented at administrative hearing does not constitute "findings of fact" sufficient to permit judicial
review; administrative agency must indicate what it
determines in fact occurred, and not merely what
the contradictory evidence indicates might have occurred. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4).
[9] Workers* Compensation 413 €=>1939.5
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact,
Findings, and Verdict
413kl939 Review of Decision of Department, Commission, Board, Officer, or Arbitrator
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413kl939.5 k. Conflicting Evidence. Most Cited Cases
It is responsibility of administrative law judge
in workers' compensation proceeding to resolve
factual conflicts. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[10] Workers1 Compensation 413 €=>1740
413 Workers1 Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial
413XV1(P)6 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by Board, Commission, or Court
413kl737 Form, Contents, and Sufficiency
413kl740 k. Opinion or Reasons.
Most Cited Cases
Workers' Compensation 413 C^>1744
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial
413XVI(P)6 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by Board, Commission, or Court
413kl737 Form, Contents, and Sufficiency
413kl744 k. Ultimate or Evidentiary Facts. Most Cited Cases
To address errors claimed by workers' compensation claimant in decision of Industrial Commission, Court of Appeals had to have findings that
indicated respectively the issues decided, the legal
interpretations and applications made, and the subsidiary factual findings in support of Industrial
Commission's decision. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[11] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^1738
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial
413XVI(P)6 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by Board, Commission, or Court
413kl737 Form, Contents, and Sufficiency

413kl738 k. In General Most Cited
Cases
To satisfy its statutory obligation to make findings of fact sufficiently detailed to permit meaningful appellate review, Industrial Commission, at
minimum, had to identify medical condition from
which claimant was suffering, and to give some explanation, factual or legal, as to how claimant failed
to prove causation. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4).
[12] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^1366
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(L) Presumptions and Burden of Proof
413XVI(L)2 Particular Matters
413kl356 Injuries or Death for Which
Compensation May Be Had
413kl366 k. Aggravation or Acceleration of Previously Impaired Condition. Most
Cited Cases
Workers' compensation claimant with preexisting medical condition must prove both legal and
medical causation.
[13] Workers' Compensation 413 €^1738
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVi(P) Hearing or Trial
413XVI(P)6 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by Board, Commission, or Court
413kl737 Form, Contents, and Sufficiency
413kl738 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Court of Appeals is unable to assume that any
given finding was in fact made by Industrial Commission, where multiple conflicting versions of
facts create matrix of possible factual findings.
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4).
[141 Administrative Law and Procedure 15A
€^>816
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ISA Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
i 5 AV(F) Determination
15Ak816 k. Annulment, Vacation or Setting Aside of Administrative Decision. Most Cited
Cases
Administrative agency's failure to make sufficiently detailed findings of fact to permit meaningful appellate review does not necessarily require
vacation of order complained of, if agency's error
has not substantially prejudiced petitioner.
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[15] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A
€=>749
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(D) Scope of Review in General
15Ak749 k. Presumptions. Most Cited
Cases
When considering error that is strictly of administrative agency's own making, such as failing
to make adequate findings, any doubt about whether petitioner was prejudiced is resolved in petitioner's favor. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[16] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A
€=^784.1
15 A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15 Ak784 Fact Questions
15Ak784.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 15Ak784)
There is substantial prejudice inherent in
agency's failure to make adequate factual findings,
when evidence is not clear and uncontroverted.
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[17] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A

€>=>485
15 A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative Agencies, Officers and Agents
15 AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications
15 Ak484 Findings
15Ak485 k. Necessity and Purpose.
Most Cited Cases
Complete, accurate, and consistent findings of
fact are essential to proper determination by administrative agency. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[18] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A
€==>485
15 A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative Agencies, Officers and Agents
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications
15Ak484 Findings
15Ak485 k. Necessity aind Purpose.
Most Cited Cases
Factual findings are integral part of logical process that administrative tribunal must go through in
reaching a decision. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[19] Workers' Compensation 413 €=>1939.2
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact,
Findings, and Verdict
413k 1939 Review of Decision of Department, Commission, Board, Officer, or Arbitrator
413kl939.2 k. Review of Fact
Questions in General. Most Cited Cases
Any doubt as to whether workers' compensation claimant was prejudiced by Industrial Commission's failure to make adequate factual findings supporting its denial of benefits would be resolved in
claimant's favor in case in which evidence was not
clear and uncontroverted. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16
(4).
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[20] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A
€=^816

by its new findings and conclusions of law.
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).

15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(F) Determination
15Ak816 k. Annulment, Vacation or Setting Aside of Administrative Decision. Most Cited
Cases
As general rule, appropriate relief for agency's
failure to make adequate findings is to vacate order
complained of and to order agency to make more
adequate findings in support of, and more folly articulate reasons for, die determination which it
made. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).

*3 Linda M. Barclay (argued), Howard, Lewis &
Petersen, Provo, for petitioner.

[21] Workers' Compensation 413 €=>1935
413 Workers' Compensation
413XV1 Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XV1(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)12 Scope and Extent of Review in General
413kl935 k. Presumptions and Burden
of Showing Error. Most Cited Cases
Absent adequate findings, there is no presumption that Industrial Commission's decision denying
workers' compensation benefits was correct
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[22] Workers' Compensation 413 €^>1951
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)13 Determination and Disposition of Proceeding
413kl951 k. Further Proceedings Before Board, Commission, or Trial Court Most Cited
Cases
Upon vacation of Industrial Commission's order denying workers' compensation benefits, based
on Commission's failure to make adequate findings
in support of its decision, Commission was free to
deny benefits or grant benefits as might be dictated

Richard Sumsion (argued), Salt Lake City, for
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah.
Benjamin J. Simms, Salt Lake City, for Industrial
Com'n of Utah.
Before BENCH, P J , and GREENWOOD, and
ORME, JJ.
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
Petitioner Roberta Adams seeks review of the
Industrial Commission's decision to deny her benefits under the Utah Occupational Disease Disability
Law, Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-2-1 to -65 (1988). We
vacate the Commission's order.
FACTS
Adams worked as a telemarketer for Unicorp.
Her duties consisted primarily of dialing telephone
numbers and talking on the telephone while sitting
at a desk. She was not equipped with a headset or
any type of automatic dialing equipment. She was
required to dial manually and hold the receiver to
her ear and mouth. After working at Unicorp for
approximately one year, Adams left Unicorp to
seek medical attention for debilitating pain she
claimed had developed gradually as a result of her
employment. In general, Adams now claims that
the repetitive motion of calling on a manual phone
and holding the phone to her mouth and ear caused
her neck pain, neck stiffness, muscle spasm, pain in
her right arm and shoulder, a "pins and needles"
sensation and numbness in her right shoulder and
arm, and fatigue.
When Adams informed her supervisor of her
pain, he referred her to his chiropractor, Dr. Robert
Pope, for treatment. Dr. Pope examined her and
diagnosed her as having "cervico-brachial syn-
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drome, carpal tunnel syndrome, myofascitis, and
brachial neuralgia." Adams's condition was subsequently described by Dr. Pope as "repetitive motion syndrome." Dr. Pope also indicated that he believed there was a very high probability that
Adams's condition resulted from her job duties.
Adams then began to see another chiropractor,
Dr. Arnold Otterson, whose office was closer to her
home. Dr. Otterson diagnosed Adams as having
acute traumatic cervico-brachial syndrome with associated brachial neuralgia. Dr. Otterson likewise
described Adams's condition as repetitive motion
syndrome. He treated.her for several months and
her condition improved. Dr. Otterson indicated to
the Industrial Commission that in his professional
opinion, Adams's "condition was directly related to
her employment due to repetitive use of the phone."
Adams was next seen and evaluated by Dr.
Richard Jackson, an orthopedic surgeon. His evaluation indicated that Adams was suffering from a degenerative C5-6 disc. Inasmuch as Dr. Jackson did
not deal with head and neck problems, he referred
Adams to Dr. Joseph R. Watkins, a neurologist Dr.
Watkins diagnosed Adams as having "work related
cervical strain with some head discomfort and right
shoulder discomfort" and "stress syndrome with
multiple other symptoms, essentially resolved with
resolution of work."
The Workers' Compensation Fund (the Fund)
required Adams to undergo an independent medical!
evaluation by Dr. Edward Spencer. Dr. Spencer observed from the medical records that Adams had
spondylosis of the C4-5 and C5-6 disc with narrowing at the C5-6 level. He also observed a narrowed
L4-5 and L5-S1 disc with osteophyte formation
from L5 at the L5-S1 level. Dr. Spencer diagnosed
Adams as having probable "conversion disorder,"
"chronic cervical and lumbar disc disease," " chondromalacia of the patello-femoral joint," and "
obesity and poor conditioning." He further found
that her major problem was psychological and did
not require any additional medical or surgical treatment for her condition.

The Fund then required Adams to be examined
by Dr. Leonard W. Jarcho, the *4 former head of
the Neurology Department at the University of
Utah. Dr. Jarcho concluded that Adams did not
have any neurological problem that he could identify. He also indicated that he believed that the minimal orthopedic problem was not connected to
Adams's complaints or her prior employment. Dr.
Jarcho described Adams's reactions, activities and
movements during the examination as "strange,"
and concluded that Adams was in need of psychiatric diagnosis and treatment.
As directed by the Fund, Adams was then examined by Dr. David L. McCann, a psychiatrist,
who was assisted by Dr. Leslie M. Cooper, a clinical psychologist. Dr. McCann concluded that Adams
suffered from a personality disorder and did not
have any physical impairment or other problems associated with her employment, but that her complaints were motivated by a desire to obtain compensation.
A hearing was then held where the foregoing
conflicting diagnoses were presented to an administrative law judge (A.L.J.). The A.L.J, denied benefits. Adams appealed the A.L.J.'s decision to the
Commission, which affirmed the decision and adopted the findings and conclusions of the A.L.J, as
its own. Adams now seeks review of the Commission's decision.
Adams presents three claims for our determination: (1) the Commission's findings and conclusions
should be reversed because they are insufficient as
a matter of law, (2) the Commission's factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence, and
(3) her condition constitutes a compensable condition under Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission, 800
P.2d 330 (Utah App.1990) (interpreting Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986)). Inasmuch as we find that the Commission's findings are
insufficient and order additional findings, we do not
address points (2) and (3).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
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Our review of the Commission's denial of benefits is governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). UAPA provides, in relevant
part:
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that
a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:

(h) the agency action is ... (iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1990).
[1] Adams claims that she is entitled to relief
under subsection (h). FNl The question of whether
the Commission's action constitutes arbitrary action
for want of adequate findings is governed by our
determination of whether this court is able to conduct a meaningful review. Whether the findings are
adequate is therefore a legal determination that requires no deference to the Commission.
FNl. Adams also claims the following subsections of section 63-46b-16(4) constitute
grounds for relief:
(c) the agency has not decided all of the
issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied die law;

(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by
the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of
the whole record before the court;
Inasmuch as we reverse the Commission's order because its failure to make
adequate findings constituted arbitrary
action warranting relief under subsection

(h), we need not address the standards of
review for subsections (c), (d), and (g).
ADEQUACY OF FINDINGS
[2] An administrative agency must make findings of fact and conclusions of law that are adequately detailed so as to permit meaningful appellate review.
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of the Commission, the findings must be
"sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached." Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999
(Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P2d
1336 (Utah 1979)).... *5 [T]he failure of an
agency to make adequate findings of fact in material issues renders its findings " arbitrary and
capricious " unless the evidence is "clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one conclusion."
Id. (quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236
(Utah 1983)).
Nyrehn v. Industrial Comm'n, 800 P.2d 330,
335 (Utah App.1990), cert denied, 815 P.2d 241
(Utah 1991) (emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly described
the detail required in administrative findings in order for findings to be deemed adequate.
[An administrative agency] cannot discharge its
statutory responsibilities without making findings
of fact on all necessary ultimate issues under the
governing statutory standards. It is also essential
that [an administrative agency] make subsidiary
findings in sufficient detail that the critical subordinate factual issues are highlighted and resolved
in such a fashion as to demonstrate that there is a
logical and legal basis for the ultimate conclusions. The importance of complete, accurate, and
consistent findings of fact is essential to a proper
determination by an administrative agency. To
that end, findings should be sufficiently detailed
to disclose the steps by which the ultimate factual
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conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact and
law, are reached. See generally, Rucker v. Dalton,
598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). Without such
findings, this Court cannot perform its duty of reviewing [an administrative agency's] order in accordance with established legal principles and of
protecting the parties and the public from arbitrary and capricious administrative action.

the governing rules of law to those findings.... It
is not the prerogative of this Court to search the
record to determine whether findings could have
been made by the Commission to support its order, for to do so would be to usurp the function
with which the Commission is charged.
Mountain States Legal Found, v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 636 P.2d 1047, 1052 (Utah 1981).

Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986)
(emphasis added).

[6] The findings made by the A.LJ. and adopted by the Commission in the present case are inadequate in that they do not disclose the steps taken
by the Commission in reaching its decision to deny
Adams benefits. The Commission's "findings"
amount to the following single conclusory statement as to causation: "The preponderance of medical evidence in this case establishes that the applicant's various listed symptoms are not related to her
work as a telemarketer at Unicorp."

[3][4][5] If agency findings reveal the steps
taken by the agency in reaching its decision, the
failure to disclose a specific subsidiary finding may
or may not be fatal to the agency's decision. A finding may be implied if it is clear from the record,
and therefore apparent upon review, that the finding
was actually made as part of the tribunal's decision.
See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787-788, (Utah
1991).FN2 We may not merely assume, however,
that an undisclosed finding was in fact made. The
party wishing to defend an agency decision must
carry its burden of showing that the undisclosed
finding was actually made.
FN2. In so stating, we acknowledge that
our ruling in Nyrehn, 800 P.2d at 335, a
pre-UAPA case, that material subsidiary
findings may not be implied is limited under UAPA and the supreme court's language in Ramirez. UAPA recognizes the
possibility of implied factual findings. See
section 63-46b-16(4Xg). An agency decision may therefore be upheld under
UAPA despite the absence of express written findings regarding a material fact if the
reviewing court can determine that the material finding was in fact made, although
not expressly written.
For this Court to sustain an order, the findings
must be sufficiently detailed to demonstrate that
the Commission has properly arrived at the ultimate factual findings and has properly applied

[7] Because the Commission concluded that
Adams failed to prove causation, the Commission
denied her benefits. The Commission correctly indicated in its adopted conclusions of law that causation is one of the ultimate factual conclusions that
must *6 be proven by a claimant See, e.g., Allen v.
Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).
However, the Commission's conclusion that Adams
failed to prove causation, without supporting findings, is arbitrary. "Administrative bodies may not
rely upon findings that contain only ultimate conclusions." Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney,
818 P.2d 23, 31 (Utah App.1991). See also Vali
Convalescent & Care Insts. v. Division of Health
Care Financing, 797 P.2d 438, 448 (Utah
App.1990) (statement of ultimate facts alone was
essentially pro forma). Cf Mountain States Legal
Found, 636 P.2d at 1052 ("Ultimate findings ...
must be sustained if there are adequate subordinate
findings to support them"). Given the numerous
legal and factual questions regarding causation in
this case,1™ the Commission's solitary finding
that Adams failed to prove causation does not give
the parties any real indication as to the bases for its
decision and the steps taken to reach it, nor does it

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 9
821 P.2d 1
(Cite as: 821 P.2d 1)
give a reviewing court anything to review.
FN3. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §
35-2-27(28) (1988); Allen v. Industrial
Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).
[8][9] While the purported "Findings of Fact"
written by the A.LJ. contain an informative summary of the evidence presented, such a rehearsal of
contradictory evidence does not constitute findings
of fact. In order for a finding to truly constitute a
"finding of fact," it must indicate what the A.L.J,
determines in fact occurred, not merely what the
contradictory evidence indicates might have occurred. "[I]t is the responsibility of the administrative law judge to resolve factual conflicts." Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P.2d 237, 241 (Utah
1987).
As is apparent in the recitation of the various
diagnoses presented to the A.L.J., the doctors each
had differing explanations for Adams's medical
condition and whether it was caused by her employment. The evidence did not merely indicate two
possible versions of a fact whereby we could conclude that the denial of benefits necessarily indicates that the Commission accepted one version over
another. The evidence shows several possible configurations and degrees of injury and/or disease, if
any, and the causes, if any, thereby creating a matrix of possible factual findings. A mere summary of
the conflicting evidence in this case therefore does
not give a clear indication of the A.L J.'s or the
Commission's view as to what in fact occurred.
Since we cannot even determine why the Commission found there was no causation shown, we
clearly cannot assume that the Commission actually
made any of the possible subsidiary findings. The
findings are therefore inadequate.
[10] In order for this court to address the errors
claimed by Adams, we must have findings that indicate respectively (1) the issues decided, see section 63-46b-16(4Xc); (2) the legal interpretations
and applications made, see section 63-46b-16(4Xd);
and (3) the subsidiary factual findings in support of

the decision, see section 63-46b-16(4)(g). A simple
conclusion that Adams failed to prove medical
causation does not contain any of the foregoing information.
[11] At a minimum, there should have been a
finding in the present case identifying the occupational disease or injury, if any, suffered by Adams.
The Commission could not logically conclude that
Adams's medical condition, if any, was not caused
by her employment without first establishing what
her medical condition was.044 This it failed to do.
The Commission's findings of fact simply do not
"resolve all issues of material fact necessary to justify the conclusions of law and judgment entered
thereon." Parks v. Zions First Nat'l Bank 673 P.2d
590,601 (Utah 1983) (footnote omitted).
FN4. See, e.g„ Nyrehn, 800 P.2d at 335
(error for A.LJ. to apply higher standard
required of applicants with pre-existing
conditions that contributed to the injury
without first finding that the applicant had
a pre-existing condition which contributed
to the injury).
[12] The Commission should have also given
some explanation, factual or legal, as to how
Adams failed to prove causation. *7 An applicant
with a pre-existing condition must prove both legal
and medical causation. See Allen, 729 P.2d at
25-27. The Commission relied upon Allen, but its
findings do not make it clear whether it believed
that Adams failed to prove medical or legal causation. Both issues were apparently involved in this
matter. Inasmuch as our standard of review varies
depending upon whether Adams failed to prove legal or medical causation, the Commission's failure to
identify whether Adams failed to prove legal or
medical causation prevents us from reviewing that
conclusion.
[13] When multiple conflicting versions of the
facts create a matrix of possible factual findings,
we are unable on appeal to assume that any given
finding was in fact made. See, e.g., Carlton v.
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Carlton, 756 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah App.1988) (finding
giving only a lump sum total valuation of all marital property was inadequate to permit review of disputed valuations of individual marital assets). Because of the matrix of factual possibilities in the
present case, we are unable to conduct a meaningful
review. We therefore hold that the Commission's
denial of benefits based upon a solitary finding regarding the ultimate issue of causation fails "to disclose the steps by which the ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact and law, are
reached," id, and therefore renders the action arbitrary.
PREJUDICE
[14][15] Our conclusion that the Commission
acted arbitrarily by failing to enter adequate findings and legal conclusions does not end our inquiry,
however. As required by section 63-46b-16(4), the
agency's error must "substantially prejudice" the
petitioner before we may grant relief. The Utah Supreme Court recently indicated in Morton International, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d
581, 584-585 (Utah 1991), that the substantial prejudice language in section 63-46b-16(4) prevents an
appellate court from granting relief if an agency error is harmless. The supreme court defined harmless error as being an error "sufficiently inconsequential that ... there is no reasonable likelihood
that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Id We also note that when considering an error that is strictly of the agency's own making, such
as failing to make adequate findings, any doubt
about whether a petitioner was prejudiced is resolved in the petitioner's favor. Angell v. Board of
Review of Indus. Comm'n, 750 P.2d 611, 613 (Utah
App.1988).
[16][17][18] We recognize as a matter of law
the substantial prejudice inherent in the failure to
make adequate findings when the evidence is not
clear and ^incontroverted. Nyrehn, 800 P.2d at 335.
"The importance of complete, accurate, and consistent findings of fact is essential to a proper determination by an administrative agency." Milne

Truck Lines, 720 P.2d at 1378. The findings are an
integral part of the logical process a tribunal must
go through in reaching a decision. See, e.g, Allred
v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1114 (Utah App.1990)
(final determination to be supported by adequate
findings "made in the course of employing" the
analytical approach established by the court on appeal). Cf Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1372
(Utah 1988) ("trial court must make adequate findings and conclusions demonstrating that it has considered [relevant] factors" (emphasis added)). Once
an administrative agency attempts to state its findings, identify the applicable law, and articulate its
logic, it may discover that critical facts are not
properly before it,™5 that the law is other *8 than
anticipated, or that its initial logic is flawed. In
such situations, a result contrary to the initial conclusions of the body may be dictated. The process
of articulation clearly enhances agency selfdiscipline and protects against arbitrary and capricious decisions. Without the safeguard of adequate
findings, there is no guarantee that the agency followed a logical process in reaching its decision. If,
on the other hand, the agency identifies the facts,
law, and reasoning supporting its decision, it reveals its logical process and the parties can be assured that a logical process occured, even if it is in
some manner flawed.
FN5. We recognize that an administrative
agency may hear evidence that is legally
inadmissible under the technical rules of
evidence; under the "residuum rule,"
however, its findings of fact cannot be
based exclusively on such inadmissible
evidence. "They must be supported by a
residuum of legal evidence competent in a
court of law." Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor
Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 1984)
. See also Mayes v. Department of Employment Sec, 754 P.2d 989, 992 n. 1 (Utah
App.1988) (explaining inconsistent standards for admitting evidence and relying
upon evidence admitted). The process of
articulating the critical facts gives an ad-
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ministrative agency pause to ascertain
what evidence it may properly rely upon to
make such findings in light of the residuum rule. See, eg, Tolman, at 31-32 (at a
minimum, issues regarding admissibility of
evidence should have been addressed in
the findings).
If an agency's logical process is flawed, its
shortcomings can be corrected on review, but only
if the agency creates findings revealing the evidence upon which it relies, the law upon which it relies, and its interpretation of the law. Absent adequate findings, a petitioner wishing to challenge
an agency's factual findings will not be able to marshal the evidence in support of the findings. See
generally Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of
the Indus. Comm'n, 776 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah
App.1989) (party challenging factual findings of
agency must marshal evidence in support of such
finding and show that it is not substantial). Nor will
a petitioner be able to challenge the agency's undeclared interpretation of the law or its undisclosed
logic. See, e.g, State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767,
771 n. 11 (Utah App.1990) (trial court's failure to
make adequate findings "placed appellate counsel
at a disadvantage in framing and developing their
arguments on appeal").
[19] If findings are inadequate, this court will
also be unable to effectively and efficiently perform
its duty of review. uTo enable this Court to determine whether an order is arbitrary and capricious, the
Commission must make findings of fact that are
sufficiently detailed to apprise the parties and the
Court of the basis for the Commission's decision."
Mountain States Legal Found, 636 P.2d at 1051
(citations omitted). While these disadvantages may
not be reflected in the initial outcome of the hearing
below, they directly affect the ultimate outcome of
the matter on review and are therefore relevant to
the question of prejudice. It is axiomatic that the
denial of Adams's claim without the possibility of
meaningful review by this court, as provided for by
UAPA, is clearly prejudicial.

The Fund has not established that the Commission's failure to make adequate findings of fact and
conclusions of law was harmless as defined in Morton International, at 584-585. ™* We therefore resolve any doubt in Adams's favor and hold that
Adams was prejudiced by the Commission's failure
to make adequate factual findings and legal conclusions.
FN6. It is possible in some cases that the
failure to make adequate findings is nevertheless harmless. See, e.g, Nyrehn, 800
P.2d at 335 (failure to make findings necessary to determine whether a higher legal
standard should be applied before applying
the higher standard was harmless error
when the undisputed facts of the case satisfied the higher standard). Cf Olson v.
Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566-67 (Utah 1985)
(even though findings were inadequate as
to financial needs of wife, no remand was
necessary because even accepting the
wife's evidence as true, there was no abuse
of discretion by trial court).
RELIEF
[20][21][22] As a general rule, the appropriate
relief for an agency's failure to make adequate findings is to vacate the order complained of and to order the agency to "make more adequate findings in
support of, and more fully articulate [the] reasons
for, the determination ... made." Vali Convalescent
& Care Insts., 191 P.2d at 450. However, as we
have acknowledged herein, absent adequate findings there is no presumption that the Commission's
decision is correct. The process of articulation may
or may not cause the Commission to reach a different decision. Since we vacate the Commission's order denying benefits, it is free to deny benefits or
grant benefits as may be dictated by its new findings of fact and conclusions of law.™7
FN7. We express no opinion on the merits
of Adams's remaining claims inasmuch as
they may be resolved by the Commission's
entry of adequate findings. Her remaining
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claims are best left for another day.
*9 CONCLUSION
We vacate the Commission's order denying
Adams benefits and direct the Commission to produce adequate findings of fact and conclusions of
law and enter a new order.
GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ., concur.
UtahApp.,1991.
Adams v. Board of Review of Indus. Com'n
821 P.2d 1
END OF DOCUMENT
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[2] Workers' Compensation 413 €=>1338
Court of Appeals of Utah.
AE CLEVITE, INC. and Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company, Petitioners,
v.
LABOR COMMISSION and Charles Tjas, Respondents.
No.990218-CA.
Feb. 10,2000.
Employer and its insurer sought review of Utah
Labor Commission decision awarding workers1
compensation benefits for an at-home injury. The
Court of Appeals, Wilkins, J., held that: (1) as general proposition, workers' compensation statute applies to "work at home" situations if injuries arise
out of and in die course of employment, and (2) injuries to claimant, a salesperson who used personal
residence as his base of operations, in fall on icy
driveway that he was salting in anticipation of delivery of work-related materials arose out of and in
course of employment.
Affirmed.

413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(L) Presumptions and Burden of Proof
413XVI(L)1 In General
413kl338 k. Presumptions in general.
Most Cited Cases
Court of Appeals resolves any doubt respecting
the right to workers' compensation in favor of the
injured employee. U.C.A.1953,34A-2-401.
13] Workers' Compensation 413 0 = : > 516
413 Workers' Compensation
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May
Be Had
413Vffl(A) Nature and Character of Physical
Harm
413Vin(A)lInGeneral
413k516 k. Necessity that injury be accidental in general. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 413k553)
Workers' Compensation 413 C=>604

West Headnotes
[1] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A €==>
754.1
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(D) Scope of Review in General
15Ak754 Discretion of Administrative
Agency
15Ak754.1 k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
When the Legislature has granted an agency
discretion to determine an issue, Court of Appeals
reviews the agency's action for reasonableness.
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16.

413 Workers' Compensation
413VIU Injuries for Which Compensation May
Be Had
413VIII(C) Injuries Arising Out of and in
Course of Employment in General
413k604 k. In general. Most Cited Cases
Workers' Compensation 413 0=^1421
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
413XVI(N)1 In General
413kl421 k. Preponderance of evidence. Most Cited Cases
To qualify for workers' compensation benefits,
employee must suffer injury caused by accident,
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and, in addition, prove by preponderance of evidence both that accident occurred in the course of
employment and that accident arose out of employment. U.C. A. 1953, 34A-2-401 (1998).
[4] Workers1 Compensation 413 €=^>714
413 Workers'Compensation
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May
Be Had
413VIII(D) Particular Causes, Circumstances, and Conditions of Injury
413VIII(D)17 Place of Injury with Reference to Plant or Premises of Employer
413k714 k. Outside workers in general. Most Cited Cases
Injuries sustained by salesperson who used personal residence as base of operations, in fall on icy
driveway that he was salting in anticipation of delivery of work-related materials by mail carrier, occurred in the course of employment for woiker's
compensation purposes, even though salesperson
was not performing work-related duty or in an employer-controlled area when injuries occurred.
U.C.A.1953,34A-2-401.
[5J Workers' Compensation 413 ©==>617
413 Workers' Compensation
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May
Be Had
413VIII(C) Injuries Arising Out of and in
Course of Employment in General
413k614 In Course of Employment in
General
413k617 k. What are injuries in course
of employment in general. Most Cited Cases
Accident occurs in the course of employment,
for workers' compensation purposes, when it occurs
while the employee is rendering services to his employer which he was hired to do or doing something
incidental thereto, at the time when and the place
where he was authorized to render such service.
U.CA.1953,34A-2-401.
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413 Workers' Compensation
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May
Be Had
413VIII(C) Injuries Arising Out of and in
Course of Employment in General
413k614 In Course of Employment in
General
413k615 k. In general. Most Cited
An activity is incidental to the employee's employment, for workers' compensation purposes, if it
advances, directly or indirectly, his employer's interests. U.C.A.1953,34A-2-401.
17] Workers' Compensation 413 0=>714
413 Workers'Compensation
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May
Be Had
413VIII(D) Particular Causes, Circumstances, and Conditions of Injury
413VIII(D)17 Place of Injury with Reference to Plant or Premises of Employer
413k714 k. Outside workers in general. Most Cited Cases
Neck injuries suffered by salesperson when he
fell on icy driveway of his personal residence, as he
put down salt in anticipation of mail carrier's arrival
with work-related materials, arose out of employment for worker's compensation purposes, in view
of the "work at home" arrangement between salesperson and employer. U.C.A.1953,34A-2-401.
[8] Workers' Compensation 413 € ^ 7 1 4
413 Workers' Compensation
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May
Be Had
413VIII(D) Particular Causes, Circumstances, and Conditions of Injury
413Vffl(D)17 Place of Injury with Reference to Plant or Premises of Employer
413k714 k. Outside workers in general. Most Cited Cases
As a general proposition, Workers' Compensation Act applies to "work at home" situations when

[61 Workers' Compensation 413 €^>615
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a person sustains an injury by an accident arising
out of and in the course of employment.
U.C.A.1953,34A-2-401.
*1073 Dori K. Petersen and Michael E. Dyer,
Blackburn & Stoll, LC, Salt Lake City, for Petitioners.
Gary E. Atkin and K. Dawn Atkin, Atkin & Anderson, Salt Lake City, for Respondent Tjas.
Alan Hennebold, Salt Lake City, for Respondent
Labor Commission.
Before Judges BILLINGS, DAVIS, and WILKINS.
FNl

FN1. Justice Wilkins heard the arguments
in this case and participated in its resolution prior to his swearing-in as a member
of the Utah Supreme Court.
OPINION
WILKINS, Judge:
T| 1 Petitioners Ae Clevite, Inc., and its insurance carrier, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,
seek review from a final order of the Utah Labor
Commission (Commission) entered on February 26,
1999, awarding Mr. Charles Tjas workers' compensation benefits from an injury occurring at his
home. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
K 2 Neither party disputes the facts of this case.
In its ruling the Commission found that Mr. Tjas
sustained a severe neck injury causing quadriplegia
on January 13, 1997, while spreading salt on the
driveway of his residence. When the injury occurred, Mr. Tjas was employed by Ae Clevite, an
automotive supply company, as a district sales
manager in Utah and several surrounding states.
Because Ae Clevite did not have an office in Salt
Lake City, it authorized Mr. Tjas to use his personal residence in Salt Lake City as a base of opera-

tions for his work. Ae Clevite provided Mr. Tjas
with various office supplies, a car, and frequently
delivered company correspondence and other materials to Mr. Tjas's home by U.S. mail or private
*1074 courier. Part of Mr. Tjas's duties included
making sales calls and performing office work at
home.
] 3 The night before the accident, several
inches of snow fell on Mr. Tjas's steep driveway.
The next morning, Mr. Tjas drove to several local
sales calls but did not clear the snow. Although Mr.
Tjas's son removed the snow later that morning, the
driveway remained icy. After returning home in the
mid-afternoon, Mr. Tjas spent nearly an hour loading his car with material for an upcoming sales trip
and waited for a large package to be delivered in
connection with the business trip. When Mr. Tjas
observed the mailman approaching, he decided to
spread salt on the driveway so the postman could
make his delivery more safely. In doing so,
however, Mr. Tjas slipped on the ice and fell, suffering a severe neck injury.
% 4 Mr. Tjas subsequently filed a claim for
workers1 compensation benefits with the Utah
Labor Commission for his injuries. The Commission's Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded
that Mr. Tjas's injury arose out of and in the course
of his employment and awarded benefits. The
Labor Commission subsequently affirmed the ALJ's
decision awarding Mr. Tjas compensation pursuant
to section 34A-2-401 of the Utah Code. Ae Clevite
and its insurance carrier filed this petition for judicial review.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
T[ 5 This case involves the application of the
Utah Workers' Compensation Act to a "work at
home" situation. Specifically, we consider whether
the Commission erred in determining that Mr.
Tjas's injury "arose out of and in the course of* his
employment with Ae Clevite, thus entitling him to
workers' compensation benefits under Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-2-401 (1997), the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
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[1] T[ 6 The applicable standard of review for a
formal adjudicative hearing is governed by the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). See Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1997); see also Caporoz v.
Labor Comm'n, 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah
Ct.App.1997). "When the Legislature has granted
an agency discretion to determine an issue, we review the agency's action for reasonableness." Caporoz, 945 P.2d at 143; see Cross v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 824 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah
Ct.App.1992) (stating "[w]hen there exists a grant
of discretion, 'we will not disturb the Board's application of its factual findings to the law unless its;
determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality' ") (citation omitted). Absent a
grant of discretion, we use a correction-of-error
standard a 'in reviewing an agency's interpretation
or application of a statutory term.' " Cross, 824
P.2d at 1204 (citation omitted).
[2] % 7 In this case, the Legislature has granted
the Commission discretion to determine the facts
and apply the law to the facts in all cases coming
before it. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 (1997).
¥m
As such, we must uphold the Commission's
determination that Mr. Tjas's injury "arose out of
and in the course o f his employment, unless the
determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality so as to constitute an abuse of
discretion under section 63-46b-16(hXi) of the
UAPA. See Caporoz, 945 P.2d at 143 (indicating
agency has abused its discretion when agency action is unreasonable). Moreover, we resolve "
'[a]ny doubt respecting the right of compensation in
favor of the injured employee.' " Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1997) (citation
omitted).
FN2. This section provides: "The commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the
facts and apply the law in this chapter or
any other title or chapter it administers."
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 (1997).
ANALYSIS

[3] K 8 To qualify for workers' compensation
benefits in Utah, a person must be an employee
who suffers an injury caused by an accident. See
Buczynski v. Industrial Comm'n, 934 P.2d 1169,
1172 (Utah Ct.App.1997). In addition, the employee must prove two essential elements under section
34A-2-401: (1) the accident occurred "in the course
o f the employment, and (2) the accident* 1075
"arose out o f the employment Id™* An employee must prove both elements by a preponderance of
the evidence. See id Petitioners do not dispute that
Mr. Tjas sustained an accidental injury. Rather, petitioners argue that the injury does not satisfy either
of the elements of section 34A-2-401 of the Utah
Code.
FN3. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401(l)
(1997) reads:
Each employee ... who is injured ... by
accident arising out of and in the course
of the employee's employment, wherever
such injury occurred, if the accident was
not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid
compensation for loss sustained on account of die injury ... and such amount
for medical, nurse, and hospital services
and medicines ... as provided in this
chapter.
A. "In the Course o f Employment
[4][5][6] % 9 First, petitioners argue that Mr.
Tjas's injury did not arise "in the course o f his employment because Ae Clevite never requested, directed, encouraged, or reasonably expected Mr. Tjas
to salt his driveway and because Mr. Tjas was not
in an "employer controlled" area when the injury
occurred. Utah courts, however, have recognized
that an employee's injury arises in the course of employment even if these circumstances are not
present. Indeed, "[u]nder Utah law, an accident occurs 'in the course of employment when it 'occurs
while the employee is rendering sendees to his employer which he was hired to do or doing something
incidental thereto, at the time when and the place
where he was authorized to render such service.
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Bitczynski, 934 P.2d at 1172 (citations omitted; emphasis added); see Black v. McDonald's of Layton,
733 P.2d 154, 156 (Utah 1987) (indicating accident
is in scope of employment when it occurs "within
the period of employment, at a place or area where
the employee may reasonably be, and while the employee is engaged in an activity at least incidental
to his employment"); 82 Am.Jur.2d Workers' Compensation § 266 (1992) (same). An activity is
"incidental to the employee's employment if it advances, directly or indirectly, his employer's interests" Black, 733 P.2d at 156 (emphasis added).
% 10 In this case, the Commission concluded
that Mr. Tjas's injury arose in the course of his employment because his efforts to make his driveway
safe for the delivery of work-related materials was
"reasonably incidental" to his work for Ae Clevite.
Specifically, it ruled that the ability of Ae Clevite
to have work-related materials delivered to Mr.
Tjas's home by mail or courier service was an
"integral part of the employment relationship," so
that Mr. Tjas's activity was "reasonably incidental"
to his business. We agree. Although Mr. Tjas was
not performing a work-related duty or in an employer-controlled area when the injury occurred, he
was removing an obstacle which could have impeded his work and was at the location of his regular place of work when the injury occurred. We recognize that Mr. Tjas may have decided to salt the
driveway at some other time for his own non-job
related purposes, yet the fact remains that when he
did, it was in an attempt to remove a hurdle that
could have prevented the delivery of the expected
business package. In other words, Mr. Tjas's act of
salting the driveway was motivated in-part by a
purpose to benefit Ae Clevite and thus was reasonably incidental, rather than tangentially related, to
his employment. As such, the Commission correctly concluded that Mr. Tjas's injuries arose "in
the course o f his employment.
B. "Arising out o f Employment
[7] K 11 Second, petitioners argue that Mr.
Tjas's injury did not "arise out o f his employment

with Ae Clevite. Specifically, petitioners contend
that the injury arose from Mr. Tjas's duty as a
homeowner to maintain his premises, a risk Mr.
Tjas would have been equally exposed to apart
from his employment.
K 12 In Buczynski we stated that in Utah,
[a]n accident arises out of employment when
there is a causal relationship between the injury
and the employment. Arising out of, however,
does not mean that the accident must be caused
by the employment; rather, the employment is
thought of more as a condition out of which the
event arises than as the force producing the event
in affirmative fashion.
*1076 934 P.2d at 1172 (citations and internal
quotations omitted; emphasis in original); see also
82 Am.Jur.2d Workers' Compensation § 269 (1992)
(indicating the "arising out o f requirement must be
satisfied by a showing of "causal connection
between work and injury"; "the injury must have
been one of the risks connected with the employment, flowing therefrom as a natural consequence
and must have been directly connected with the
work").
% 13 Under the facts of this case, we agree with
the Commission that Mr. Tjasfs injury arose from a
risk associated with his work for Ae Clevite due to
the parties1 "work at home" arrangement As such,
we hold the Commission did not err in ruling that
Mr. Tjas's injury arose from his employment with
Ae Clevite.
CONCLUSION
[8] \ 14 As a general proposition, the Workers'
Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401
(1997), applies to "work at home" situations when a
person sustains an injury by an accident "arising
out of and in the course o f the employees employment. Moreover, we hold that under these facts, Mr.
Tjas's injury at his home falls within the category of
compensability under section 34A-2-401 because it
was an injury that arose out of and in the course of
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his employment.
K 15 Affirmed.
U 16 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS,
Judge, and JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge.
Utah App.,2000.
Ae Clevite, Inc. v. Labor Com'n
996 P.2d 1072, 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 2000 UT
App35,4A.L.R.6th723
END OF DOCUMENT
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
COLOR COUNTRY MANAGEMENT dba Sizzler
Restaurant and/or Mid-Century Insurance Company, Petitioner,
v.
LABOR COMMISSION and Nellie Thomas, Respondents.
No.20001019-CA.
Dec. 6,2001.
Employer sought judicial review of Labor
Commission Appeals Board's decision that claimant
had a permanent total disability and that employer's
reemployment plan was insufficient The Court of
Appeals, Davis, J., held that: (1) statute required
Commission to evaluate and approve reemployment
plan; (2) reemployment plan was defective for failure to include subsistence benefits and include the
correct physical work restrictions; (3) employer's
due process rights were not violated by woikers'
compensation procedures; (4) abstract of award
based on interim order was issued in error.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part
West Headnotes
[l] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A O ^
657.1
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(A) In General
15 Ak657 Nature and Form of Remedy
15Ak657.1 k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
Judicial review of final agency actions is governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act.

15 A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15Ak796 k. Law questions in general.
Most Cited Cases
Whether a statute itself is unconstitutional, and
whether the agency interpretation of die statute is
unconstitutional or incorrect, are questions of law
that are reviewed under a correction of error standard.
[31 Appeal and Error 30 C=>842(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(l) k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
Due process challenges are questions of law
(hat are reviewed applying a correction of error
standard
[4] Appeal and Error 30 C=>842(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(l) k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
Construction of a statutory provisions is a
question of law which is reviewed for correctness.
151 Statutes 3610=>181(1)

[2] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A O ^
796
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361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361kl 80 Intention of Legislature
361kl81 In General
361kl81(l) k. In general. Most
Cited Cases
Statutes 361 €==>188
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361kl87 Meaning of Language
361kl88 fc In general. Most Cited
When interpreting statutory provisions, the
Court of Appeals is guided by its primary purpose
of giving effect to the legislative intent, and it first
turns to the plain language of the statute to divine
this intent
16] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^9003
413 Workers' Compensation
413IX Amount and Period of Compensation
413K(D) Other Benefits
413DC(D)3 Rehabilitation and Retraining
Compensation
413k900.3 k. Rehabilitation as affecting eligibility for or amount of benefits. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 413k960)
Workers' compensation statute that required
Labor Commission to review reemployment plan
meant that Commission had to evaluate and approve employer's plan for injured employee; alternative construction would allow employer's to draft
reemployment plan that employee had no chance of
fulfilling and then deny benefits. U.C.A.1953,
35-1-67(1996).
[7J Workers' Compensation 413 €=^9003
413 Workers' Compensation
413IX Amount and Period of Compensation
413DC(D) Other Benefits
413DC(D)3 Rehabilitation and Retraining

Compensation
413k900.3 k. Rehabilitation as affecting eligibility for or amount of benefits. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 413k960)
Reemployment plan for injured worker, submitted to Labor Commission by employer, was defective for failure to include subsistence benefits as
required by statute, and for including physical work
restrictions that did not comply with restrictions
specified by treating physician and incorporated in
permanent total disability order. U.CA.1953,
35-l-67(6XcXii)(1996).
[8] Constitutional Law 92 C=>4186
92 Constitutional Law
92XXVII Due Process
92XXVIl(G) Particular Issues and Applications
92XXVII(G)7 Labor, Employment, and
Public Officials
92k4186 k. Workers' compensation
and employers' liability. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k301(4))
Workers' Compensation 413 C^>1691
413 Workers'Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XV1(P) Hearing or Trial
413XVI(P)1 In General
413kl691 k. Scope and extent; matters
and evidence considered. Most Cited Cases
Workers' compensation claims by injured employee for permanent partial and permanent total
disability benefits did not violate employer's due
process rights, even though claims were not ripe
when they were first made, where Labor Commission had continuing jurisdiction over proceeding,
only temporary total disability benefits were initially awarded and ruling on permanent benefits
was expressly reserved, and employer was not prejudiced by timing of claims for permanent benefits.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14; Const Art. 1, § 1.
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[91 Constitutional Law 92 €=>4186
92 Constitutional Law
92XXVII Due Process
92XXVII(G) Particular Issues and Applications
92XXVII(G)7 Labor, Employment, and
Public Officials
92k4186 k. Workers1 compensation
and employers1 liability. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k301(4))
Workers* Compensation 413 C=^1691
413 Workers' Compensation
413XV1 Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial
413XVI(P)1 In General
413kl691 k. Scope and extent; matters
and evidence considered Most Cited Cases
Employer's due process rights were not violated by procedures employed in workers' compensation claim proceeding and employer had a meaningful opportunity to be heard, where both parties
submitted additional medical and other evidence
and arguments to ALJ after initial hearing without
objection, second ALJ reviewed all the evidence including functional capacity evaluation and independent medical examination, and evidence was before Labor Commission Appeals Board on review.
U.S.C.A. Const Amend 14; Const Art. 1, § 7;
U.C.A.1953,35-1-88 (1996).
[101 Workers' Compensation 413 €=^1167
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVT Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(A) In General
413kll67 k. Proceedings before boards,
commissions, or arbitrators. Most Cited Cases
Although proceedings for woikers' compensation claims are very informal and of their own kind
or class, the proceedings still must satisfy basic notions of fairness.

92 Constitutional Law
92XXVII Due Process
92XXVII(G) Particular Issues and Applications
92XXVII(G)7 Labor, Employment, and
Public Officials
92k4186 k. Workers' compensation
and employers' liability. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k301(4))
Workers' Compensation 413 €=>1305
413 Woikers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(G) Medical Examination
413U305 k. In general. Most Cited Cases
Failure to appoint medical panel to review
evidence in workers' compensation claim proceeding did not violate employer's due process rights,
where appointment of panel is discretionary, and
opinions of medical doctors regarding claimant's injuries and employability were not in conflict.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14; Const Art. I, § 7.
[121 Constitutional Law 92 €=>4186
92 Constitutional Law
92XXVII Due Process
92XXVIl(G) Particular Issues and Applications
92XXVH(G)7 Labor, Employment, and
Public Officials
92k4186 k. Workers* compensation
and employers' liability. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k301(4))
Workers' Compensation 413 0 ^ 3 0
413 Workers' Compensation
4131 Nature and Grounds of Employer's Liabil- ity
413kl2 Constitutionality of Statutes
413k30 k. Payment, enforcement, and disposition of compensation. Most Cited Cases
Employer's right to procedural due process was
not violated by workers' compensation statute gov-

[Ill Constitutional Law 92 €=>4186
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eming awarding disability benefits, even though
employer had vested property interest in monies
paid for compensation benefits and insurance
premiums, and not merely an interest in an expectation of property, where Labor Commission conducts multiple hearings on claims and can reconsider prior rulings due to continuing jurisdiction
over claims, and worker's compensation claimant
had ultimate burden in proving disability. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 14; Const. Art. 1, § 7 U.C.A.1953,
35-1-67(1996).
[13] Workers' Compensation 413 €=>1765
413 Workers1 Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(Q) Award or Judgment
413kl765 k. In general. Most Cited Cases
Abstract of decision providing a benefit award
in workers' compensation proceeding was issued in
error, where order on which abstract was based was
an interim, rather than final order. U.C.A.1953,
34A-2-212.
*970 Carrie T. Taylor and Mark R. Sumsion,
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, Salt Lake City,
for Petitioner.
Aaron J. Prisbrey and Virginius Dabney, Dabney &
Dabney, St George, for Respondents.
Before JACKSON, Associate P.J., and DAVIS and
THORNE,Jr.,JJ.
OPINION
DAVIS, Judge;
\ 1 Color Country Management and Mid Century Insurance Company (collectively Color Country) petition for review of the action of the Labor
Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§
34A-2-801(8) (1997), 63-46b-16 (1997),™ and
Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. ™2
FN1. The Utah Administrative Procedures

Act (UAPA) applies to all administrative
proceedings commenced on or after January 1, 1988. See Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-22(l) (1997); South Davis Cmty.
Hosp. v. Dep't of Health, 869 P.2d 979,
981 (Utah Ct.App.1994). Because any
changes to UAPA during the pendency of
this claim are of no consequence to the disposition of this appeal, we cite to the most
recent version for the sake of convenience.
FN2. Color Country refers to the Commission in its motion for review and
throughout its brief although the decision
under review was issued by the Appeals
Board. A decision of die Appeals Board is
treated as a final order of the Commission
unless set aside by this court See Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-l-303(2XcXii) (1997).
BACKGROUND
\ 2 Because Color Country does not challenge
the Appeals Board's findings of fact,, we recite the
relevant facts from the Board's order on Color
Country's motion for review. See Osman Home
Imp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 958 P2d 240, 241 n. 1
(UtahQ.App.1998).
\ 3 Nellie Thomas was employed by Color
Country at its Sizzler restaurant where she worked
preparing salads and maintaining the salad bar. On
October 15, 1994, Thomas, *971 while taking dirty
dishes from the salad bar to the dish-washing station, slipped in a puddle of greasy water, fell, and
fractured her ulna, dislocated the radial head, and
tore the rotator cuff in her left arm. She also sustained injury to her spine. Thomas had six surgical
procedures over the next few years, including the
attachment of a metal plate in her arm; removal of a
loose screw; a bone graft and reapplication of a dynamic compression plate; surgery on her rotator
cuff; surgical removal of the second plate; a cast on
her arm due to a new fracture through one of the
screw holes; and another surgical procedure to repair yet another fracture with another bone graft,
this one through the callus.
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% 4 On May 15,1997, Thomas filed an application for a hearing regarding her workers1 compensation claim. An administrative law judge (ALJ) held
an evidentiary hearing on January 6, 1998. On
January 8, 1998, the ALJ awarded Thomas temporary total disability benefits of $140 per week and
specifically reserved ruling on permanent partial
and permanent total disability.
\ 5 On June 23, 1998, the same A U issued a
supplemental order, citing a January 20, 1998 report *» by Dr. Scott Smith in which Dr. Smith
gave Thomas a twenty percent whole person
impairment rating based on the problems she had
with her left arm, shoulder, and her neck. The ALJ
awarded Thomas permanent partial disability benefits based on the twenty percent whole person
impairment, with a credit for amounts already paid
by Color Country, and reserved ruling on permanent total disability.
FN3. Although the impairment rating was
done January 20, 1998, it was not received
by the Commission until June 22,1998.
% 6 On August 11, 1998, the same ALJ issued a
third order finding that because Thomas had
readied medical stability, the issue of permanent
total disability was now "ripe for determination,"
* and concluded Thomas was "tentatively permanently totally disabled" He ordered Color Country
to pay subsistence benefits of $140 per week, suspended permanent partial payments, and informed
the parties that Color Country could submit a reemployment plan and request a hearing on the plan.
% 7 In September 1998, Color Country submitted a reemployment plan and requested a hearing.
In the meantime, the first A U retired and a second
ALJ held a hearing March 8, 2000, regarding the
reemployment plan submitted by Color Country.
On May 18, 2000, he issued an abstract based on
the August 11, 1998 award. On June 14, 2000, the
second ALJ issued an order in which he reaffirmed
the earlier orders, rejected the reemployment plan,
and entered a final award of permanent total disab-

ility.
^ 8 Color Country subsequently filed two motions for review: one filed June 16, 2000, to have
the Appeals Board review the propriety of the abstract, and one filed July 14, 2000, to have the Appeals Board review the compensation award.
1 9 In its October 31,2000 order addressing the
compensation award, the Board found that by January 20, 1998, Thomas had reached medical stability
with permanent impairments to her left shoulder
consisting of limitations to her range of motion,
"joint crepitation, and distal clavicle resection."
The Board determined that Thomas had a twentynine percent impairment of the left shoulder, which
it equated as a seventeen percent whole person
impairment The Board described the neck impairment as "critical signs of impairment without radiculopathy or loss of motion, but with some evidence of arthritis for [a] 5% whole person impairment" The Board determined that these impairments, when combined, produced a twenty percent
whole person impairment
\ 10 The Board agreed with the earlier findings
by the A U that Thomas could not perform other
work reasonably available when taking into consideration her "age, education, past work experience,
medical capacity and residual functional capacity."
The Board noted that Thomas had over thirty years
experience as a certified nursing assistant, but that
she could not resume those duties due to her
impairment The Board found that she could not return to her job at *972 Sizzler due to her impairment, and that her circumstances limited her ability
to do other work reasonably available in the area
where she lived.
\ 11 The Board then examined the reemploymnet plan that Color Country submitted. The Board
noted that the plan did not provide for "education,
training, accommodation of physical problems or
payment of continuing disability compensation to
provide for ... subsistence during the period of rehabilitation and reemployment"
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% 12 Based on its findings, the Board concluded that Thomas had carried her burden of proving permanent total disability and that she was entitled to an award of $131 per week, reduced from
the $140 per week awarded by the ALJ. ™*
FN4. The reduction of benefits is not an issue on appeal.
_ % 13 After the Board's October 31, 2000 decision affirming the ALTs rejection of the reemployment plan and the award of permanent total
disability, Color Country filed a petition for judicial
review in this court pursuant to section 34A-2-801
(8), section 63-46b-16, and Rule 14 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
t H On January 22, 2001, the Commission
denied the motion for review of the abstract by stating that the Appeals Board would not take any action on the motion for review of the abstract because "it appears your motion for review is moot"
due to a stay granted by the district court
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1 15 On appeal, Color Country argues that (1)
the Commission misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. §
35-1-67 (1994); ** (2) its due process rights were
violated by the Commission, and if the Commission
interpreted and applied section 35-1-67 correctly,
then section 35-1-67 is unconstitutional on its face
and as applied; and (3) the abstract was improperly
issued because there was no final order at the time
it was issued.
FN5. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1994)
was the applicable statute for awarding
permanent total disability benefits at the
time Thomas sustained her workplace injury. See Abel v. Indus. Comm'n, 860 P.2d
367, 369-70 (Utah Ct.App.1993). The current version, as amended, is codified at
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 (1997).
[1] % 16 "Judicial review of final agency actions is governed by die Utah Administrative Pro-

cedures Act" Viktron/Lika Utah v. Labor Comm'n,
2001 UT App 8, 1 5, 18 P.3d 519. Under section
63-46b-16, we may grant relief "only i£ on the
basis of the agency's record, [we] determine[ ] that
[Color Country] has been substantially prejudiced"
because "the agency action, or the statute or rule on
which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied" or if "the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law.n Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4Xa), (d) (1997).
[2][3](4] \ 17 Whether die statute itself is unconstitutional, and whether die agency interpretation of die statute is unconstitutional or incorrect,
are questions of law that are reviewed under a correction of error standard. See Esquivel v. Labor
Comm'n, 2000 UT 66, %% 13-19, 7 P.3d 777; Morton int% Ina v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581,
587-89 (Utah 1991); Velarde v. Board of Review,
831 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah CtApp.1992). "Due process challenges are questions of law that we review
applying a correction of error standard." West Valley City v. Roberts, 1999 UT App 358,1 6, 993 P.2d
252. Whettier there was a final order at die time die
abstract was issued involves die construction of
statutory provisions and is a question of law which
we review for correctness. See Esquivel, 2000 UT
66at113,7P.3d777.
ANALYSIS
f 18 We first address Color Country's claim
that die Commission interpreted section 35-1-67 incorrectly by requiring Commission approval of a
reemployment plan. Color Country also argues the
Commission erred by concluding that die reemployment plan must include subsistence payments and
that the plan was unreasonable.
J 19 According to Color Country, the hearing
called for in section 35-1-67 is merely to determine
whether die reemployment plan is *973 or has been
successful, and it does not confer on the Commission the autiiority to approve or disapprove the reemployment plan.
[5] % 20 Section 35-1-67 allows an employer to
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submit a reemployment plan for an employee who
is seeking permanent total disability benefits:
(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent
total disability is not final, unless otherwise
agreed to by the parties, until:

(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the commission a reemployment plan as
prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider
reasonably designed to return the employee to
gainful employment or the employer or its insurance carrier provides the commission notice that
the employer or its insurance carrier will not submit a plan; and
(iii) the commission, after notice to the parties,
holds a hearing, unless otherwise stipulated, to
consider evidence regarding rehabilitation and to
review any reemployment plan submitted by the
employer or its insurance carrier under Subsection (6XaXii).
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1994) (emphasis
added). When interpreting statutory provisions, we
are guided by our primary purpose of giving effect
to the legislative intent, and we first turn to the
plain language of the statute to divine this intent.
See Regal Ins, Co. v. Bott, 2001 UT 71, \ 10, 31
R3d524.
[6] \ 21 The verb "review" is defined as: "to go
over or examine critically or deliberately"; "to go
over with critical examination in order to discover
excellences or defects"; and "to make a formal or
official examination of the state o r something.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1944
(1986). This meaning, taken together with the requirement that the employer "submit" the plan, that
the commission "consider" evidence, and that the
plan be "reasonably designed to return the employee to gainful employment" convinces us that the
plain meaning that the Legislature intended by its
use of the word "review" in section 35-1-67(6) was

to have the Commission independently evaluate and
approve the employer's reemployment plan. We
think it is clear that to require an entity to submit
something to an agency charged with implementation of a remedial act and ask the agency to review
it for reasonableness requires an evaluation and the
agency's approval. The alternative construction
urged by Color Country, if carried to its logical extreme, would give employers who sought to avoid
paying compensation the ability to draft a plan that
an employee had no chance of fulfilling and then
deny benefits because the employee was not cooperating with reemployment efforts. This would
be in direct contravention to the larger purpose and
spirit of the Workers' Compensation Act. See Wilstead v. Indus. Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 214, 407 P.2d
692, 693 (1965) (stating the purpose of the Act is to
insure income to an injured employee and his or her
family and eliminate expense, delay, and uncertainty of the employee in having to prove negligence, and to place the burden of industrial injuries
on industry); Industrial Comm'n v. Daly Mining
Co., 51 Utah 602, 172 P. 301, 306 (1918) (rejecting
employer's construction of the Act because it would
in large measure "make it useless and of no material benefit"). We thus reject the construction urged
by Color Country and conclude the Commission did
not err in interpreting section 35-1-67 to require
Commission approval of the reemployment plan.
[7] \ 22 We also reject Color Country's argument that the Commission erred in ruling that die
statute requires that the reemployment plan provide
for the payment of subsistence benefits. Section
35-l-67(6XcXii) plainly states that a plan " shall include payment of reasonable disability compensation to provide for the employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process." Utah Code Ann. §
35-l-67(6XcXii) (1994) (emphasis added). Thus,
not only was the Commission's decision that the
subsistence benefits must be included in the plan
correct, it was also correct to rule the plan was defective for failing to do so. Moreover, the second
ALJ pointed to an additional shortcoming of the
plan when he rejected it. According to the June 14,
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2000 order, the plan was defective because the
physical work restrictions*974 for Thomas contained in the plan were materially different than
those specified by Dr. Smith and referred to in the
August 1998 order awarding permanent total disability benefits. The ALJ noted that Kit Bertsch, who
drafted the reemployment plan for Color Country,
testified she was never given a copy of the August
1998 order or Dr. Smith's restrictions for Thomas.
She also testified that, had she received these materials, she would have relied upon them in drafting
the reemployment plan. The Commission correctly
applied the law in determining that the plan was not
reasonable.
% 23 Color Country next argues that its due
process rights were violated by the Commission
and that section 35-1-67 is unconstitutional because
it violates the due process clauses of the Federal
and Utah Constitutions. Color Country cites to the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution in making this argument, but it does not articulate any basis for interpreting the two provisions
differently or suggest that Article 1, Section 7 entitles it to greater protection than that afforded by
the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, we analyze this
claim only under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and we undertake no independent analysis of Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution. See State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35,K 12 &
n.3,999P.2d7.
\ 24 Notwithstanding that the general policies
and provisions of workers' compensation acts are
not unconstitutional,**6 particular provisions of
these acts may yet run afoul of the Constitution,
and so we now turn to consider the specific due
process challenges raised by Color Countiy.
FN6. According to Professor Larson, the
American system of workers' compensation that evolved near the turn of the twentieth century differed from the German
system, which incorporated contributions
from the workers for insurance, in that it

imposed "unilateral liability without fault
upon the employer," and made the employer "bear the entire burden of any insurance
against that liability." 1 Arthur Larson &
Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers1 Compensation Law § 2.06, at 2-11 (2001). Nevertheless, it is well-settled that workers1
compensation acts in general, and the Utah
Act specifically, do not violate the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because they impose liability
upon industry without regard to fault or because they have abrogated defenses available to employers at common law. See
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 60
Utah 161, 207 P. 148, 152 (1922), qf?d by
263 U.S. 418, 44 S.Ct. 153, 68 L.Ed. 366
(1923). The United States Supreme Court
rejected due process challenges to state
workers' compensation acts brought by
employers in a series of cases decided the
same day in 1917. See New York C.K Co.
v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 37 S.Ct 247, 61
L.Ed. 667 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243
U.S. 210, 37 S.Ct. 255, 61 L.Ed. 678
(1917); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 37 S.Ct. 260, 61 L.Ed.
685(1917).
Over the years, the Utah Supreme Court
has rejected several due process challenges to the Workers' Compensation
Act brought by employers, beginning as
early as 1918. See, e.g.t Scranton Leasing Co. v. Indus. Comm% 51 Utah 368,
170 P. 976, 979 (1918) (rejecting due
process challenge brought by employer
based on Commission's power to set insurance rates under the Act); see also
United Air Lines Transport Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 107 Utah 52, 151 P.2d
591, 595 (1944) (rejecting argument of
employer/insurer that the Act was unconstitutional because it allowed taking
of property without due process).
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[8] % 25 Color Country's due process argument
has several components. First, it argues that its due
process rights were violated because the issues of
permanent partial and permanent total disability
were not ripe for consideration at the time of die
first hearing before die ALJ on January 6, 1998.
The basis for this argument is that Thomas had not
reached medical stability by the time of the first
hearing, and she had not received any permanent
work restrictions. Color Country argues that the
permanent partial and permanent total disability
claims should have been dismissed at the first hearing, and because these issues were not dismissed,
the Commission "exceeded its adjudicative authority and denied [Color Country's] due process rights
to a meaningful hearing" We reject this argument
\ 26 The ALTs January 8, 1998 order awarded
only temporary total disability benefits and expressly reserved ruling on die permanent partial and
permanent total disability issues because Thomas
had not readied medical stability. Workers' compensation claims are best viewed as a process,
rather than as a discrete event, and die Commission
had continuing jurisdiction over *975 Thomas's
claims. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78(1) (1994)
(currently codified at Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-420
(1) (1997)); Continental Casualty Co. v. Indus.
Comm'n, 79 Utah 532, 11 P2d 329, 337 (1932)
(stating that a single application for benefits gives
Commission plenary jurisdiction to determine eligibility for all forms of benefits). Furthermore, we
fail to see how Color Country was prejudiced by
the ALTs actions because there was no award of
permanent partial disability made until six months
after the January 1998 order, and there was no permanent total disability award made until eight
months after the January 1998 order.
\ 27 The second due process argument focuses
oh flie procedures used by the Commission. Color
Country claims that the Commission deprived it of
a meaningful opportunity to be heard by the manner
in which the evidence was considered. Color Country claims it did not have adequate notice that the

Commission would consider the permanent partial
and permanent total disability issues witfiout an additional hearing or post-hearing opportunities to
submit additional evidence by bodi parties. In addition, Color Country complains that the Commission
violated its due process rights when die first AU
allowed Thomas to submit "post-hearing evidence
regarding her impairment rating and work restrictions^ Color Country also complains tiiat the
second AU violated its due process rights by failing to consider certain evidence submitted by it and
by failing to appoint a medical panel.
[9][10] \ 28 Under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88
(1994),°" the Commission is not bound by die
usual rules of evidence or any formal rules of procedure. Although proceedings for workers' compensation claims are very informal and of their own
kind or class, die proceedings still must satisfy basic notions of fairness. See Utah Fuel Co. v. Indus.
Comm'n, 59 Utah 46, 201 P. 1034, 1034-35 (1921).
After a careful review of die record, we conclude
that die procedures utilized here did not deprive
Color Country of notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard. As we noted above, die permanent
partial and permanent total awards were first made
six and eight months, respectively, after die January
6, 1998 hearing. Bofli parties submitted additional
medical and odier evidence and directed arguments
to die ALJ after die first hearing, and tiiere was no
objection made to this informal process while it
was going on.
FN7. Currently codified at Utah Code Ann.
§34A-2-802(1997).
% 29 In addition, die second ALJ, in his June
14, 2000 order, reviewed all the evidence, including
the functional capacity evaluation (FCE) by Michael Meek and die independent medical examination (JME) by Dr. Root** Thus, even if; as Color
Country argues, die first ALJ failed to consider
evidence submitted by Color Country, tiiere were
two more independent analyses of all the evidence
submitted in this case: one by the second ALJ after
die March 8, 2000 hearing and again by die Board
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on Color Country's motion for review, and we fail
to see how Color Country was denied due process
of law here. See Vati Convalescent & Care Inst. v.
Indus. Comm'n, 649 P.2d 33, 36 (Utah 1982)
(stating that due process does not always require a
hearing prior to eveiy administrative action nor is it
necessary to hold a hearing at a particular point in a
proceeding so long as a hearing is held prior to a final order becoming effective).
FN8. In fact, the second A U had to independently review the evidence and make
his own findings on the issue of permanent
total disability compensation because the
first ALJ had mistakenly relied on Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 (1997) instead of
section 35-1-67, The second ALJ addressed Thomas's claim and re-analyzed
the findings made by the first ALJ under
section 35-1-67, applying the statutory
factors and those in the pertinent section;
of the Administrative Code, and he
reached die same conclusion as the first
A U : that Thomas was entitled to permanent total disability compensation,
[ U ] T 30 We also reject Color Country's claim
that it was denied due process because there was no
medical panel appointed. The appointment of a
medical panel is discretionary and is called for
when there are significant medical issues in dispute.
See WUlardson v. Indus. Comm'n, 904 P.2d 671,
674-75 (Utah 1995). Here, Color Country points to
the reports of Drs. Root and Tebbs and claims there
was a conflict in die evidence *976 between these
reports and that of Dr. Smith. However, die second
ALJ specifically addressed this in his June 14, 2000
order. He considered all of this evidence and concluded that there was no conflict in die evidence
sufficient to mandate a medical panel because the
reports of Drs. Root and Tebbs were from November 1996 and January 1997, respectively. The ALJ
pointed out that tiiese reports were made over a
year before Thomas readied medical stability and
also noted that Dr. Root dealt only widi Thomas's

arm injuries and failed to include die injuries to her
neck in making his impairment rating. The AU
concluded that there was "no conflict in the medical
records as neither Dr. Root, nor Dr. Tebbs, pretended to provide conclusive, comprehensive impairment ratings ... at a point of medical stability." We
also note, as did the ALJ, that Thomas underwent
two more surgical procedures after the reports of
Drs. Root and Tebbs were prepared.
1 31 Moreover, as the Board noted in its October 2000 order, in Dr. Roofs 1998 IME, his ultimate conclusion on Thomas's employability was: "I
think her chances of being gainfully employed with
all of these problems would be difficult" In die
IME, I>r. Root also stated tfiat "Ms. Thomas's complaints about neck and shoulder discomfort are directly related to die initial injury in October of
1994." Thus, Dr. Roofs conclusions were not in
conflict with die conclusions of Dr. Smith on these
issues. Considering all of the above, we cannot say
the Commission abused its discretion by not appointing a medical panel.
\ 32 Color Country also argues that if die Commission's interpretation and application of section
35-1-67 is correct, then section 35-1-67 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied for additional
reasons. Color Country argues that section 35-1-67
violates the due process clause because it does not
provide time frames for die second hearing or any
opportunity for corrective action following a
second hearing. Color Country also argues that the
Act is unconstitutional because there is no provision for recoupment of monies paid as subsistence
benefits to an employee pursuant to an interim order if it later turns out that the finding of permanent
total disability was erroneous. Color Country argues that it can be years before such an order is judicially reviewed, and because the employee does
not have to hold the money in trust, there is "little
or no chance of any recovery."
f 33 It is clear tfiat Color Country has a property interest in the monies it pays for compensation
benefits and/or insurance premiums. It is equally
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clear that, for purposes of our due process analysis,
(here has been state action here. This issue turns,
then, on whether Color Country received all the
process it was due before the Commission deprived
it of its property interest.
t 34 In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
349, 96 S.Ct. 893, 910, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), the
United States Supreme Court rejected a due proeess
challenge brought by a recipient of social security
disability benefits (SSDI) whose benefits had been
terminated without a pre-termination hearing. In
doing so, the Court identified three factors for analyzing procedural due process challenges: first, the
private interest affected by the official action;
second, "the risk of erroneous deprivation" of the
interest by the procedures used and the probable
value of additional or substitute procedural protections; and third, die governmental interest,
"including the function involved and die fiscal and
administrative burdens" of additional or substitute
procedures. Id at 335, 96 S.Ct at 903; see also In
re S.A., 2001 UT App 307, % 11, 432 Utah Adv.
Rep.21,37P.3dll66.
% 35 In addressing each of these factors in the
context of the SSDI benefits at issue in Mathews,
the Court noted that due process is not a "
'technical conception with a fixed content unrelated
to time, place and circumstances.' " Id at 334, %
S.Ct at 902 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748, 6
L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961)). The Court pointed out that
due process is flexible and calls for such procedures
as are demanded by a particular situation. See id
[12] \ 36 We adopted the reasoning and the
factors from Mathews in Lander v. Industrial Commission, 894 P.2d 552, 555-57 (Utah Ct.App.1995),
where we rejected a due *977 process challenge to
a provision of the Workers' Compensation Act
brought by an employee. In Lander, we compared
the employee's interest to that in Mathews and concluded that the interest in Lander "[fell] short of a
vested right to benefits" because Lander was not
entitled to benefits yet, he was only entitled to ap-

ply for them. Id at 555. Unlike the employee in
Lander, the employer/insurer here, Color Country,
has an interest more akin to the SSDI recipient in
Mathews; that is, it has a vested right in property it
already holds, not merely an expectation of being
able to receive something in the future.
\ 37 The second Mathews factor, however,
weighs in favor of the Commission. In addition to
multiple hearings on the issue of disability under
the Act, the Commission also has the ability to reconsider prior rulings due to its continuing jurisdiction over claims. See Spencer v. Indus. Common,
733 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah 1987) (holding that the
Commission has continuing jurisdiction to modify
awards when there are significant changes or new
developments in a claimant's condition). Moreover,
the procedures contained in UAPA are available to
ensure accurate decision making by the Commission. f*19 These include: a requirement that the
Commission afford parties the opportunity to
present evidence, argue, respond, conduct crossexamination, submit rebuttal evidence, and that
testimony be under oath and recorded under section
63-46b-8; an opportunity for discovery under section 63-46b-7; written orders with findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and the reasoning relied upon
under section 63-46b-10; agency review under section 63-46b-12; agency reconsideration under section 63-46M3; appellate judicial review under
63-46b-16; and the right to seek a stay of orders under 63-46b-18. These procedures closely approximate the full panoply of rights found in a full blown
civil trial.
FN9. Except
63-46b-l(2Xi).

as

limited

by

section

% 38 The Mathews Court pointed out that 'the
decision whether to [award] disability benefits will
turn, in most cases, upon 'routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician specialists/ "
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344, 96 S.Ct at 907 (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 404, 91 S.Ct
1420, 1428, 28 L,Ed.2d 842 (1971)). The Mathews
Court concluded that due to the nature of such de-
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cisions, the risk of error was low enough so that
there was no need for a hearing before an employee's benefits were terminated, so long as there were
procedures in place for a challenge to be brought
following termination of benefits. See id.
1 39 The reasoning of the Mathews Court applies equally here. The procedures under UAPA
outlined above, the nature of the evidentiary determination to be made, the fact that there were
multiple hearings, continuing jurisdiction to cure
defects, and the fact that the claimant bears the ultimate burden, all persuade us that the risk of erroneous deprivation under existing procedures is low,
and that there is little, if any, probable value in the
additional procedures suggested by Color Country.
% 40 The final Mathews factor requires an examination of the governmental interest at stake, including the burdens of added procedures. As the
Mathews Court noted:
At some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative action and to society in terms of increased
assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost. Significantly, the cost of
protecting those whom the preliminary administrative process has identified as likely to be found
undeserving may in the end come out of the
pockets of the deserving since resources available
for any particular program of social welfare are
not unlimited.
Id at 348, 96 S.Ct. at 909. The concern with
depleting limited social resources to add procedural
protections is of particular significance here because one of the primary underlying purposes of the
Act is to dispense with expense, delay, and uncertainty of recovery for employees. See Wilstead, 407
P.2dat693.
\ 41 Thus, we do not agree with Color Country
that section 35-1*67 is constitutionally deficient for
failure to mandate additional hearings or require
that specific time lines *978 be met. We also reject

its argument that the Act provides for inadequate
review. As we noted above, workers1 compensation
claims are best viewed as a process, rather than as a
discrete event.
\ 42 We also reject Color Country's argument
that the statute is unconstitutional because there is
no provision for recoupment of money paid under
an interim order that is later reversed In Kerens v.
Industrial Commission, 713 P.2d 49 (Utah 1986),
our supreme court ruled that an employer could not
offset medical payments it had previously made for
an employee's back injury that later turned out not
to be compensable against an order to pay benefits
based on the same employee's compensable neck
injury. See id at 54-55. Although the court did not
rule on the constitutionality of this, nor was it
raised, other courts from other jurisdictions have
considered this precise question and have ruled that
failure to provide a means for such a recoupment is
not a violation of due process. See, e.g., Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Duvall, 113 N.H. 28,
300 A.2d 732, 734 (1973) (holding Hie New Hampshire Act did not provide for recoupment and that
this was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). Indeed, some states, as a result of employers
obtaining stays during the sometimes lengthy appeals process, have enacted legislation specifically
denying stays or providing for payment of workers'
compensation benefits during appeal, and these provisions have also been held not to offend constitutional principles. See, e.g., McAvoy v. KB. Sherman Co., 401 Mich. 419, 258 N.W.2d 414, 422
(1977) (upholding provision that mandated paying
70% of award to employee during pendency of appeals); Merchants Mutual Ins. Co. v. Newport Hospital, 108 R.I. 86, 272 A.2d 329, 331 (1971)
(upholding statute with "no-stay" provision).
% 43 On balance, we conclude that the risk of
erroneous deprivation of Color Country's property
interest under the procedures of section 35-1-67 and
UAPA is so minimal that the benefits of any additional procedures are outweighed by their administrative costs. In addition to the fiscal and adminis-
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trative costs imposed by additional procedures, the
delay and potential deprivation of benefits to
claimants who have already met their initial burden
of proving a compensable claim weighs heavily
against Color Country, where the very purpose of
the Act challenged is to do away with expense and
delay and afford injured workers speedy, certain,
and just compensation. Any claimed harm to employers and insurers in Color Country's position is
also mitigated by the ability to spread the costs associated with the Act over an entire industry and
(hen on to society as a whole by adjusting the appropriate rates of insurance premiums and charges.
The procedures used by the Commission under section 35-1-67 and UAPA provided all the process
that was constitutionally due before Color Countiy
was deprived of its property interest™10 All
things considered, Color Country's arguments are
best directed to the Legislature. See Rekward v. Indus. Comm'n, 755 P2d 166, 169 (Utah
CtApp. 1988) (rejecting appellant's argument for
creation of a fifth class of disability benefits not
contained within the Act and stating problem was
one for the Legislature).
FN10. Because we reject Color Country's
"as applied" challenge, its facial challenge
must necessarily fail. See United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct
2095, 2100, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) ("A fecial challenge to a legislative Act is ... the
most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid.").
[13] K 44 Color Country's final argument is that
the abstract should not have been issued by the
second ALJ because there was no final order at the
time. The Commission concedes this point in its
brie£ although Thomas does not.
^ 45 The abstract was issued under Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-2-212 (1997), which states that an abstract "of any final order providing an award" can
be filed under the Act with the clerk of the district

court. At the time the abstract was issued, in May
of 2000, the second ALfs findings, conclusions,
and order based on the March 2000 hearing had not
yet issued, and there was no oral ruling from the
bench at that hearing. Thus, the only order the abstract could have been based on was *979 the August 1998 order by the first ALJ, tentatively awarding permanent total disability benefits to Thomas.
Color Country argues that the August 1998 order,
upon which the abstract is based, was not a final order, and therefore, the abstract was issued in error.
We agree.™11
FN11. Color Country also argues that it is
entitled to the costs and fees that arose
from defending against the abstract, but
because Color Countiy has failed to cite to
authority of any kind in support of this argument, we decline to address it. See Utah
R.App. P. 24(aX9); State v. Thomas, 961
P2d 299,305 (Utah 1998).
\ 46 The August 1998 order by the first ALJ
made only a "tentative" award. Under Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission,
2000 UT 40, 999 P.2d 17, agency action is not final
if it is "preliminary, preparatory ... or intermediate
with regard to subsequent agency action." Id z t \
16, 999 P.2d 17. Because the August 1998 order
was of an interim nature, we conclude the order
was not a final order, and hence, the abstract was
improperly issued.
CONCLUSION
f 47 We reject Color Country's interpretation
of section 35-1-67 and affirm the Commission's determination that the reemployment plan was not
reasonable. We reject Color Country's claim that
the Commission and the statute deprived it of due
process of law. We also conclude that the abstract
was improperly issued. Accordingly, we reverse
that part of the order issuing the abstract, and otherwise affirm.
\ 48 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON,
Associate Presiding Judge, and WILLIAM A.
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
Linda Lee HYMAS, Petitioner,
v.
LABOR COMMISSION, SOS Staffing/Hyclone,
and/or Insurance Company of the State of
Pennsylvania, Respondents.
NO.20070875-CA.
Dec. 26,2008.
Background: Employee's widow petitioned for review of the Labor Commission's decision affirming
the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) ruling that
she was not entitled to death benefits after her husband died of a heart attack while working at employer.
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, P J.,
held that neither employee's widow nor employee's
co-workers were qualified to testify as to the medical cause of employee's death.
Affirmed.
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Before GREENWOOD, P.J., McHUGH and ORME

OPINION
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge:
% 1 Linda Lee Hymas (Mrs. Hymas) petitions
for review of the Labor Commission's *220 decision affirming the Administrative Law Judge's
(ALJ) ruling that she is not entitled to death benefits after her husband died of a heart attack while
working at SOS Staffing. The ALJ held that Mrs.
Hymas failed to establish medical causation
between Mr. Hymas's death and his work. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
\ 2 Mrs. Hymas sought death benefits based on
her claim that the physical stress of her husband's
job at SOS caused or contributed to his death. The
A U reviewed the medical record submitted by Mrs.
Hymas, which included a letter from die medical
examiner identifying the cause of death as a heart
attack, but did not include records from Mr.
Hymas's primary physician. The medical examiner's letter stated that "the efforts of work related
stress may be a factor in additional work load being
placed on the heart," but did not opine as to wheth. er work activities had caused or contributed to Mr.
Hymas's heart attack. The AU asked if the record
was complete, and Mrs. Hymas's attorney responded that it was. Based on that evidence, the ALJ
ruled that the medical records Mrs. Hymas submitted did not meet the appropriate medical causation
standard to show that a work accident or disease
caused or contributed to Mr. Hymas's heart attack.
% 3 Mrs. Hymas requested a continuance so that
she could submit additional medical evidence. The
ALJ denied the request, stating that "Mhe longstanding rule is that you come to the hearing prepared to present the evidence. And we dont make
continuances based on the parties'—the sudden
realization that they need more evidence." Mrs.
Hymas also asked that she and her husband's coworkers be allowed to testify regarding the medical

causal connection between the work and her husband's death, but the ALJ refused the request because Mrs. Hymas had failed in her initial burden
of showing medical causation, and lay testimony
could not overcome this deficiency. Mrs. Hymas requested review by the Labor Commission.
% 4 The Labor Commission affirmed the ALfs
ruling, stating that (1) "[b]ecause Mrs. Hymas's
witnesses were not qualified to testify as to the
medical cause of Mr. Hymas's death, [the ALJ] did
not err in rejecting their testimony" (2) "[Mrs.
Hymas] did not submit the necessary medical evidence at the hearing, or explain why it was not possible to obtain such evidence;" and (3) "Mrs.
Hymas had a reasonable opportunity to present
medical evidence to establish a medical causal connection between Mr. Hymas's work and his death
[but did not]."
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1][2] | 5 We review Mrs. Hymas's claim that
the Labor Commission erred in denying her workers' compensation benefits following the death of
her husband. Mrs. Hymas raises several issues,
each sharing the core argument that the Labor Commission abused its discretion and violated her due
process rights by not allowing additional evidence
and testimony after the initial hearing before the
AU. "[TJhe Legislature has granted the [Labor]
Commission discretion to determine the facts and
apply the law to the facts in all cases coming before
it." Ae Clevite, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT
App 35,1 7, 996 P. 2d 1072. We will uphold the
Labor Commission's determination unless it
"exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Id.
ANALYSIS
[3] ^ 6 Compensation for a work-related death
is governed by Utah Code section 34A-2-401
(Workers Compensation Act), which states:
(1) An employee ... who is injured and the dependents of each such employee who is killed, by
accident arising out of and in the course of the
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employee's employment, wherever such injury
occurred, if the accident was not purposely selfinflicted, shall be paid:
(a) compensation for loss sustained on account
of the injury or death;
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for:
(i) medical, nurse, and hospital services;
(ii) medicines; and
*221 (iii) in case of death, the amount of funeral expenses.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (Supp.2008).
Claimants pursuing compensation under the Workers Compensation Act must prove that the employee was killed "by accident," and must also show
both medical and legal causation. See Allen v. Industrial Comm'it, 729 P.2d 15, 18, 22-23 (Utah
1986). The Labor Commission determined that
Mrs. Hymas had not proved medical causation, and
thus determined it was unnecessary to consider
whether Mr. Hymas's death was uby accident" or
whether there was legal causation.
% 7 Mrs. Hymas argues that the Labor Commission failed to follow the proper procedures. Specifically, she argues that die ALJ erred by not considering whether Mr. Hymas's death was an accident, not examining the facts concerning whether
Mr. Hymas had a pre-existing condition, and not
analyzing legal causation.
\ 8 Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d
15 (Utah 1986), does not prescribe any particular
sequence in which the elements of accident, legal
causation, and medical causation must be addressed. See generally id. Indeed, in the interest of
efficiency, if one element cannot be met, there is no
reason to address the remaining issues. See Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah
1987) ("Because the result in this case turns on the
issue of medical causation, we will not examine the
issue of legal causation."). Here, the Labor Com-

mission concluded that the medical causation element had not been met and chose not to consider
the questions of accident or legal causation. If the
Labor Commission properly concluded that medical
causation had not been met, then there was no reason to address the other issues.
[4] % 9 We turn, then, to whether the Labor
Commission's ruling on medical causation was an
abuse of discretion. To demonstrate medical causation, a "claimant must show by evidence, opinion,
or otherwise that the stress, strain, or exertion required by his or her occupation led to the resulting
injury or disability." Allen, 729 P.2d at 27. The
Labor Commission determined that the evidence
Mrs. Hymas offered did not do this. Mrs. Hymas
challenges this decision.
[5] % 10 First, the Labor Commission determined that Mrs. Hymas was not prepared for the
hearing and that the ALJ had the discretion to deny
any continuances that would allow for post-hearing
evidence. The Labor Commission relied on its rules
to support its position. Rule 602-2-1 of the Utah
Administrative Code sets forth fee procedures for
an adjudication of workers' compensation benefits
before fee Labor Commission. See Utah Admin.
Code R602-2-1. Among fee instructions are fee
following:
F. Discovery.

6. Parties shall diligently pursue discovery so as
not to delay the adjudication of the claim. If a
hearing has been scheduled, discovery motions
shall be filed no later than 45 days prior to fee
hearing unless leave of the administrative law
judge is obtained.

H. Medical Records Exhibit.
1. Hie parties are expected to exchange medical
records during the discovery period.
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2. Petitioner shall submit all relevant medical records contained in his/her possession to the respondent for the preparation of a joint medical records exhibit at least twenty (20) working days
prior to the scheduled hearing.

5. The medical record exhibit prepared by the respondent shall be delivered to the Division and
the petitioner or petitioner's counsel at least ten
(10) working days prior to the hearing. Late-filed
medical records may or may not be admitted at
the discretion of the administrative law judge by
stipulation or for good cause shown.

I. Hearing.

3. No later than 45 days prior to the scheduled
hearing, all parties shall file a signed pretrial
disclosure form that identifies: (1) fact witnesses the parties actually intend to call at the
hearing; *222 [and] (2) expert witnesses the
parties actually intend to call at the hearing....

7. Parties are expected to be prepared to present
their evidence on the date the hearing is scheduled Requests for continuances may be granted
or denied at the discretion of the administrative
law judge for good cause shown. Lack of diligence in preparing for the hearing shall not con*
stitute good cause for a continuance.
8. Subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the
Labor Commission, the evidentiary record shall
be deemed closed at the conclusion of the hearing, and no additional evidence will be accepted
without leave of the administrative law judge.
Id. (emphases added). Accordingly, the Labor
Commission concluded that the ALJ had not abused

© 2011 Thomson Reuters.

its discretion in denying Mrs. Hymas's motion for a
continuance. Likewise, we conclude that the Labor
Commission's decision did not exceed the bounds
of reason and rationality.
[6] '% 11 The Labor Commission also affirmed
the ALJPs decision not to allow Mrs. Hymas or Mr.
Hymas's co-workers to testify as to the cause of Mr.
Hymas's heart attack because "the witnesses were
not qualified to testify as to the medical cause of
Mr. Hymas's death." The Labor Commission emphasized, as did the ALJ, that the witnesses Mrs.
Hymas wished to call were not medical witnesses
and that "medical evidence of causation is required." The Labor Commission referred to Griffith
v. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 264, 399 V2d
204 (1965), which asks: "Where the injury complained of affects die internal anatomy, by what
means but through medical testimony can petitioner
prove that her ailments were caused by the accident?" Id. at 206. The Labor Commission stated
that die lay testimony may have been "relevant to
other aspects of Mrs. Hymas's claim, such as the issue of legal causation. But lay testimony is not
competent to prove medical causation." Accordingly, die Labor Commission concluded that die
ALJ did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit
the testimony of lay witnesses. Again, we conclude
that the Labor Commission's decision did not exceed the bounds of reason and rationality.
[7][8][9] J 12 Finally, the Labor Commission
determined that the ALJ was not required to submit
the medical evidence to a medical panel because
medical panels are only mandatory where there is
conflicting evidence, and, in this case, the medical
records presented did not reveal any conflicting
evidence. Rule 602-2-2 of the Utah Administrative
Code states:
A. A [medical] panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge where one or more significant medical issues may be involved. Generally
a significant medical issue must be shown by
conflicting medical reports. Significant medical
issues are involved when there are:
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1. Conflicting medical opinions related to causation of the injury or disease[.]
Utah Admin. Code R602-2-2. Mrs. Hymas argues that a medical panel was necessary because
there was a significant medical issue. In response,
the Labor Commission contends that there were no
conflicting medical opinions because nothing in the
record before the ALJ presented controverted evidence, and therefore, there was no evidence of "a
significant medical issue."
[RJeferral to a medical panel is mandatory only
where there is a medical controversy as evidenced through conflicting medical reports.
Whether there are conflicting medical reports is a
question of feet We must uphold the Commission's factual findings if such findings are supported by substantial evidence based upon the record as a whole.
Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial
CommH 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997). Here, the
Labor Commission's factual findings are clearly
supported by the record: based on the information
before the ALJ at the time of the hearing, there
were no conflicting medical reports. Indeed, the
Labor Commission also indicated that it had reviewed additional documentation from the parties
and concluded that there were still no conflicting
medical reports. Accordingly, we conclude that the
Labor Commission's decision*223 does not exceed
the bounds of reason and rationality.
% 13 Affirmed.
% 14 WE CONCUR: CAROLYN B. McHUGH,
Judge, and GREGORY K. ORME, Judge.
UtahApp.,2008.
Hymas v. Labor Com'n
200 P.3d 218, 620 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 2008 UT
App471
END OF DOCUMENT
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC., Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH and Linda Lee Taylor,
Respondents.
NO.910592-CA.
Aug. 14,1992.
Employer brought action challenging Industrial
Commission order awarding workers' compensation
benefits to claimant The Court of Appeals, Orme,
J., held that: (I) employer failed to completely satisfy its obligation to marshal evidence in connection with sufficiency of evidence challenge; (2) Administrative Law Judge (ALT) did not prejudicially
err when she submitted to medical panel question
of whether there was "medically demonstrable
causal connection" between industrial accident and
claimant's subsequent injuries; and (3) medical panel, in concluding that claimant's prior industrial injury, rather than subsequent lifting of child, was
primary cause of second back injury, did not act
beyond its authority by assuming facts not in evidence, weighing facts or acting as fact finder.

pensation claimant's disc fusion surgery was necessitated by industrial accident which occurred during
course of her employment failed to completely satisfy its obligation to marshal evidence and, thus,
findings would not be disturbed; in challenging
ALfs decision, employer catalogued only evidence
in record most helpful to its position, and fully neglected to amass evidence supporting ALTs findings.
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4Xg).
[2] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^1691
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial
413XVI(P)1 In General
413kl691 k. Scope and Extent; Matters and Evidence Considered. Most Cited Cases
Administrative Law Judge (AU) did not prejudicially err in workers* compensation proceeding
when she submitted to medical panel question of
whether there was "medically demonstrable causal
connection" between industrial accident and
claimant's subsequent injuries, even though applicable test required more of causal connection than
phraseology of inquiry may have suggested, as ALJ
properly reserved for herself ultimate determination
on narrower issue of legal causation, and applied
correct legal standard. U.CA.1953,35-l-77(2Xd).

Affirmed.
[3] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^553
WestHeadnotes
[I] Workers* Compensation 413 €==>1935
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XV1(T)12 Scope and Extent of Review in General
413kl935 k. Presumptions and Burden
of Showing Error. Most Cited Cases
Employer challenging Administrative Law
Judge's (ALPs) determination that workers' com-

© 2011 Thomson Reuters.

413 Workers' Compensation
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May
Be Had
413VIH(A) Nature and Character of Physical
Harm
413VIII(A)4 Aggravation of Previously
Impaired Condition
413k553 k. Necessity of Accident and
Causal Connection. Most Cited Cases
Correct standard for determining employer liability for subsequent injuries occurring after industrial injury does not amount to "but for" analysis.
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[4] Workers' Compensation 413 € ^ 1 7 1 9
413 Workers' Compensation
413XV1 Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial
413XVI(P)3 Questions of Law and Fact
413kl718 Arising Out of and in the
Course of Employment
413U719 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Determinations regarding factual circumstances
surrounding industrial injury must be ruled on by
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), as opposed to
medical panel, in workers1 compensation proceeding. U.C.A.1953,35-l-77(2Xd).

ence, weighing facts or acting as fact finder, despite
claim that panel's statement that claimant did not
actually pick up child directly contradicted
claimant's testimony; even if child was actually lifted, claimant's act of lifting was not outside range
of activity allowed by her treating physician and,
thus, issue was essentially irrelevant U.C.A.1953,
35-1-77.
*842 David M. McConkie and Stuart F. Weed, Salt
Lake City, for petitioner.
Jay A. Meservy, Salt Lake City, for respondents.

[5] Workers' Compensation 413 0^1687

Before BILLINGS, ORME and RUSSON, JJ.

413 Workers'Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial
413XVI(P)i In General
413kl687 k. In General Most Cited
Cases
Role of medical panel in workers' compensation proceeding is limited; it may not act as
"factfinder" in same way Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) ultimately finds facts, it may not base its
conclusions on assumption of facts not in evidence,
and it may not, except in limited circumstances, assess
credibility
of claimant's
testimony.
U.C.A.1953,35-1-77.

OPINION
ORME, Judge:
Petitioner challenges an Industrial (Commission
order awarding workers' compensation benefits to a
former employee. We affirm.

[6] Workers' Compensation 413 €>=*1687
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial
413XVI(P)1 In General
413kl687 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Medical panel, in concluding that workers'
compensation claimant's prior industrial injury,
rather than her subsequent lifting of child, was
primary cause of second back injury, did not act
beyond its authority by assuming facts not in evid-

FACTS
The facts set forth here are based primarily on
thefindingsmade by the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) and adopted by the Industrial Ccwnmission in
its Order Denying Motion for Review.
Linda Lee Taylor was an employee of Intermountain Health Care. On March 6, 1987, she sustained an injury to her back while lifting S desk at
the request of her department supervisor. Taylor
sought and received medical attention for the injury
shortly after March 6, 1987, was treated by a neurologist, and was instructed to take a week off work
at that time. After being treated conservatively over
the summer, she was referred to an orthopedic specialist in the fall of 1987, and was hospitalized for
one week in November of 1987.
After a further 30-day absence from work,
Taylor returned to work for short intervals beginning in late December of 1987. However, constant
sitting and bending while at work caused Taylor to
experience severe discomfort in her back and right
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leg. Thus, pursuant to her doctor's orders, Taylor
stayed off work until July of 1988,™* during
which time she received temporary total disability
benefits. MC refused to rehire Taylor when she
sought to resume her job duties in July of 1988.
Taylor found employment with Interwest Medical,
and worked there from October of 1988 until April
of 1989, losing two to three days of woik per month
due to her ongoing back problems. She continued to
receive conservative medical care for her back
problems until April 15,1989.
FN1. A May 11, 1988, letter from Taylor's
treating physician indicates that Taylor
stopped working due to recurrent episodes
of pain.
On that day, Taylor attempted to lift her four
month old grandchild from a baby *843 walker
when she experienced a sudden, sharp pain in her
back, similar to what she experienced in March of
1987 while lifting the desk. Upon bending down to
remove her grandchild from the walker, Taylor's
back "went out," she was unable to pick up the
child, and she could not straighten up. Taylor testified that she had experienced the same type of pain
several times since the original desk-lifting accident
in 1987.
Following this incident, Taylor sought treatment for extreme pain in her back, and was hospitalized on April 21, 1989. She was released by her
doctor to return to woik in May of 1989, but had
been terminated by Interwest. Although Taylor attempted to find other work, because of restrictions
placed on her activities by her then treating physician, she was only able to work on a part-time basis
between April and September of 1989, when she
was hospitalized for surgery. At that time, Taylor's
treating physician performed disc fusion surgery in
an attempt to alleviate some or all of Taylor's discomfort.
In April of 1990, a physician who had not
treated Taylor reviewed Taylor's medical records
and issued a report assessing the medical cause of

the need for the disc fusion surgery. He opined that
it was improbable that the surgery would have been
necessary if the lifting incident in April of 1989 had
not occurred.™2
FN2. In an April 1989 letter to IHC,
Taylor's treating physician noted he felt
that Taylor's back problems were 25% the
result of the 1987 industrial injury and
75% nonindustrial. Sometime after performing Taylor's disc fusion surgery, the
same physician opined that Taylor's back
problems beginning in April 1989,.and the
subsequent surgery in September of 1989,
were 50% related to the March 6, 1987, industrial injury and 50% die result of nonindustrial degeneration.
After the surgery, Taylor filed an Application
for Hearing requesting payment of medical expenses and disability benefits. Because there appeared to be some medical controversy regarding
the significance of the April 1989 lifting incident,
the ALJ referred the matter to a medical panel to resolve the conflict The ALJ asked the medical panel
whether there was "a medically demonstrable causal connection between the applicant's back problems noted after April 15, 1989 and the March 6,
1987 industrial accident" In its report, the medical
panel answered the general inquiry in the affirmative and concluded that Taylor's September 1989
surgery was 70% the result of the March 1987 industrial injury and 30% the result of the April 15,
1989 incident lifting the baby. The ALJ then determined that the September 1989 surgery was necessary primarily as a result of the March 1987 industrial injury, and that IHC was therefore responsible for payment of the benefits requested by
Taylor. IHC sought review of the matter by the Industrial Commission, which affirmed the decision
of the ALJ. IHC thereupon appealed to this court.
On appeal, IHC argues that (1) the Industrial
Commission incorrectly affirmed the ALJ's finding
that the September 1989 disc fusion surgery was
necessitated by the industrial accident because the
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finding was not supported by substantial evidence;
(2) the ALJ failed to adopt the correct standard to
determine employer liability for nonindustrial injuries occurring after an industrial accident; and (3)
the medical panel acted beyond its authority by assuming facts not in evidence, weighing facts, and
acting as a factfinder.
EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT
IHC assails the Industrial Commission's affirmance of the ALTs decision. The thrust of IHCs attack appears to be against the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the ALJ's factual findings, insofar as those findings led the ALJ to conclude that
Taylor's September 1989 disc fusion surgery was
necessitated by the industrial accident of March
1987. However, IHC makes little effort to identify
particular findings of fact which it challenges on
this basis, or, indeed, to differentiate in its analysis
between factual findings and legal conclusions.
In any event, to successfully challenge findings
of fact made in an administrative proceeding, the
party seeking to upset *844 those findings must
show that the findings are "not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court." Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-16(4)(g) (1990). See Grace Drilling Co. v.
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah
App.1989). Under this "whole record test," a party
challenging the findings must " marshall all of the
evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are
not supported by substantial evidence." Id at 68
(emphasis in original). Accord Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464 & n. 7 (Utah
App.1991).
[1] In challenging the ALJ's decision, IHC
catalogues only that evidence in the record most
helpful to its position, and wholly neglects to amass
the evidence supporting the ALPs findings. Thus,
IHC has "failed to completely satisfy [its] obligation to marshal the evidence by 'persistently arguing [its] own position without regard for the

evidence supporting the [ALfs] findings.' " Heinecke, 810 P.2d at 464 (quoting Horton v. Gem
State MuL, 794 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah App.1990)).
FN3
We therefore decline to disturb the findings
made by the ALJ and ratified by the Industrial
Commission.
FN3. In Heinecke, we explained that while
evidence contrary to the findings is relevant to the appellate court's review of the
"whole record," such evidence becomes
relevant only when the court "scrutinizes
the supporting evidence under the
'substantial evidence viewed in light of the
whole record test.' " 810 P.2d at 464 n. 8.
Thus, evidence contrary to that supporting
the findings should "be referred to in briefing only after the supporting evidence has
been separately marshalled " Id. Since IHC
has failed to comply with the marshaling
requirement in this case, we have no occasion to consider the evidence supporting its
position.
APPROPRIATENESS OF QUESTION SUBMITTED TO MEDICAL PANEL
[2] IHC next claims the ALPs formulation of
one of the questions submitted to the medical panel
was legally incorrect. Specifically, IHC argues that
in submitting to the medical panel the question of
whether there was any "medically demonstrable
causal connection between the industrial accident
and the subsequent injuries," the ALJ adopted a
substantially more liberal standard for causation
than that adopted by the Utah Supreme Court.
In objecting to the wording of this question,
IHC argued that, in place of the language requiring
a "medically demonstrable causal connection"
between the accident and Taylor's injuries, the
question submitted to the panel should have inquired whether the September 1989 disc fusion surgery was the "direct and natural result" of the
March 6, 1987, industrial accident. IHC relies on
Professor Larson's treatise and two Utah Supreme
Court cases in support of its contentions. See 1 Lar-

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 5
839P.2d841
(Cite as: 839 P.2d 841)
son, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 13.11
(1992); Mountain States Casing Servs. v. McKean,
706 P.2d 601, 602 (Utah 1985) (adopting Larson's §
13.11 as proper legal standard for determining compensability of injury occurring subsequent to compensable industrial injury); Perchelli v. Industrial
Comm'n, 475 P.2d 835 (Utah 1970) (cited by Larson in § 13.11(a)). IHC contends that under Perchelli, the legal standard for causation is essentially
a "but for" test. See 475 P.2d at 837. IHC argues
that rather than incorporating the allegedly correct
"but for" test, the question submitted to the medical
panel by the ALJ constitutes a standard for causation that would impose responsibility on an employer upon a finding of even the slightest relationship between the industrial accident and the injury
in question. To properly dispose of this claim, it is
necessary to analyze the contrasting functions of
the medical panel and ALJ, as well as the proper
causation standard.
A. Function of Medical Panel
Referring to the Perchelli case, and other cases
involving further medical complications flowing
from a compensable injury, Professor Larson notes
that "[t]he issue in all of these cases is exclusively
the medical issue of causal connection between the
primary*845 injury and the subsequent medical
complications." 1 Larson, § 13.11(a) at 3-517. Utah
Code Ann. § 35-l-77(lXa) (1991) provides for permissive referral of the medical causation issue to a
medical panel by the ALJ:

of its expertise." IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584
P.2d 828, 830 (Utah 1978). ™4 However, "the final responsibility of making the decision as to the
issues in such a proceeding is given to the Commission," id, and the medical panel may not take over
this responsibility of the Commission. Id at 830 n.
4. Accord Jensen v. United States Fuel Co., 424
P.2d 440, 442 (Utah 1967).™5 Thus, the role of
the medical panel is only "to assist the administrative law judge in deciding whether medical cause
has been proven." Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 731 P. 2d 1079, 1084 (Utah 1986)
(emphasis added).™6
FN4. "The medical panel ... shall make
such study, take such X-rays, and perform
such tests ... as it may determine to be necessary or desirable." Utah Code Ann. §
35-l-77(2Xa)(1991).
FN5. In Jensen, the Utah Supreme Court
held that
[i]t is not the panel's prerogative to encroach upon the authority vested in the
Commission to make the findings of fact
and render the decision upon the application. Its proper purpose is limited to
medical examination and diagnosis, the
evidence of which is to be considered by
the Commission in arriving at its de- cision.
424P.2dat442.

Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for
injury by accident, or for death, arising out of and
in the course of employment, and if the employer
or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may refer the medical aspects of the case
to a medical panel appointed by the commission.
See also Workers' Comp. Fund v. Industrial
Comm'n, 761 P.2d 572,576 (Utah App.1988).
The function of the medical panel is to give the
Commission "the benefit of its diagnosis relating to
those matters that are particularly within the scope

FN6. "It is through the expertise of the
medical panel that the Commission should
be able to make the determination of
whether the injury sustained by a claimant
is causally connected or contributed to by
the claimant's employment." Schmidt v. Industrial Comm'n, 617 P.2d 693, 697 (Utah
1980) (Wilkins, J., concurring).
B. Propriety of ALJ's Approach
In the instant case, the question submitted by
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the ALJ to the medical panel constituted a broad request for information in the form of a medical opinion on the relationship, if any, between Taylor's
disc fusion surgery and the prior industrial injury.
In a sense, then, whether the question, as phrased,
incorporated the correct legal standard for causation
is inconsequential because the ALJ, not the medical
panel, is responsible for making the actual decision
regarding medical causation. Id See also Jensen,
424P.2dat442.
[3] We do not agree with IHC that the correct
standard for determining employer liability for subsequent injuries occurring after an industrial injury
essentially amounts to a "but for" analysis. In
Mountain States Casing Servs. v. McKean, 706
P.2d 601 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court
stated that a [a] subsequent injury is compensable if
it is found to be a natural result of a compensable
primary injury." Id at 602 (emphasis added). A
claimant "is not required to show that his original
tragedy was the sole cause of a subsequent injury,
but only that the initial work-related accident was a
contributing cause " of the subsequent injury. Id
(emphasis added). McKean and Perchelli both draw
from Larson's statement of the general rule regarding workers' compensation, which provides in pertinent part:
The basic rule is that a subsequent injury,
whether an aggravation of the original injury or a
new and distinct injury, is compensable if it is the
direct and natural result of a compensable
primary injury.
1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, §
13.11 (1992). In discussing the Perchelli case, Professor Larson observed that the result in that case
was correct: "The presence of the sneezing incident, which triggered pain and then disc surgery,]
should not obscure the true nature of the case,
which is nothing more than a further medical*846
complication flowing from a compensable injury."
1 Larson, § 13.11(a) at 3-516.

IHC argues, McKean requires more of a causal connection than the phraseology of the inquiry to the
medical panel may suggest. The record reveals that
despite the imprecise phrasing of the causation
question submitted to the medical panel, the ALJ,
after examining the panel's report, applied the correct legal standard in determining causation. In its
report submitted to the Industrial Commission, the
medical panel arrived at a conclusion, based on its
medical expertise, that Taylor's September 1989
surgery was 70% the result of the March 1987 industrial injury and 30% the result of the April 15,
1989, incident in lifting the baby. This is hardly the
immaterial causal link IHC fears the ALJs question
might have elicited. Such a conclusion was entirely
within the authority of the medical panel. Relying
upon this medical conclusion, the ALJ then went on
to apply the compensability test as described by
Larson. See 1 Larson, § 13.11(a) at 3-517. The applicable test includes an analysis of the facts surrounding the subsequent injury and analysis of the
connection between the subsequent injury and the
original compensable industrial injury. Determinations regarding factual circumstances surrounding
an industrial injury must be ruled on by the ALJ.
Cf. Price River Coal Co.t 731 P.2d at 1084 ("It is
not the role of the medical panel to resolve conflicts
in the factual evidence regarding the injured party's
activities.").
In submitting to the medical panel a broad request for medical information and opinion on the
issue of medical causation, while reserving for herself the ultimate determination on the narrower issue of legal causation, the ALJ acted in accordance
with the rules enunciated in Price River Coal Co.
and McKean. We therefore see no prejudicial error
in the submission of the question, as phrased, to the
medical panel.
MEDICAL PANEL'S ALLEGED IMPROPER ASSUMPTION OF FACTS
Lastly, IHC claims the medical panel acted
beyond its authority in assuming facts not in evidence, weighing facts, and acting as factfinder. Spe-

[4] While the applicable test is not "but for," as
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cifically, IHC claims that, contrary to fee evidence
and Taylor's own testimony, the medical panel determined that Taylor did not actually pick up the
child in the April 15,1989, lifting incident.
[5] As discussed previously, the role of the
medical panel is controlled by statute and administrative rule. The Industrial Commission "may refer
the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel
appointed by fee commission." Utah Code Ann. §
35-1-77 (1990). While the medical panel is
"responsible to make findings regarding disputed
medical aspects of a compensation claim," Utah
AdmiitCode R490-1-1(F) (1991), the role of the
medical panel is limited. IGA Food Fair v. Martin,
584 P.2d 828, 830 (Utah 1978). In no sense may fee
medical panel act as "factfinder" in fee same way
fee ALJ ultimately finds facts. Price River Coal Co.
v. Industrial Comm% 731 P. 2d 1079, 1084 (Utah
1986).FN7 *847 Nor may fee panel base its conclusions on fee assumption of facts not in evidence.
See Utah Packers, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 24
Utah 2d 230, 469 P.2d 500, 503 (1970). Finally, fee
medical panel may not, except in limited circumstances, assess the credibility of fee claimant's testimony. See Zimmerman v. Industrial Comm'n, 785
P.2d 1127,1133 (Utah App.1989).
FN7. Section 35-1-77, rule 490-l-l(F), and
some reported decisions refer to fee medical panel making "findings" about fee medical aspects of a case. See, e.g.t Anderson
v. Dominic Elec, 660 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah
1983)
(commission adopted panel's
"findings" as its own). However, fee term,
as employed in those authorities, must be
distinguished from "findings" in its termof-art sense, which refers to fee
nondelegable duty of fee ALJ and Commission to "find fee facts" or make
"findings of fact" Section 35-l-77(2Xd)
illustrates this distinction:
The commission may base its finding
and decision on the report of fee panel,
medical director, or medical consultants,

but is not bound by the report if other
substantial conflicting evidence in the
case supports a contrary finding.
See also Pittsburgh Testing Lab. v.
Keller, 657 P.2d 1367, 1371-72 (Utah
1983) (decision and findings of Commission upheld where, despite contrary
"findings" of fee medical panel, competent and comprehensive medical evidence
in record supported Commission's finding feat there was causal connection
between distress at place of work and
worker's heart attack four days later);
Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wallace, 728
P.2d
1021, 1022 (Utah
1986)
(notwithstanding medical panel finding
that worker's condition needed medical
treatment for three months after accident, Industrial Commission's finding
feat woikefs condition stabilized 23
months after accident and feat worker
was feus eligible for temporary total disability benefits during feat period was
supported by evidence).
[6] IHC points to fee medical panel's statement
in its report feat on April 15, 1989, Taylor did not
actually pick up fee child, claiming fee panel's
statement directly contradicts Taylor's testimony at
fee hearing. IHC further argues feat fee medical
panel's statement indicates fee panel questioned
Taylors credibility in determining which version of
her story is valid. Thus, IHC argues, fee panel, contrary to Taylor's testimony, minimized fee amount
of exertion by Taylor on April 15, 1989, thereby
improperly limiting fee contribution of feat incident"
to Taylors need for surgery.
We agree wife fee Industrial Commission's
conclusion feat this argument appears to be one of
semantics. Taylor testified at fee hearing, feat on
April 15, 1989, she bent over to pick up fee grandchild, lifted him partially out of a walker, but was
unable to lift him further or place him back in fee
walker. In a bent over position, Taylor held fee

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 8
839P.2d841
(Cite as: 839 P.2d 841)
child until his mother relieved her. The medical
panel report states:
It is noted that the records have indicated she
picked up the grandchild, but no details as to the
weight or size appearing in the record, so that the
applicants current interpretation of the 4 monthold child that she reached out to pick up but did
not pick up is probably valid.
However, in its report, the medical panel also
stated that "[a]gain on 15 April 1989, she was noted
to have turned the wrong way and picked up a
grandchild with sudden onset of pain in the lower
back radiating again to the right leg." It is clear
from the report that the medical panel considered
fee physician's notes detailing the event as well as
Taylor's testimonial version of the event. Apparently, whether Taylor actually picked up the child
seems to have played no part in the panel's ultimate
conclusion. The panel stated, with our emphasis:
It would appear that the intention to lift a
13-pound child is well within the limits of lifting
allowed by her treating physician ... so that this
probably should not be considered a breach of
treatment recommendations.
The panel clearly considered other evidence in
reaching its conclusion, such as Taylor's continuing
treatment for back discomfort from the time of the
industrial accident in 1987 up to April of 1989, and
a similar incident resulting in identical symptoms in
October of 1987.*** The medical panel acted
within its authority in considering all evidence pertaining to die April 1989 lifting incident and forming a medical conclusion based on that evidence. In
forming its conclusion, die medical panel made no
inappropriate credibility determinations, nor did it
engage in factfinding beyond its authority. Rather,
it is clear from the record that the medical panel
based its determination on medical evidence in the
record: Even if the child was actually lifted,
Taylor's act of lifting the child was not outside the
range of activity allowed by her treating physician.
Thus, the question whether Taylor actually lifted
the child became essentially irrelevant, and the

medical panel could properly conclude that the prior industrial injury, and not any actual lifting of the
child-much less a mere bending incident to an attempted lifting-was the primary cause of the second
injury.
?•
, FN8. The medical panel's review of
Taylor's file revealed that "the pattern of
her difficulty has been well confirmed,
with low back pain radiating to the right
leg, particularly to the small toes on the
right" The panel noted that an incident
similar to die April 15, 1989, lifting incident occurred in October of 1987 when she
" 'moved wrong/ and had extreme back
pain." Apparently Taylor was at work, and,
turning to get out of a chair, she "felt acute
onset of lumbosacral back pain with radiating pain into die foot and leg."
*848 CONCLUSION
Because IHC failed to properly marshal the
evidence in support of the ALTs findings, we decline to disturb tiiose findings as ratified by the Industrial Commission. The question submitted by
the ALJ to the medical panel concerning medical
causation constituted a broad request for information in die form of a medical opinion. Relying upon
die medical panel's more focused and wellsupported conclusion, die ALJ applied the correct
standard in making die ultimate determination concerning medical and legal causation. Finally, IHCs
arguments concerning the medical panel's alleged
inappropriate assumption of facts not in evidence,
weighing of facts, and finding of facts are without
merit. The medical panel acted well within its audiority in formulating its opinion regarding medical
causation. For the foregoing reasons, the order of
the Industrial Commission denying IHCs motion
for review is affirmed.
BILLINGS and RUSSON, JJ., concur.
UtahApp.,1992.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Board of Review
of Indus. Com'n of Utah
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Westiaw.
Pagel
11 P.3d 277,404 Utah Adv. Rep. 9,2000 UT 75
(Citeas:llP.3d277)
whether to set aside a default judgment.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Kurtis LUND dba Kurt Lund Construction and B &
B Drywall, Inc., Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Fon Ray BROWN, III, Sally Brown, and John Does
and Jane Does 1-10, Defendants and Appellees.
No. 981778.
Sept. 22,2000.
General contractor and drywall subcontractor
en home construction project brought action against
homeowner to foreclose mechanic's liens, and
homeowner filed counterclaims. After contractor
filed bankruptcy petition, and contractor and subcontractor did not file answers to counterclaims
based on belief that bankruptcy stay applied to
counterclaims, default judgment was entered. Contractor and subcontractor moved to vacate judgment, and the District Court, Cache County, Gordon J. Low, J., denied motion. Contractor and subcontractor appealed. The Supreme Court, Durrant,
J., held that: (1) belief that stay applied to counterclaims provided a reasonable justification or excuse
for failure to answer, and could provide basis for
relief from judgment; (2) contractor and subcontractor, whose default was not based on a failure to
appear, were entitled to notice of request for default
judgment; and (3) allegations in original complaints
were sufficient to show a meritorious defense.
Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes
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228 Judgment
228IV By Default
228IV(B) Opening or Setting Aside Default
228kl39 k. Discretion of court. Most
Cited Cases
While trial court's discretion in deciding
whether to set aside default judgment is broad, it is
not unlimited, and as a threshold matter, court's ruling must be based on adequate findings of fact and
on the law.
[3] Courts 106 €==*26(3)
106 Courts
1061 Nature, Extent, and Exercise of Jurisdiction
in General
1061(A) In General
106k26 Scope and Extent of Jurisdiction
in General
106k26(3) k. Abuse of discretion in
general. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 106k26)
A decision premised on flawed legal conclusions constitutes an abuse of discretion.
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228 Judgment
228IX Opening or Vacating
228k344 k. Discretion of court. Most Cited
Cases
Trial court's discretion in ruling on motion for
relief from judgment based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect should be exercised in furtherance of justice, and should incline
towards granting relief in a doubtful case to the end
that the party may have a hearing. Rules Civ.Proc.,
Rule 60(b).
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228 Judgment
228IV By Default
228IV(B) Opening or Setting Aside Default
228kl43 Excuses for Default
228kl43(3) k. Mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect in general. Most Cited Cases
If a default judgment is issued when a party
genuinely is mistaken to a point where, absent such
mistake, default would not have occurred, the
equity side of the court should grant relief. Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 60(b).
[61 Judgment 228 €==>139
228 Judgment
228IV By Default
228IV(B) Opening or Setting Aside Default
228kl39 k. Discretion of court Most
Cited Cases
It is uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment where
there is reasonable justification or excuse for the
defendant's failure to appear, and timely application
is made to set it aside. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 60.
[7] Appeal and Error 30 €=>865
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on
Nature of Decision Appealed from
30k865 k. On appeal from judgment by
confession or default or from orders relating
thereto. Most Cited Cases
Appellate court reviews for correctness trial
court's determination of whether a defense is meritorious, as required to obtain vacatur of default
judgment.
[8] Judgment 228 €>=H43(3)
228 Judgment
228IV By Default
228IV(B) Opening or Setting Aside Default

228kl43 Excuses for Default
228kl43(3) k. Mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect in general. Most Cited Cases
Belief by contractor who had been hired to
build home, and drywall subcontractor, that stay
resulting from contractor's filing of bankruptcy petition applied to counterclaims asserted by
homeowner after contractor and subcontractor
brought suit to foreclose mechanic's liens, and thus
excused their failure to file answers, provided a
reasonable justification or excuse for their failure to
answer, which could provide basis for relief from
default judgment which had been entered with respect to counterclaims. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.CA. §
362; Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 60(b).
[91 Bankruptcy 51 €^>2394.1
51 Bankruptcy
51IV Effect of Bankruptcy Relief; Injunction
and Stay
51IV(B) Automatic Stay
51k2394 Proceedings, Acts, or Persons
Affected
51k2394.1 k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
Bankruptcy 51 €=>2395
51 Bankruptcy
51IV Effect of Bankruptcy Relief; Injunction
and Stay
51IV(B) Automatic Stay
51k2394 Proceedings, Acts, or Persons
Affected
51k2395 k. Judicial proceedings in
general. Most Cited Cases
Bankruptcy Code imposes an automatic stay on
any action against the debtor that was or could have
been commenced prior to the bankruptcy, and on
any act to obtain, or exercise control over, property
of the bankruptcy estate. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A.
§362(aXU).
[10] Bankruptcy 51 €==>2396
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51 Bankruptcy
51IV Effect of Bankruptcy Relief; Injunction
and Stay
51IV(B) Automatic Stay
51k2394 Proceedings, Acts, or Persons
Affected
51k2396 k. Co-debtors and third persons. Most Cited Cases
Bankruptcy Code forbids prosecution of an action against a non-debtor where the claim is one
which could also be asserted by the bankruptcy
trustee. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 362.

[13] Statutes 361 €=>206
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic
Aids to Construction
361k206 k. Giving effect to entire statute. Most Cited Cases
Where possible, court must give meaning to all
provisions of a statute.
[14] Statutes 361 €=^206

[11] Judgment 228 €=^123(1)
228 Judgment
228IV By Default
228IV(A) Requisites and Validity
228kl21 Application for Judgment
228kl23 Proceedings in General
228kl23(l) k. In general. Most
Cited Cases
General contractor and subcontractor who had
brought action against homeowner to foreclose
mechanic's liens, and who were in default with respect to homeowner's counterclaims for breach of
contract due to reasonable belief that bankruptcy
stay applied to counterclaims, were entitled to notice of homeowner's motion for entry of default
judgment. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 5(a), 55.
[12J Judgment 228 €=^123(1)
228 Judgment
228IV By Default
228IV(A) Requisites and Validity
228kl21 Application for Judgment
228kl23 Proceedings in General
228kl23(l) k. In general. Most
Cited Cases
Rule creating exception to general principle
that it is unnecessary to give a party in default any
notice of any action taken applies to parties who
have appeared, but who are in default for other
reasons. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 5(a), 55.

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic
Aids to Construction
361k206 k. Giving effect to entire statute. Most Cited Cases
Any interpretation which renders parts or
words in a statute inoperative or superfluous is to
be avoided.
[15] Judgment 228 €^>145(1)
228 Judgment
228IV By Default
2281V(B) Opening or Setting Aside Default
228kl45 Meritorious Cause of Action or
Defense
228kl45(l) k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
Purpose of rule that relief from default judgment requires a showing of a meritorious defense is
to prevent the necessity of judicial review of questions which, on the face of the pleadings, are frivolous. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 60(b).
[16] Judgment 228 0^145(1)
228 Judgment
228IV By Default
228IV(B) Opening or Setting Aside Default
228kl45 Meritorious Cause of Action or
Defense
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228kl45(l) k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
Party need not actually prove its proposed defense in order to establish a meritorious defense
sufficient to allow grant of relief from default judgment. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b).

counterclaims based on their reasonable belief that
stay resulting from contractor's bankruptcy petition
applied to counterclaims. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 362; Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b).
*278 Diane H. Banks, Robert A. Garda, Jr., Salt
Lake City, for plaintiffs.

[17J Judgment 228 €>^145(4)
Christopher L. Daines, Logan, for defendants.
228 Judgment
228IV By Default
228IV(B) Opening or Setting Aside Default
228k 145 Meritorious Cause of Action or
Defense
228kl45(4) k. Sufficiency of defense.
Most Cited Cases
Fundamental policy underlying rule that relief
from default judgment requires a showing of a meritorious defense is simply to prevent the necessity
of treating defenses that are frivolous on their face,
and thus, where a party presents a clear and specific
proffer of a defense that, if proven, would preclude
total or partial recovery by die claimant or counterclaimant, it has adequately shown a nonfrivolous
and meritorious defense, for purposes of motion to
set aside a default judgment. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
60(b).
[18] Judgment 228 €=^145(4)
228 Judgment
228IV By Default
228IV(B) Opening or Setting Aside Default
228kl45 Meritorious Cause of Action or
Defense
228kl45(4) k. Sufficiency of defense.
Most Cited Cases
Allegations by general contractor and drywall
subcontractor in their actions to foreclose mechanic's liens against homeowner that they had entered
into contract to build a house, and that homeowner
had failed to pay for work done, were sufficient to
establish meritorious defense to homeowner's
breach of contract counterclaims, as required to allow grant of relief from default judgment entered
after contractor and subcontractor failed to answer

DURRANT, Justice:
% 1 Plaintiffs below, Kurtis Lund (Lund) and B
& B Drywall (B & B) appeal the trial court's denial
of their motion to vacate an entry of default judgment. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND
J 2 In September 1996, Fon and Sally Brown
(the Browns) hired Lund to construct a house. Lund
hired B & B as a subcontractor to install drywall
Lund worked on the house between October 1996
and May 1997. *279 B & B worked on the house in
April and May 1997. When the Browns refused to
pay them for their work, Lund and B & B filed
mechanic's liens.
% 3 In November 1997, Lund and B & B filed
an action in district court seeking to foreclose on
their liens. Specifically, they both sought reimbursement for their own work and Lund also sought
reimbursement for its work and the work performed
by the subcontractors, including B & B. The
Browns filed an answer and counterclaim on
December 15, 1997, alleging that Lund had
breached the construction contract. In addition, the
Browns alleged that B & B had breached its contract with Lund, thereby causing damages to the
Browns as the intended third party beneficiaries.
The Browns sought money damages and an order
releasing the liens.
K 4 On December 29, 1997, before replies to
the Browns' counterclaim were due, Lund filed for
bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Utah. Lund's claim against the
Browns therefore became an asset of his bank-
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ruptcy estate. Lund notified both the trial court and
the Browns of the bankruptcy proceedings. Because
Lund and B & B believed that bankruptcy code section 362(a) automatically stayed any actions involving property of the bankruptcy estate, neither
Lund nor B & B filed a reply to the Browns1 counterclaim.
K 5 Without providing notice, the Browns*
counsel, Mr. Garda, sought a default judgment
against Lund and B & B for failing to reply to the
counterclaim. On May 21, 1998, the trial court
entered defaults against Lund and B & B. On May
28, the trial court entered default judgments, declaring Lund's and B & B's liens invalid and requiring
B & B to pay specified damages and attorney fees.
The Browns1 counsel notified Lund and B & B by
mail of the default judgments on June 17,1998.
\ 6 Shortly thereafter, Lund and B & B filed a
motion to set aside the default judgments pursuant
to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Lund and B
& B argued that the judgments should be vacated
under the "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" prong of rule 60 because they had
believed the bankruptcy case stayed any further actions regarding their complaint or the counterclaim.
Lund and B & B asserted several other reasons why
the judgments should be set aside, including that
the Browns did not provide them required notice of
the default actions.
1 7 The Browns countered that they complied
with all notice requirements, that the bankruptcy
stay did not apply to B & B, and that the stay did
not prohibit a declaratory judgment, such as one invalidating the mechanic's lien, against Lund. The
Browns claimed that neither Lund nor B & B had
any justifiable reason for failing to respond to the
counterclaim. The Browns argued in the alternative
that even if Lund or B & B could satisfy rule 60(b),
the default judgments should not be vacated because neither of them had demonstrated the existence of a "meritorious defense" to the counter- claim.

% 8 The trial court denied Lund's and B & B's
motion to vacate "[f]or reasons stated" by the
Browns. Lund and B & B now appeal. On appeal
we must decide whether the trial court correctly determined that (1) neither Lund nor B & B had a
reasonable excuse for failing to respond to the
counterclaim and that (2) Lund and B & B did not
have a "meritorious defense" to the counterclaim.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1][2][3] % 9 As to the first issue, a trial court
has broad discretion in deciding whether to set
aside a default judgment. See Katz v. Fierce, 732
P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). Though
broad, the court's discretion is not unlimited. As a
threshold matter, a court's ruling must be "based on
adequatefindingsof fact" and "on the law." May v.
Thompson, 611 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Utah 1984) (per
curiam). A decision premised on flawed legal conclusions, for instance, constitutes an abuse of discretion.
[4][5] % 10 Moreover, the nature of a default
judgment and the equitable nature of rule 60
provide further limits. See id; see also Schwab v.
Bullock's Inc., 508 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir.1974)
(explaining limits to trial court's discretion under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (which is virtually identical to *280 Utah's rule 60)); 11 Charles
Alan Wright, Arthur R, Miller & Mary Kay Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2857, at 257-58
(2d ed.1995) (stating that "[bjased on the remedial
nature of Rule 60(b), the discretion of the district
court to deny a motion for relief is limited"). For
example, we have stated that a trial court's
"discretion should be exercised in furtherance of
justice and should incline towards granting relief in
a doubtful case to the end that the party may have a
hearing." Helgesen v. Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079,
1081 (Utah 1981) (citing Warren v. Dixon Ranch
Co., 123 Utah 416, 420, 260 P.2d 741, 743 (1953));
see also Katz, 732 P.2d at 93 (stating that courts
should be indulgent toward vacating default judgments where the defaulted party demonstrates a
reasonable justification or excuse for failing to an-
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swer). Likewise, we have stated that "if default is
issued when a party genuinely is mistaken to a
point where, absent such mistake, default would not
have occurred, the equity side of the court ...
[should] grant relief." May, 611 P.2d at 1110.

the bankruptcy stay did not prohibit actions against
a nondebtor like B & B nor did it prohibit a declaratory judgment against the debtor, Lund, and, therefore, neither Lund nor B & B had a justifiable reason for not responding.

[6] % 11 Based on these principles, this court
has stated that " 'it is quite uniformly regarded as
an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default
judgment where there is reasonable justification or
excuse for the defendants failure to appear, and
timely application is made to set it aside.' " Helgesen, 636 P.2d at 1081 (quoting Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 54, 376 P.2d 951,
952 (1962)). Thus, while we review the trial court's
decision in the instant case for abuse of discretion,
we emphasize that the court's discretion is not unlimited.

[8] % 16 We need not decide the exact scope of
the bankruptcy stay in order to find that Lund's and
B & B's reliance on the stay merits relief from the
default judgment. For rule 60(b) purposes, it is
enough to state that there is substantial support for
Lund's and B & B's interpretation of bankruptcy
law. In other words, under rule 60(b), Lund and B
& B need not show that their interpretation of bankruptcy law is legally correct, but merely that they
possessed a reasonable, good faith belief that the
bankruptcy stay was effective against the Browns'
counterclaim. In this regard, it is worth noting that
the bankruptcy stay provision "is drafted so broadly
that it encompasses all types of legal proceedings,"
including "actions seeking injunctive or similar relief as well as actions seeking money judgments." 1
Collier Bankruptcy Manual % 362.03[1] (Lawrence
P. King ed., 3d ed.1999). For this reason, any party
"seeking to take action against the debtor or its
property is well advised to assume that the stay applies and seek relief by appropriate proceedings in
the bankruptcy court." Id 1362.03[4][b].

[7] \ 12 As to the second issue on appeal, we
review for correctness the trial court's determination of whether a defense is meritorious. See Erickson v. Schenkers Ml Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d
1147,1148 (Utah 1994).
ANALYSIS
I. RULE 60(b)
% 13 Rule 60(b) provides that a "court may in
the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" Utah R.
Civ. P. 60(bXl).
% 14 Lund and B & B offer two grounds for
their argument that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to set aside the default judgment.
First, they argue that they were reasonably justified,
for rule 60(b) purposes, in not replying to the
Browns' counterclaim because of the bankruptcy
stay. Second, they assert that the Browns' failure to
notify them of the default motion justifies their failure to respond.
K 15 With respect to the first contention, the
Browns countered, and the trial court agreed, that

[9] % 17 Pertinent to the instant case, the bankruptcy code imposes an automatic stay on. any action against the debtor that was or could have been
commenced prior to the *281 bankruptcy, and on
any act to obtain, or exercise control over, property
of the bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C.A. §
362(aXl), (3) (1993). Lund's mechanic's lien constituted a legal interest in the Browns' home, see,
e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (1997), which became protected property of the bankruptcy estate.
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(1) (1993). Therefore,
Lund and B & B were reasonably justified in not
responding to the assertion in the counterclaim that
the liens should be released because any attempt to
do so could potentially violate the stay as an act "to
exercise control over property of the [bankruptcy]
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estate." W.§362(aX3).

take this opportunity to elucidate the rules in question.

[10] J 18 Further, B & B justifiably believed
that a bankruptcy stay prohibits actions against
nondebtors in some situations. For instance, the
bankruptcy code forbids "prosecution of an action
against a non-debtor where the claim is one which
could also be asserted by the bankruptcy trustee."
In re US. Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 113 B.R. 487, 490
(Bankr.N.Dind.1990); see also 1 Collier Bankruptcy Manual % 362.03[3]. In the instant case, the
Browns1 damages claim against B & B is premised
on B & B!s alleged breach of contract with Lund.
Certainly, Lund possessed the right to pursue such a
claim against B & B. Hence, the Browns were arguably barred from doing so under the stay. Therefore, B & B reasonably believed that it did not need
to reply to the Browns' counterclaim.
f 19 Under the circumstances of this case,
Lund's and B & B's good faith, legitimate belief
that no action would or could be taken against them
due to the bankruptcy stay constitutes a "reasonable
justification or excuse" for their failure to reply to
(he counterclaim.
[11] <| 20 We therefore conclude that, standing
alone, the arguable applicability of the bankruptcy
stay provides sufficient justification to excuse
Lund's and B & B's failure to reply under rule 60(b)
. W e nonetheless address the second argument because we deem it important to clarify the requirements of the procedural rules relating to provision
of notice of motions for default judgment. We also
conclude that the Browns' failure to provide notice
of the default judgment proceedings provides additional justification for granting Lund and B & B relief from the judgments.
% 21 The Browns' attorney argues that he had
no obligation to notify Lund and B & B of the default judgment proceedings and that the lack of notice cannot therefore furnish a basis for setting the
defaults aside.™1 Because (he Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure are not a model of clarity in explaining
(he notice requirements to parties in default, we

FN 1. In the alternative, the Browns' attorney argues that he did in fact notify Lund
and B & B of the default judgment proceedings by sending them a copy of an affidavit of attorney fees in support of default judgment. The Browns' attorney did
not make this argument to the trial court in
response to the motion to vacate the judgment even though Lund's and B & B's
counsel submitted an affidavit to the trial
court in support of the motion that categorically denied receiving "any papers in conjunction with the default judgment, or beforehand." Instead, the Browns' attorney
simply argued that no notice was required.
We decline to address counsel's new argument raised for the first time on appeal.
[12] % 22 Our inquiry begins with Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 5, which expresses the general
principle that notice of all proceedings must be
provided to all parties. Rule 55 provides an exception to (he general notice rule. Subpart (aX2) of rule
55, subtitled "[n]otice to party in default," states in
pertinent part that it is unnecessary to give a party
in default "any notice" of any action taken "except
as provided in Rule 5(a) " Thus, rule 55(aX2) establishes that there is a limitation to the scope of rule
55's notice exception (hat parties in default are not
entitled to further notice, and that the limitation is
found somewhere in rule 5(a).
[13][14] % 23 Rule 5(a) contains two subparts.
Subpart (1) requires that "every written motion other than one which may be heard ex parte ... shall be
served upon each of the parties." Utah R. Civ. P.
5(aXl). Subpart (1) cannot logically be read as the
limitation referenced by rule 55(aX2). If so read,
rule 55(aX2) and rule 5(a)(1) taken together would
provide, in effect, that notice to a party in default is
not required where *282 notice is not required. Under this reading, rule 55(aX2)'s reference to a rule
(5)(a) limitation is wholly superfluous and leaves
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the question begging as to just what the limitation
is. We will not adopt such a reading in light of the
well-established principle of statutory construction
requiring us to give meaning, where possible, to all
provisions of a statute. See A.C. Fin. Inc. v. Salt
Lake County, 948 P.2d 771, 779 (Utah 1997). As
we have previously noted, " '[A]ny interpretation
which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous is to be avoided.' " State v. Hunt,
906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995) (quoting United
States v. Rowlings, 821 F.2d 1543, 1545 (11th
Cir.1987)).
\ 24 Subpart (2) of rule 5(a) seems the more logical candidate to provide the limitation referenced
in rule 55(a). First, it explicitly references notice requirements with respect to parties in default.
Second, while it includes no express, affirmative
limitation on the scope of rule 55's default party exception to the general notice requirements, it does
provide a limitation by implication. Subpart (2)
provides that "[n]o service need be made on parties
in default for failure to appear except as provided in
Rule 55(aX2)." Utah R. Civ. P. 5(aXl) & (2). Thus,
subpart (2) impliedly creates two classes of defaulting parties, those in default for failure to appear and
those in default for other reasons. The negative
pregnant of subpart (2)'s provision that notice need
not be given to parties in default for failure to appear is that notice should be given to parties in default who have made an appearance. There is an obvious policy justification for distinguishing
between these two classes of defaulting parties. A
much more compelling case can be made for requiring notice to a party who is in default but has nonetheless elected to participate at some level in an
action than for requiring notice to a party who has
declined to participate in any regard by simply ignoring previous notice given in the form of the
complaint.
H 25 Two additional considerations confirm the
validity of subpart (2)'s implication that notice must
be given to a party in default who has appeared.
First, interpreted this way, rule 5(a)(2) provides the

required limitation on the scope of the default party
exception referred to in rule 55(aX2). As noted
above, no other section of rule 5(a) can be legitimately read as providing the limitation. Only this interpretation gives meaning to what would otherwise
be a superfluous reference to a limitation in rule
55(a).
% 26 Second, this interpretation of rule 5 mirrors the interpretation that has been made of its federal counterpart. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(a)
requires service of papers and pleadings on each
party not in default for failure to appear. Thus, by
appearing at any time in the action, a party becomes entitled to have his attorney notified of all
subsequent proceedings and receive copies of all
papers, even if he later chooses to default.
Wright et al., supra K 11, § 1144, at 416
(footnotes omitted); see also New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 142 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating
that defendant's appearance entitled him to service
of all papers, including the summary judgment motion made and granted after defendant had been defaulted). The federal interpretation is persuasive in
light of the fact that our rule 5 is "substantially similar" to federal rule 5. See Utah R. Civ. P. 5 compiler's notes.
<[ 27 The Browns1 attorney argues that this
court has previously held that rule 5 does not require notice be given to parties in default He misreads our precedent. In Central Bank & Trust v.
Jensen, the case upon which he relies, we held that
rule 5(a) excludes "parties in default from those entitled to notice." 656 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Utah 1982).
In that case, however, we did not address the circumstance where a party having already made a
formal appearance in a case is subjected to a motion
for default judgment on a counterclaim. In Central
Bank & Trust, the defaulting party never made an
appearance prior to having default judgment
entered against him. Moreover, were we to apply
Central Bank & Trust's holding to all motions for
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default, we would render meaningless the provisions in rules 55 and 5 requiring notice of a motion
for default in particular categories of cases. Accordingly, we distinguish Central Bank & Trust's holding from *283 the instant case wherein Lund and B
& B made an appearance.
II. MERITORIOUS DEFENSE
[15] % 28 We have held that relief from judgment requires a showing of a meritorious defense to
a claim. The purpose of the meritorious defense
rule is " 'to prevent the necessity of judicial review
of questions which, on the face of the pleadings, are
frivolous.' " Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1149 (quoting
State ex rel Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. Musselman, 667
P.2d 1053, 1060 (Utah 1983) (Durham, J., dissenting)). The rule requires the party seeking to set
aside a judgment to " 'show' " that he or she " 'has
a meritorious defense to the action.' " Id. at 1148
(quoting Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1055-56 (plurality
opinion) (footnote omitted)). Thus, in the instant
case, our central inquiries are whether Lund and B
& B (1) adequately "showed" the trial court a (2)
proposed defense containing allegations, facts, or
claims that, if proven at trial, would preclude total
or partial recovery by the Browns. See, e.g., id at
1149. We address each issue in turn.
[16][17] % 29 Although we have never explained precisely what a party must do to adequately "show" a meritorious defense, we have
made it clear that a party need not actually prove its
proposed defenses to meet this standard. See id at
1148 (rejecting a standard essentially requiring that
the defaulted party prove its proposed defense before it is eligible to have a judgment vacated).
Moreover, we have clearly articulated the fundamental policy underlying the meritorious defense
rule. That policy is simply to prevent the necessity
of treating defenses that are frivolous on their face.
Thus, where a party presents a clear and specific
proffer of a defense that, if proven, would preclude
total or partial recovery by the claimant or counterclaimant, it has adequately shown a nonfrivolous
and meritorious defense for the purposes of its mo-

tion to set aside a default judgment. In their memorandum in support of the motion to set aside the default judgments, Lund and B & B argued the following to the trial court:
The Complaint alleges the Browns breached their
contract. The Counterclaim alleges the plaintiffs
[Lund & B & B] breached their contract. The
Complaint seeks enforcement of the mechanics
liens. The Counterclaim asserts the liens are invalid.
Plaintiffs [Lund and B & B] have already alleged meritorious defenses to the Counterclaim.
The defenses to the Counterclaim are readily apparent in the original Complaint.
[18] ^ 30 The complaint alleges that Lund
entered into a contract with the Browns to build a
house, that Lund contracted with B & B to install
drywall, and that the Browns failed to pay Lund
and B & B for work done. In particular, the complaint states that "Lund performed the various items
of labor and work, and furnished the materials necessary for the construction of the House in accordance with Lund's agreement with the Browns, including subcontracting with B & B and others."
(Emphasis added.) Claims one and two of the counterclaim essentially allege that Lund and B & B
breached their respective contracts by failing to
perform, or negligently performing, numerous contractual obligations. Claim three alleges that Lund
and B & B maliciously filed mechanics liens containing erroneous amounts owed and incorrect completion dates.
\ 31 Obviously, the complaint and counterclaim are based on the same disputed facts surrounding the performance of the same contract. The
respective allegations present genuine issues of material fact, the resolution of which, one way or the
other, will necessarily affect each party's ability to
recover for its own claims. For example, Lund specifically alleged that he performed "in accordance"
with the contract, while the Browns allege the opposite. It makes no difference for our purposes that
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the counterclaim is more specific than Lund's and B
& B's complaint. The critical fact remains that both
positions cannot be correct. In short, if Lund and B
& B prove their claims at trial, the Browns cannot
recover on their counterclaims.
% 32 This is in essence a simple contract claim.
Both the complaint and the counterclaim*284 turn
upon the essential question of whether the contract
was breached. In light of the fact that the trial court
already had possession of Lund's and B & B's complaint, there appears little more Lund and B & B
realistically could have done, short of proving their
claims in an evidentiary hearing, to "show" the trial
court their meritorious defense. Thus, we hold that
Lund and B & B adequately showed the trial court
their proposed meritorious defense. The trial court
erred in ruling otherwise.
CONCLUSION
^ 33 We reverse the trial court's denial of
Lund's and B & B's motion to vacate the default
judgments. The arguable applicability of the bankruptcy stay sufficiently excused them from replying
to the Browns' counterclaim under rule 60(b). In
addition, Lund and B & B have shown a meritorious defense to the counterclaim.
% 34 REVERSED and REMANDED.
K 35 Chief Justice HOWE, Associate Chief Justice
RUSSON, Justice DURHAM, and Justice
WILKINS concur in Justice DURRANTs opinion.
Utah,2000.
Lundv. Brown
11 P.3d 277,404 Utah Adv. Rep. 9,2000 UT 75
END OF DOCUMENT
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Supreme Court of Utah.
Enrique MARTINEZ, Respondent,
v.
MEDIA-PAYMASTER PLUS/CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, and
Labor Commission of Utah, Petitioners.
Nos. 20050745,20050750.
May 18,2007.
Background: Workers* compensation claimant
sought writ of review from an order of the Labor
Commission that denied claimant's claim for permanent total disability benefits. The Court of Appeals, 117 P.3d 1074, reversed and remanded.
Holdings: After granting certiorari, the Supreme
Court, Parrish, J., held that:
(1) Commission's factual findings were not inadequate as a matter of law so as to relieve claimant
of his obligation to marshal the evidence;
(2) when a party failed to marshal the evidence, the
reviewing court still retained discretion to determine if the appealed decision had adequate factual
support;
(3) determinations by the Commission, regarding
the "essential functions" of prior employment and
whether other work was Reasonably available,"
were factual findings reviewable under a substantial evidence standard of review, rather than an abuse of discretion; and
(4) claimant had the burden of proof to establish the
elements of permanent total disability.

30k757(3) k. Statement of Evidence. Most
Cited Cases
Appeal and Error 30 €^>854(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k851 Theory and Grounds of Decision
of Lower Court
30k854 Reasons for Decision
30k854(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
When there is no logical and legal basis for a
factfinder's ultimate conclusions, and there is no
principled basis on which to sustain the factual
findings, marshaling of the evidence by the appellant is not required because the findings are so inadequate that they cannot be meaningfully challenged as factual determinations.
[2] Workers* Compensation 413 €=>1756
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial
413XVI(P)6 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by Board, Commission, or Court
413kl751 Particular Facts and Conclusions
413kl756 k. Earnings and Impairment of Earning Capacity. Most Cited Cases
Workers1 Compensation 413 O^>1907

Court of Appeals reversed.
West Headnotes
[1] Appeal and Error 30 €^>757(3)
30 Appeal and Error
30X11 Briefs
30k757 Statement of Case or of Facts

413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)10 Assignments of Error and
Briefs
413kl907 k. Briefs. Most Cited Cases
Failure of Labor Commission in workers1
compensation proceeding to directly address
claimant's sitting and standing limitations or to al-
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low for some task modifications, in reaching its
conclusion that claimant's work-related impairments did not prevent him from performing fastfood work, did not render Commission's factual
findings inadequate as a matter of law such that
claimant was excused from marshalling the evidence on appeal, as Commission's finding that available fast-food positions could be modified to accommodate claimant's limitations was a logical
finding based on the presented evidence, and Commission's order did carefully consider claimant's
weight limitations on lifting and pushing, evidence
of symptom magnification, and the fast-food industry's practice of assigning tasks according to the
respective abilities of each individual employee.

[51 Administrative Law and Procedure 15A C^>
791
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15Ak784 Fact Questions
15Ak791 k. Substantial Evidence.
Most Cited Cases
Compliance with the marshalling of the evidence undertaking on appeal helps ensure that the
factual findings of an agency are overturned only
when lacking in substantial evidence. Rules
App.Proc, Rule 24(aX9).

[3] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A € = *
791

[6) Administrative Law and Procedure 15A © ^
784.1

15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15Ak784 Fact Questions
15Ak791 k. Substantial Evidence.
Most Cited Cases
To successfully challenge an agency's factual
findings, a party must marshal all of the evidence
supporting the findings and show that despite the
supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or
contradictory evidence, thefindingsare not supported by substantial evidence. Rules App.Proc, Rule
24(aX9).

15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15Ak784 Fact Questions
15Ak784.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
The marshaling of the evidence requirement
applies when a party challenges a court's or an
agency's factual findings, regardless of the standard
of review at issue.

[4] Appeal and Error 30 €=>757(3)
30 Appeal and Error
30X11 Briefs
30k757 Statement of Case or of Facts
30k757(3) k. Statement of Evidence. Most
Cited Cases
Marshalling of the evidence undertaking on appeal requires counsel to construct the evidence supporting the adversary's position, and then ferret out
a fatal flaw in the evidence. Rules App.Proc, Rule
24(aX9).

[7] Appeal and Error 30 €=>757(3)
30 Appeal and Error
30X11 Briefs
30k757 Statement of Case or of Facts
30k757(3) k. Statement of Evidence. Most
Cited Cases
The marshaling of the evidence requirement is
not a limitation on the power of the appellate
courts; rather, it is a tool pursuant to which die appellate courts impose on the parties an obligation to
assist them in conducting a whole record review,
and is not, itself, a rule of substantive law. Rules
App.Proc, Rule 24(aX9).
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[81 Appeal and Error 30 €=^757(3)
30 Appeal and Error
30X11 Briefs
30k757 Statement of Case or of Facts
30k757(3) k. Statement of Evidence. Most
Cited Cases
Parties that fail to marshal the evidence on appeal do so at the risk that the reviewing court will
decline, in its discretion, to review the trial court's
factual findings. Rules App.Proc, Rule 24(aX9).
[9] Appeal and Error 30 C^>757(3)
30 Appeal and Error
30X11 Briefs
30k757 Statement of Case or of Facts
30k757(3) k. Statement of Evidence. Most
Cited Cases
When a party fails to comply with the marshalling of the evidence requirement when challenging factual findings on appeal, a reviewing court
retains discretion to consider independently the
whole record and determine if the decision below
has adequate factual support. Rules App.Proc., Rule
24(aX9).
[10] Workers1 Compensation 413 €^1939.11(9)
413 Workers1 Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact,
Findings, and Verdict
413kl939 Review of Decision of Department, Commission, Board, Officer, or Arbitrator
413kl939.11 Particular Findings
413kl939.il (9) k. Amount and
Period of Compensation. Most Cited Cases
Determinations by the Labor Commission in a
workers' compensation proceeding, regarding the
"essential functions" of prior employment and
whether other work is "reasonably available," are
factual findings, and thus reviewed under a substantial evidence standard of review, rather than an

abuse of discretion standard of review; though the
word "essential" introduces a level of abstraction it
does not create a mixed question and the fact-finder
must make the determination based and factual
evidence and testimony from those with experience
in the particular industry, and considerations such
as an employee's age, education, past work experience, medical capacity and residual functional capacity that inform what is "reasonably available"
are factual considerations not further defined by an
overarching legal principle. West's U.C.A. §§
34A-2-801, 63-46b-16(4); U.C.A.1953, 34A-2-413
(2005).
[11] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A
€^754.1
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(D) Scope of Review in General
15Ak754 Discretion of Administrative
Agency
15Ak754.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Agency actions are reviewed for abuse of discretion when there is an express or implied delegation within the statute. West's U.C.A. § 63-46b-16
(4).
[12] Appeal and Error 30 €^842(9)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k83 8 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(9) k. Mixed Questions of
Law and Fact. Most Cited Cases
Codifying a factual issue does not transform an
issue from one of fact to a mixed question of law
and fact for purposes of determining the appropriate
standard of review.

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 4
164 P.3d 384,578 Utah Adv. Rep. 20,2007 UT 42
(Cite as: 164 P.3d 384)
[13] Appeal and Error 30 €^>842(9)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(9) k. Mixed Questions of
Law and Fact. Most Cited Cases
The existence of an articulable legal issue is a
necessary element of a mixed question, for purposes of determining the appropriate standard of review on appeal.
[14] Appeal and Error 30 €=>842(9)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XV1(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(9) k. Mixed Questions of
Law and Fact. Most Cited Cases
A "mixed question," subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review, is one in which a court
must determine when the articulated legal rule to be
applied to a set of facts, a rule that is established
without deference to the trial courts, embodies a de
facto grant of discretion which permits the trial
court to reach one of several possible conclusions
about the legal effect of a particular set of facts
without risking reversal.
[15] Appeal and Error 30 €>^>842(9)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact

30k842(9) k. Mixed Questions of
Law and Fact. Most Cited Cases
When determining whether an issue presents a
mixed question subject to an abuse of discretion
standard of review, the legal principle at issue must
first be identified.
[16] Appeal and Error 30 €=>842(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Appeal and Error 30 €>^842(9)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(9) k. Mixed Questions of
Law and Fact. Most Cited Cases
For purposes of determining the appropriate
standard of review, factual issues are generally empirical, legal issues apply an abstract rule regardless
of the specific facts, and mixed questions generally
arise when the applicability of the legal rule turns
on the combination of present facts.
[17] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A
€==>791
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Preview of
15 Ak784 Fact Questions
15Ak791 k. Substantial Evidence.
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Most Cited Cases
Substantial evidence exists on an appeal when
the factual findings support more than a mere scintilla of evidence though something less than the
weight of the evidence.
[18] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A

Most Cited Cases
Whole record review under substantial evidence test considers the evidence in support of the
administrative finding, as well as evidence that detracts from the finding. West's U.C.A. § 63-46b-16
(4Xg).
[21] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A
C=?791

15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15Ak784 Fact Questions
15Ak791 k. Substantial Evidence.
Most Cited Cases
An administrative law decision meets the substantial evidence test on appeal when a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate the evidence supporting the decision.
[19] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A
©=>791
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15Ak784 Fact Questions
15Ak791 k. Substantial Evidence.
Most Cited Cases
In order to determine whether an agency decision is supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court must consider the whole record before the lower court. West's U.C.A. § 63-46b-16
(4Xg).
[20] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A
€=>791
ISA Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15 Ak784 Fact Questions
15 Ak791 k. Substantial Evidence.

15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15Ak784 Fact Questions
15Ak791 k. Substantial Evidence.
Most Cited Cases
To aid an appellate court in conducting a whole
record review of an agency decision, the party challenging the factual findings must marshal all of the
evidence and demonstrate that, despite the facts
supporting the decision, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence. West's U.C.A. §
63-46b-16(4Xg).
[22] Appeal and Error 30 €^>842(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Burden of proof questions typically present issues of law that an appellate court reviews for correctness.
[23] Workers' Compensation 413 € ^ 1 3 7 5
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(L) Presumptions and Burden of Proof
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413XVI(L)2 Particular Matters
413kl373 Amount and Period of Compensation
413kl375 k. Extent and Duration of
Injury or Disability. Most Cited Cases
The Labor Commission does not have the authority to allocate the burden of proof on permanent
total disability determinations in workers' compensation proceedings; permanent total disability statute
only grants the Commission the authority to determine whether the facts presented meet the requirements for a finding of permanent total disability. U.C.A.1953,34A-2-413(lXc) (2005).
[24] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A
€=^760
15 A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(D) Scope of Review in General
15Ak754 Discretion of Administrative
Agency
15Ak760 k. Wisdom, Judgment or
Opinion. Most Cited Cases
. Grants of discretion to administrative agencies
should be limited to those issues on which the agencies have special experience or expertise placing
them in a better position than the courts to construe
the law.
[25] Appeal and Error 30 €=>842(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Supreme Court reviews the Court of Appeals'
interpretation of a statute for correctness.
[26] Statutes 361 € ^ 1 8 8

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361 V1(A) General Rules of Construction
361kl87 Meaning of Language
361kl88 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
When interpreting statutes, courts look first to
the statute's plain language with the primary objective of giving effect to the legislature's intent.
[27] Statutes 361 C=?188
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361 kl 87 Meaning of Language
361kl88 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Statutes 361 C=*212.6
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k212 Presumptions to Aid Construction
361k212.6 k. Words Used Most Cited
Cases
When interpreting a statute, courts presume
that the legislature used each word advisedly and
read each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.
[28] Statutes 361 €^>205
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic
Aids to Construction
361k205 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Statutes 361 C=*223.2(.5)
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
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361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k223 Construction with Reference to
Other Statutes
36ik2232 Statutes Relating to the
Same Subject Matter in General
361k223.2(.5) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Statutes should be read as a whole and their
provisions interpreted in harmony with related provisions and statutes.

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361 Vl(A) General Rules of Construction
36lkl87 Meaning of Language
36lkl90 k. Existence of Ambiguity.
Most Cited Cases
When viewed holistically, a statute is ambiguous if duplicative, yet plausible meanings are not
eliminatedfrompossibility.
132) Workers' Compensation 413 0=^1375

[29] Statutes 3610=^188
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361 V1(A) General Rules of Construction
361kl87 Meaning of Language
361U88 k. In General Most Cited
Cases
When the language of a statute is plain, interpretive tools beyond looking at the statute are not
needed.
[30] Statutes 361 C=*184
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361kl80 Intention of Legislature
361kl84 k. Policy and Purpose of Act
Most Cited Cases
Statutes 3 6 1 0 ^ 2 1 7 , 4
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k213 Extrinsic Aids to Construction
361k217.4 k. Legislative History in
General. Most Cited Cases
If the language of a statute is ambiguous, a
court may look beyond the statute to legislative history and public policy to ascertain the statute's intent.
p i ] Statutes 361 €>^190

413 Workers1 Compensation
4I3XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(L) Presumptions and Burden of Proof
413XVI(L)2 Particular Matters
4l3kl373 Amount and Period of Compensation
413kl375 k. Extent and Duration of
Injury or Disability. Most Cited Cases
An employee has the burden of proof to establish the elements of permanent total disability in a
workers' compensation proceeding. U.CA.1953,
34A-2-4l3(lXc)(2005).
[33] Statutes 361 € ^ 2 0 6
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic
Aids to Construction
361k206 k. Giving Effect to Entire
Statute. Most Cited Cases
Courts avoid construing a particular provision
of a statute so as to neutralize other provisions if
any other construction of the particular provision is
at all tenable.
*387 Richard R Buike, Salt Lake City, for respondent
Merrill F. Nelson, Christian S. Collins, Salt Lake
City, for Media-Paymaster Plus.
Alan L. Hennebold, Salt Lake City, for Labor
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Commission.
1

Floyd W Holm, Murray, for amicus Workers Compensation Fund.

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
PARRISH, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
\ 1 Enrique Martinez petitioned the Utah
Labor Commission (the "Commission") for an
award of permanent total disability compensation
against his former employer, Media-Paymaster Pius
("Media"). After an administrative law judge (the
"ALJ") denied his claim and the Commission confirmed die decision, Martinez sought a writ of review from the Utah Court of Appeals. The court of
appeals reversed the Commission's order and remanded the matter to the Commission to award
Martinez benefits. We granted certiorari to determine (1) whether the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review, and (2) whether the employee or the employer bears (he burden of proof
when an employee seeks compensation under Utah
Code section 34A-2-413(lXc).
t 2 Regarding the first issue, the court of appeals reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard the Commission's determination that Martinez
could perform die "essential functions" of his prior
employment, as well as its determination that other
work was "reasonably available" to him. Because
we conclude that the court of appeals should have
reviewed these determinations under a substantial
evidence standard, we remand them to die court of
appeals for consideration under die appropriate
standard of review. With regard to the second issue,
we conclude that an employee seeking an award of
permanent total disability bears the burden of proving each of the four elements specified under section 34A-2-4l3(lXc).

BACKGROUND
H 3 On October 28, 1996, while performing
temporary work as a movie extra for Media, Martinez slipped and fell on a wet floor, suffering in-

jury to his cervical spine and right shoulder. Martinez had retired from state employment in 1995
after working for 28 years as a maintenance specialist At the time of the accident, he was working
part-time at a McDonald's restaurant He continued
to work there until December 1996. In September
1997, Martinez tried to return to work at Media, but
no work was available. At that time, Martinez also
tried to return to light-duty work at McDonald's but
was told no such work was available. Martinez has
not worked since leaving McDonalds in December
1996.
f 4 On July 31, 2000, Martinez filed an action
with the Commission to compel Media to pay him
permanent total disability compensation for his injuries. Section 34A-2-413 of the Workers' Compensation Act (die "Act") governs permanent total
disability determinations. The relevant portions of
the Act are as follows:
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total
disability compensation, die employee has the
burden of proof to show by a preponderance of
evidence drat
0) die employee sustained a significant
impairment... as a result of die industrial accident or occupational disease that gives rise to
die permanent total disability cntidement;
(ii) die employee is permanently totally disabled; and
(iii) die industrial accident or occupational
disease was die direct cause of the employee's
permanent total disability.
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall conclude that:
(i) die employee is not gainfully employed;
*388 (ii) the employee has an impairment ...
that limit[s] the employee's ability to do basic
work activities;
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(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused
impairment ... prevents] the employee from
performing the essential functions of the work
activities for which the employee has been
qualified until the time of the industrial accident or occupational disease that is the basis
for the employee's permanent total disability
claim; and
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work
reasonably available, taking into consideration
the employee's:
(A) age;

capable of performing his prior job and other reasonably available work, and (2) fee Commission incorrectly allocated fee burden of proof. Martinez v.
Media-Paymaster Plus, 2005 UT App 308, %% 9, 13,
16,117 P.3d 1074.
\ 7 In reversing fee Commission on fee first issue, fee court of appeals reviewed for abuse of discretion fee Commission's application of its findings
of fact to the law. The court held feat fee Commission had abused its discretion in concluding feat
Martinez could perform fee essential functions of a
fast-food worker, id ffi 10-13, and in concluding
feat other work was reasonably available to Martinez, idLtl 14-15.

(B) education;
(C) past work experience;
(D) medical capacity; and
(E) residual functional capacity.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(bMc) (2005)
(amended 2006).
1 5 The ALJ denied Martinets claim, finding
feat Martinez "failed to prove that he cannot perform the essential functions of work he was qualified to perform, and ... failed to prove that there is
no other work reasonably available." Following the
denial of his claim by fee ALJ, Martinez appealed
to the Commission. The Commission confirmed fee
ALTs decision feat Martinez had failed to satisfy
two of fee elements required to establish permanent
total disability under section 34A-2-413. First, using Martinez's work at McDonald's as a benchmark,
fee Commission concluded that Martinez had failed
to show feat his impairments prevented him from
performing the essential functions of his position at
McDonald's. Second, fee Commission concluded
feat Martinez had failed to prove that he was unable
to perform other reasonably available work.
% 6 The court of appeals reversed fee Commission's order, holding that (1) fee Commission abused its discretion in concluding that Martinez was

\ 8 In reversing fee Commission on fee second
issue, the court of appeals focused on fee differences in language between Utah Code section
34A-2-4l3(lXc) ("subsection (c)") and Utah Code
section 34A-2-413(l)(b) ( "subsection (h)")™
Subsection (b) delineates three elements for which
an "employee has the burden of proof in order to
establish entitlement to benefits for permanent total
disability. Subsection (c) sets out four additional
items feat fee "Commission shall conclude" before
finding an employee permanently totally disabled.
After determining feat fee statute was ambiguous
wife respect to which party bears fee burden of
proof under subsection (c), fee court analyzed
punctuation rules, canons of statutory construction,
and public policy. It then determined feat fee employer bore fee burden of proof under subsection
(c)./dLT|7-9.
FN1. In 2006, fee legislature amended subsection (c) to clarify feat fee burden of
proof under subsection (c) was intended to
fall on fee employee. Utah Code Ann. §
34A-2-413(lXc) (Supp.2006). Because we
find feat fee language of fee 1995 version
of fee statute was unambiguous, we refrain
from considering fee statutory amendment.
See Olsen v. Samuel McTntyre /«v. Co.,
956 P.2d 257, 259, 261 (Utah 1998)
(holding feat the court does not look bey-
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ond an unambiguous statute and that retroactive legislative enactments are not applied in pending cases except in a few narrow circumstances not applicable here).
1 9 We granted certiorari on two issues: (1)
whether the court of appeals applied the correct
standard in reviewing the Commission's order, and
(2) whether the employee or the employer bears the
burden of proof under Utah Code section
34A-2-413(lXc).
ANALYSIS
f 10 Regarding die first issue, we conclude that
the court of appeals should have reviewed*389 the
Commission's findings that Martinez could perform
the essential functions of his prior employment and
that other work was reasonably available to him under a substantial evidence standard but, in fact, improperly reweighed the Commission's factual determinations under the guise of reviewing the application of facts to law. Because the court of appeals should have considered these issues under a
substantial evidence standard, we reverse and remand for consideration under the appropriate standard of review.
J 11 We similarly reverse the court of appeals'
holding on the second issue. As a threshold matter,
we find that the court of appeals correctly reviewed
the Commission's statutory interpretation of Utah
Code section 34A-2-413(lXc) for correctness. We
find, however, that the employee bears the burden
of proof under section 34A-2-413(lXc) because,
when subsections (b) and (c) are read in context, it
is clear that subsection (c) delineates the elements
an employee must prove to meet his subsection
(bXii) burden of establishing that he is permanently
totally disabled.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
% 12 We first consider Martinez's argument that
the Commission's factual findings are inadequate
as a matter of law. We then turn to Media's contention that the court of appeals erred by reviewing the
Commission's factual findings despite Martinez's

failure to marshal the evidence. Having disposed of
these two threshold matters, we then consider the
appropriate standard of review.
A. The Commission's Factual Findings Are Not Inadequate as a Matter ofLaw
[1] J 13 Martinez argues that if the essential
functions of his prior work and the reasonable
availability of other work are factual issues, the
Commission's factual findings on these issues are
so inadequate as to require their reversal as a matter
of law. In essence, Martinez argues thatt there is no
"logical and legal basis for the [Commission's] ultimate conclusions," see Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah
1986), and that consequently, this court has no principled basis on which to sustain its factual findings,
see Mountain States Legal Found v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 636 P2d 1047, 1051-52 (Utah 1981). In
such an instance, marshaling is not required because "the findings are so inadequate that they cannot be meaningfully challenged as factual determinations." Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477
(UtahCt.App.1991).
[2] f 14 Martinez contends that it was irrational
for the Commission to conclude that other work
was reasonably available in the face of testimony
by a vocational expert that Martinez could not perform any currently available jobs without some task
modification. Martinez further points to the Commission's failure to mention Martinez's sitting and
standing limitations in concluding that Martinez
could perform the essential functions of his prior
work. We disagree.
^ 1 5 The Commission's conclusion that available fast-food positions could be modified to accommodate Martinez's limitations is a logical finding based on the presented evidence. Further, despite the Commission's failure to mention the sitting
and standing requirement, its order did carefully
consider Martinezfs weight limitations on lifting
and pushing, evidence of symptom magnification,
and the fast-food industry's practice of assigning
tasks according to the respective abilities of each
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individual employee. On the basis of this evidence,
the Commission compared Martinets abilities with
the essential functions of fast-food work and concluded that "Mr. Martinez's work-related impairments do not prevent him from performing such
functions." Thus, the Commission's failure to directly address Martinez's sitting and standing limitations or to allow for some task modification in
reaching its conclusion that other work was reasonably available does not warrant reversal as a matter
of law.
B. Clarification of the Marshaling Requirement
K 16 During oral argument, Media argued that
the court of appeals was required to dismiss Martinez's factual challenge to the *390 Commission's
order because Martinez failed to properly marshal
the evidence. Media further argued that this failure
alone constitutes reversible error.™2 Media's argument is not well-taken and, in fact, evinces a fundamental misunderstanding of the marshaling obligation. We accordingly pause to clarify it.
FN2. Although we address the implications
of this argument, we do not concede the
accuracy of its premise. Martinez did challenge the Commission's factual findings
before the court of appeals, but did so under the theory that the factual findings
were inadequate as a matter of law. See
Martinez, 2005 UT App 308, J 3, 117 P.3d
1074. Under such a theory, marshaling is
not required. Woodward, 823 P.2d at 477.
Further, the court of appeals did not purport to consider the sufficiency of the
facts. Martinez, 2005 UT App 308, \ 3,
117 P.3d 1074. However, because we ultimately agree with Media's contention that
"essential functions" and "reasonably
available" are factual issues, we consider
the implications of the argument.
[3][4][5][6] \ 17 To successfully challenge an
agency's factual findings, the party "must marshall
[sic] all of the evidence supporting the findings and
show that despite the supporting facts, and in light

of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the
findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 116 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct.App.1989);
accord Utah R.App. P. 24(aX9) ("A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record
evidence that supports the challenged finding.").
FN3
This requires counsel to construct the evidence
supporting the adversary's position, and then "ferret
out a fatal flaw in the evidence." West Valley City
v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah
Ct.App.1991). Compliance with this undertaking
helps ensure that the factual findings of the agency
are overturned only when lacking in substantial
evidence.
FN3. The marshaling requirement applies
when a party challenges a court's or an
agency's factual findings, regardless of the
standard of review at issue. See, e.g.,
Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp.,
2002 UT 94, J 21, 54 P.3d 1177 (holding
that to correctly dispute the lower court's
factual findings as clearly erroneous, "an
appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when
viewing it in a light most favorable to the
court below"); United Park City Mines Co.
v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds,
2006 UT 35, ffl 37-38, 140 P.3d 1200
("[P]arties who ask this court to consider
fact-sensitive
questions-including
those
questions reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard-have a duty to marshal all
the evidence that formed die basis for the
trial court's ruling.") Consequently, this
discussion applies to the marshaling requirement generally, not just in the context
of a challenge to an agency's factual findings.
% 18 In our zeal to emphasize the importance of
die marshaling requirement to parties, we have used
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language implying that appellate courts are strictly
bound to affirm the accuracy of the agency's or trial
court's factual findings in the absence of marshaling. See, e.g, United Park City Mines Co., 2006
UT 35, % 32, 140 P.3d 1200 ("Because [the defendant] has failed to marshal the evidence supporting
the ... award, ... we cannot conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion."); Eggett v. Wasatch
Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, % 10, 94 P.3d 193 ("The
court of appeals does not review the trial court's
factual findings where the party challenging those
findings fails to marshal the evidence. Instead, the
court of appeals must assume that the record supports the findings of the trial court." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
[7][8] 1 19 Despite this language, the marshaling requirement is not a limitation on the power of
the appellate courts. Rather, it is a tool pursuant to
which die appellate courts impose on the parties an
obligation to assist them in conducting a whole record review. It is not, itself, a rule of substantive
law. Consequently, parties that fail to marshal the
evidence do so at the risk that the reviewing court
will decline, in its discretion, to review the trial
court's factual findings. See Chen v. Stewart, 2004
UT 82, % 82 n. 16, 100 P.3d 1177 (explaining that
the marshaling requirement is critical because in its
absence the appellate court "must go behind the trial court's factual findings," which often requires a
"colossal commitment of time and resources").
[9] \ 20 The reviewing court, however, retains
discretion to consider independently the whole record and determine if the decision*391 below has
adequate factual support. While parties have a duty
to marshal the evidence when challenging the factual basis for a lower body's decision, we refrain,
consistent with the Rules of Appellate Procedure,
from dictating the remedy the court of appeals must
impose when parties fail to meet this requirement.
Utah KApp. P. 24(b)(k) ("Briefs which are not in
compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court ...." (emphasis added)).

% 21 In short, parties remain obligated by our
rules to marshal the evidence when challenging the
factual findings of a lower court. We refrain,
however, from limiting the appellate courts' discretion by mandating a particular remedy when parties
fail to meet this requirement. Having determined
that the court of appeals retained the discretion to
review Martinez's challenge to the Commission's
factual findings, we turn to the standard of review
question on which we granted certiorari.
C. Whether Martinez Could Perform the "Essential
Functions" of Fast-Food Work and Whether Other
Work Was "Reasonably Available" to Him Are
Factual Questions We Review for Substantial Evidence
% 22 The court of appeals applied an abuse of
discretion standard in reviewing the Commission's
conclusions that Martinez "could perform the
'essential functions' of a fast food worker and that
other work was 'reasonably available' for him."
Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2005 UT App
308, % 10, 117 P.3d 1074 (quoting Utah Code Ann.
§ 34A-2-413(lXcXi»)> (iv) (2005) (amended
2006)). The court of appeals appears to have based
its selection of this standard of review on its conclusion that (1) the Act impliedly grants discretion
to the Commission to apply "the facte to the Act";
and (2) it would consequently review only the
Commission's application of the "facte that it found
to the law." Id%% 10-11.
[10] K 23 We conclude that the court of appeals
erred in applying an abuse of discretion standard of
review because the provisions of Utah Code section
34A-2-413 call for a factual determination. As a
result, the court of appeals actually reweighed the
Commission's factual determinations under the
guise of applying the undisputed facte to the law.
Because determining the "essential functions" of
prior employment and ascertaining whether other
work is "reasonably available" are factual issues,
we remand the matter to the court of appeals for
consideration under a substantial evidence standard
of review.
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K 24 Although we reverse the court of appeals
with respect to the standard of review, we acknowledge the difficult issue it presents. Judicial review
of Commission decisions is governed by both Utah
Code section 34A-2-801 and Utah's Administrative
Procedures Act (the "UAPA"). Utah Code Ann. §
34A-2-801(7M8) (2005). Section 63-46b-16(4Xd)
of the UAPA allows relief when "the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law." Id §
63-46b-16(4Xd) (2004). Subsection (4Xg) allows
relief when "the agency action is based on a determination of fact ... that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court." Id § 63-46b-16(4)(g). Finally, subsection (4)(hXi) allows relief when an
agency action is "an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute." Id
§
63-46b-16(4XhX0; see also Ameritemps, Inc. v.
Labor Comm'n, 2005 UT App 491, \ 8, 128 P.3d 31
(finding that an abuse of discretion standard should
be used "when an agency has discretion to apply its
factual findings to die law" (citation omitted)).
[11][12] ^ 25 The court of appeals is correct
that agency actions are reviewed for abuse of discretion when there is an express or implied delegation within the statute. That truism, however, does
not dictate the appropriate standard of review because codifying a factual issue does not transform
an issue from one of fact to a mixed question of law
and fact for purposes of determining the appropriate
standard of review. Our task, therefore, is to determine, first, whether "essential functions" and
"reasonably available" are factual, legal, or mixed
issues and, second, the appropriate standard of review.
*392 % 26 We discussed the distinctions
between legal, factual, and mixed questions and
their relationship to the appropriate standard of review in State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-37 (Utah
1994). There, we defined factual questions as
"entailing the empirical, such as things, events, actions, or conditions happening, existing, or taking
place, as well as the subjective, such as state of

mind." Id at 935. In contrast, we defined legal determinations as "rules or principles uniformly applied to persons of similar qualities and status in
similar circumstances." Id We also recognized a
third category, "the application of law to fact,"
which asks "whether a given set of facts comes
within the reach of a given rule of law." Id at 936.
[13][14] % 27 Because the court of appeals analyzed whether the undisputed facts adequately met
the statutory requirements of "essential functions"
and "reasonably available," ™* we give this third
category close consideration. See Martinez, 2005
UT App 308,1 11, 117 P.3d 1074. We begin with
the proposition that the existence of an articulable
legal issue is a necessary element of a mixed question. Pena, 869 P.2d at 937; see, e.g., PullmanStandard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 290 n. 19, 102
S.Ct 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (defining a mixed
question of law and fact as occurring when
"historical facts are admitted or established, die
rule of law is undisputed, and die issue is whether
the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or ... whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts
is or is not violated"). In other words, a mixed
question is one in which we must
FN4. Mixed questions are generally
defined as the application of law to fact,
Pena, 869 P.2d at 936, but the court of appeals transposed the standard and asked
whether the Commission abused its discretion in "applying die facts that it found to
the law." Martinez, 2005 UT App 308, 1
11, 117 P.3d 1074. Because it appears diat
the court of appeals intended to treat
"essential functions" and "reasonably
available" as mixed questions of law and
fact, we proceedfromthat premise.
determine when the articulated legal rule to be
applied to a set of facts-a rule that we establish
without deference to the trial courts-embodies a
de facto grant of discretion which permits the trial court to reach one of several possible conclusions about the legal effect of a particular set of
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facts without risking reversal.
Pewi, 869P.2dat937.
[15] ^ 28 Therefore, when determining whether
an issue presents a mixed question, we must first
identify the legal principle at issue. Our decision in
Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177
(Utah 1997), is illustrative. There, we were asked
whether the court of appeals appropriately reviewed
for legal correctness die issue of whether the petitioner was injured in the scope of her employment.
Id at 180. The Labor Commission, along with the
employee's insurer, argued that scope of employment determinations were factual and consequently
subject to a substantial evidence standard of review.
Id at 181 & n. 7. We rejected this argument, holding that whether facts fall under the "legal rule
termed "special errands/ ... requires some legal
analysis." Id Prior precedent and persuasive authority had established a legal, albeit highly fact dependent, rule for determining when a "special errand" fell within an employee's scope of employment Id at 183. Given the fact-dependent nature of
the inquiry, however, we found that we could not
"spell out in detail a legal rule that will adequately
anticipate the facts that should be outcome determinative" for the policy behind the legal rule to be
served. Id at 182 (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, we determined that whether a
"special errand" is within an employee's scope of
employment is a mixed question of law and fact requiring some deference. Id We further explained
that when considering " "whether a given set of
facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law,'
" id at 181 (quoting Pena, 869 P2d at 936), deference to the lower court is created when a legal
standard is defined " 'so that it actually grants some
operational discretion to the trial courts applying
it/ " id (quoting State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278,
282 (Utah 1994)).
[16] % 29 In summary, factual issues are generally empirical, legal issues apply an abstract rule regardless of the specific facts, and mixed questions
generally arise when the applicability of the legal

rule turns on the combination of present facts. Having undertaken*393 this attempt to flesh out the
distinctions between questions of law, questions of
fact, and mixed questions of law and fact, we turn
to the issues presented here.
1. Essential Functions
\ 30 Whether certain tasks are "essential functions" varies from job to job and industry to industry. A judge is ill-equipped to determine, with
his or her legal expertise, the essential elements of
a fast-food job. Rather, that determination must be
based on factual evidence and testimony from those
with experience in die industry. Additionally, there
is no legal rule that could create the basis for a
mixed question of fact and law. While the adjective
"essential" does introduce a level of abstraction into the fact-finder's determination, it does not create
a mixed question any more than the modifier
"reasonable" changes the reasonable man standard
into a legal determination. Cf. Benson v. Ames, 604
P2d 927, 929 (Utah 1979) (finding that negligence
under a reasonable man standard is a factual determination disrupted on appeal only if substantial
evidence fails to support the trial court's ruling).
We consequently hold that the question of whether
an employee can perform the "essential functions"
of prior employment is a factual determination that
should be overturned on appeal only if substantial
evidence fails to support it.
2. Reasonably Available
J 31 The second issue, whether other work was
"reasonably available" to Martinez:, is a closer
question. In different contexts, reasonableness has
been considered both a legal and a factual question.
See, e.g„ Benson, 604 P.2d at 929 (finding that
whether a defendant acted as a "reasonable man" in
a negligence case is an issue for the trier of fact that
should not be disturbed on appeal if it is supported
by substantial evidence). But see, e.g., Evans v.
State, 963 P.2d 177, 179 (Utah 1998) (finding that
"reasonable cause" was primarily a legal question
in the antitrust arena, but that appellate courts
should grant the fact-finder a "measure of discre-
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tion"); Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 892
(Utah 1996) ("[T]he reasonableness of an award of
attorney fees ordinarily presents a question of law
with some measure of discretion given to the trial
court.")- Additionally, the Labor Commission has
defined "reasonably available" as "regular, steady,
and readily available" work, Utah Admin. Code r.
612-l-10(DXlXb), a definition that reads like a legal rule to be applied to a factual situation.
K 32 Despite these countervailing examples, we
conclude that the question of whether other work is
"reasonably available" is a factual determination.
The statute asks the Commission to determine if
other work is reasonably available, "taking into
consideration the employeefs[ ] . . . age; ... education;
... past work experience; ... medical capacity; and ...
residual functional capacity." Utah Code Ann. §
34A-2-413(lXcX*v)- These factual considerations
inform what is reasonable; its parameters are not
further defined by an overarching legal principle, as
in the case of reasonable suspicion, for example.
See Pena, 869 P.2d at 939.
% 33 Our conclusion that "essential functions"
and "reasonably available" are factual determinations is consistent with both our prior precedent and
the applicable statutory language. First, we have
traditionally viewed permanent total disability determinations as factual. Hodges v. W. Piling &
Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718, 721 (Utah 1986); Kerans v. Indus. Comm'n, 713 P.2d 49, 54 (Utah 1986);
Brundage v. IML Freight, Inc., 622 P.2d 790, 792
(Utah 1980); Utah State Rd Comm'n v. Indus.
Comm'n, 109 Utah 553, 168 P.2d 319, 322 (Utah
1946). Second, as discussed herein, the language of
subsection (b) requires the employee to prove permanent total disability by a " preponderance of the
evidence, " using the elements of subsection (c) to
meet that evidentiary burden (emphasis added).
% 34 In sum, we conclude that the court of appeals erroneously applied an abuse of discretion
standard when reviewing the Commission's factual
findings that Martinez was capable of performing
(he "essential functions" of his prior job and that he

was capable of performing other work "reasonably
available" to him.
*394 D. The Correct Standard of Review Is Substantial Evidence
[17][18] K 35 Having determined that the correct standard of review is substantial evidence, we
pause to consider its requirements. Substantial
evidence exists when the factual findings support
"more than a mere scintilla of evidence ... though
something less than the weight of the evidence."
Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of Review of Indus.
Comm'n, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct.App.1989)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted, alteration in original). An administrative law decision
meets the substantial evidence test when "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate" the evidence
supporting the decision. Id (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
[19][20][21] % 36 In order to determine whether a decision is supported by substantial evidence,
the reviewing court must consider the whole record
before the lower court. Whitear v. Labor Comm'n,
973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (citing Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4Xg) (1997)). Whole record review considers the evidence in support of
the administrative finding, as well as evidence that
detracts from the finding. Id To aid the appellate
court in conducting a whole record review, the
party challenging the factual findings must marshal
all of the evidence and demonstrate that, despite the
facts supporting the decision, the " findings are not
supported by substantial evidence." Grace Drilling
Co., 776P.2dat68.
K 37 When we consider the actual substance of
the court of appeals1 ruling that Martinez could not
perform the "essential functions" of his past employment, the effect of a different standard of review becomes clear. For instance, it does appear, as
the court of appeals stated, that the "Commission
simply ignored the impact of the sitting and standing limitation." Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus,
2005 UT App 308, % 13, 117 P.3d 1074. However,
with the statement "The Commission ignored a sig-
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nificant portion of an evaluation that it explicitly
accepted," id (emphasis added), the court of appeals implicitly acknowledged that some of the
Commission's factual flndings were supportive of
its ultimate conclusion. This acknowledgment has
different implications under a substantial evidence
standard; if more than a scintilla of the evidence
supports the conclusion, then the Commission's ruling should remain intact.
% 38 As a natural consequence of selecting the
wrong standard of review, the court of appeals reweighed the facts that formed the basis of the Commission's conclusion that other work was
"reasonably available" under the guise of applying
the facts to the law. For example, the court of appeals stated that the Labor Commission ignored
Dr. Bertsch's cross-examination testimony that no
jobs in the current market could accommodate Mr.
Martinez's limitations. Id % \5. The Commission's
order, however, merely gave more weight to the
portion of her testimony that was more favorable to
its factual findings. In fact, Dr. Bertsch testified
that she had contacted many local fast-food restaurants with open positions and their managers expressed a willingness to hire someone with Martinez's limitations. Although recognizing that some
task modification would be required, the Commission found that fast-food work requires the completion of a "variety of tasks ... performed by a crew of
several employees." It further found that Martinez's
education, work experience, and language ability
would increase his employability. This evidence
supports the Commission's conclusion that "Media
[had] presented persuasive evidence that many employers in the fast-food business have work immediately available for someone with Mr. Martinez'
background and abilities."
^ 39 In sum, we find that the court of appeals
should have applied a substantial evidence standard
of review to the questions of whether Martinez
could perform the "essential functions" of his prior
employment and whether other jobs were
"reasonably available" to him. Because it applied

the incorrect standard of review, the court of appeals inappropriately reweighed the Commission's
factual findings under the guise of reviewing mixed
questions of law and fact Consequently, we remand for a determination under the correct standard
of review.
*395 II. THE EMPLOYEE BEARS THE BURDEN
OF PROOF UNDER UTAH CODE SECTION
34A-2-4130XC)
K 40 The parties and the amicus disagree on the
standard of review applicable to the Commission's
ruling on the burden of proof issue, so we consider
this threshold matter first.
A. We Afford No Deference to the Commission on
Matters ofStatutory Construction
[22] ^ 41 Burden of proof questions typically
present issues of law that an appellate court reviews
for correctness. Beaver County v. State Tax
Comm% 916 P.2d 344, 357 (Utah 1996). Amicus
Workers' Compensation Fund ("WCF')> however,
contends that we should defer to the Commission's
conclusion regarding the burden of j>roof because
the legislature impliedly granted the Commission
discretion to decide the issue under Utah Code section 34A-2-413(lXc). WCF reasons that "where the
legislature either expressly or implicitly grants [an]
agency discretion to interpret or apply a statutory
term," appellate courts should defer to the agency's
interpretation unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion. Luckau v. Bd of Review of Indus. Comm%
840 P.2d 811, 813 (Utah Ct.App.1992); accord
Morton Int% Inc. v. Auditing Div. of State Tax
Comm% 814 P.2d 581, 588-89 (Utah 1991)
(superseded by Utah Code section 59-1-610(1 Xb)
for the specific instance of administrative decisions
by the Utah State Tax Commission as stated in 49th
St. Galleria v. Tax Comm'n, Auditing Div., 860
P.2d 996 (Utah Ct.App.1993)). WCF contends that
subsection (c) impliedly grants such discretion to
the Commission because the listed requirements for
a permanent total disability determination are prefaced with the clause "the commission shall conclude."
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[23] % 42 We disagree and hold that the language of subsection (c) grants the Commission authority to determine only whether die facts presented meet the statute's requirements for a finding of
permanent total disability. It does not bestow on die
Commission the authority to allocate die burden of
proof
^ 43 Our conclusion in this regard is consistent
with the legislature's more general delegation of authority to the Commission found in Utah Code section 34A-1-301, which bestows on the Commission
"die duty and die full power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and apply die law in
this chapter or any other title or chapter it administers." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 (2005). We
previously have held that section 34A-1-301 does
not grant the Commission discretion for statutory
interpretation. Esquivel v. Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT
66,^18,7P.3d777.
\ 44 It is also consistent with our case law on
implied agency delegation. In Salt Lake City Corp.
v. Department of Employment Security, 657 P2d
1312, 1315-17 (Utah 1982), we acknowledged the
Commission's latitude in affirming its award of unemployment benefits to a state employee who had
voluntarily left her job. The statute at issue in that
case provided that unemployment benefits were
generally unavailable when employees voluntarily
quit, but allowed die Commission to award benefits
when required by uequity and good conscience." Id
at 1317. We conclude that this language implicitly
c<
bespeak[s] a legislative intent to delegate ... interpretation to die responsible agency." Morton, 814
P.2d at 588 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). In contrast, however, subsection (c) only
gives die Commission discretion to "find" die facts
required to establish die elements of permanent
total disability.
[24] % 45 Our conclusion is also consistent with
die principle tiiat grants of discretion to administrative agencies should be limited to diose issues on
which the agencies have "special experience or expertise placing [them] in a better position than the

courts to construe the law." King v. Indus. Comm'n,
850 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Utah CtApp.1993). Here,
however, there is notiiing to suggest that the Commission is in a better position than this court to construe the statutory allocation of the burden of proof
We consequently hold that the court of appeals appropriately applied a correctness standard when assessing which party bore die burden of proof under
subsection (c).
*396 B. The Employee Bears the Burden of Proving
the Elements of Permanent Total Disability
[25][26][27][28] t 46 We review the court of
appeals' statutory interpretation of section
34A-2-413(lXc) for correctness. See State v. Ireland, 2006 UT 82, % 6, 150 P.3d 532. When interpreting statutes, we look first to die statute's plain
language vridi the primary objective of giving effect
to die legislature's intent Savage v. Utah Youth
VilL, 2004 UT 102, \ 18,104 P3d 1242. "We presume diat the legislature used each word advisedly"
and read "each term according to its ordinary and
accepted meaning." State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, \
29, 127 P.3d 682 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Statutes should be read as a
whole and dieir provisions interpreted in harmony
widi related provisions and statutes. Miller v.
Weaver, 2003 UT 12, \ 17,66 P3d 592.
[29][30][31] \ 47 When die language of the
statute is plain, odier interpretive tools are not
needed. Adams v. Swensen, 2005 UT 8, ^ 8, 108
P.3d 725. However, if the language is ambiguous,
die court may look beyond die statute to legislative
history and public policy to ascertain die statute's
intent Utah Pub. Employees Ass'n v. State, 2006
UT 9, \ 59, 131 P.3d 208 (Parrish, J., concurring).
When viewed holistically, a statute is ambiguous if
duplicative, yet plausible meanings are not eliminatedfrompossibility. Id \ 60.
% 48 Having acknowledged these rules, we consider the plain language of section 34A-2-413(l) of
the Act, which oudines (he threshold requirements
an employee must meet to receive compensation for
permanent total disability. Subsection (b) states that
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the employee has the burden of proving three subparts: (i) that the employee was significantly impaired as a result of an industrial accident or occupational disease; (ii) that "the employee is permanently totally disabled"; and (iii) that "the industrial
accident or occupational disease was the direct
cause of the employee's permanent total disability."
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(lXbXiMi") (2005).

employer, renders meaningless the employee's responsibility to prove permanent total disability under (bXii). We avoid construing "a particular provision of a statute so as to neutralize ... other provisions if any other construction of the particular provision is at all tenable." Chris & Dick's Lumber &
Hardware v. Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511, 516 (Utah
1990) (Howe, J., dissenting).

% 49 We next turn to subsection (c), which
states that "[t]o find an employee permanently
totally disabled, the commission shair reach four
necessary conclusions:

\ 52 The plain language of subsection (c) further bolsters our interpretation that the employee
bears the burden of proof. In each of subsection
(c)'s four subparts, "the employee" must be in a
particular posture in order to be found permanently
totally disabled. These elements of proof turn on
*397 intimate facts about the employee's circumstances-his unemployment or how his; medical capacity or age affects his ability to do reasonably
available work, for example. The fact that the employee is in the best position to proffer evidence
relevant to these factual determinations further supports our interpretation that the employee bears the
burden of proof under subsection (c).

(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; (ii)
the employee has an impairment or combination
of impairments that limit the employee's ability
to do basic wotk activities; (iii) the ... impairments prevent the employee from performing the
essential functions of the wotk activities for
which the employee has been qualified until the
time of the industrial accident... and (iv) the employee cannot perform other woik reasonably
available, taking into consideration the employee's age; education; past woik experience; medical capacity; and residual functional capacity.
Id § 34A-2-413(lXc) (amended 2006).
[32] \ 50 Although subsection (c) does not explicitly allocate die burden of proof, a reading of
the statute as a whole makes clear that it falls to the
employee. Both subsections (b) and (c) include the
same critical phrase: "permanently totally disabled" Subsection (bXii) cursorily states that "the
employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of evidence that" he or she "is permanently totally disabled." It is unclear, however, from
the wording of subsection (bXii) what is required
for the employee to prove permanent total disability. Subsection (c) simply enumerates those requirements. In short, subsection (c) imbues subsection
(bXii) with meaning.
[33] \ 51 The court of appeals' interpretation,
allocating subsection (c)'s burden of proof to the

\ 53 The court of appeals* interpretation, on the
other hand, mandates that the employer disprove
the elements of subsection (c), which would require
judicially created additions to and subtractions from
the statute's plain language. For example, subsection (cXO requires proof that "die employee is not
gainfully employed " Under the court of appeals'
reading, the employer would have to prove that the
employee is gainfully employed. See Martinez v.
Media-Paymaster Plus, 2005 UT App 308, \ 9, 117
P.3d 1074. Although we concede that section
34A-2-413(lXc) was not artfully drafted, we refrain
from creating clarity by reading additional terms into the statute.
\ 54 In conclusion, we reverse the court of appeals because we can find only one plausible reading of the statute based on its plain languagenamely, that the employee has die burden of proving the elements of subsection (c). 1 ^
FN5. Having reached this legal conclusion,
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we remain mystified about its effect on the
outcome of this case. Usually, burden of
proof questions are outcome determinative
only in the case of an evidentiary draw.
And in their briefs to us, neither party asserts that was the case here. Thus, even
had we upheld the court of appeals* decision on the burden of proof issue, it is
unclear whether that conclusion would
have required the Commission to reverse
its initial denial of permanent total disability. We encourage parties to consider and
brief the effect of their legal challenges on
a casefs outcome so that we can better advise lower courts about the ramifications
of our rulings.
CONCLUSION
% 55 The court of appeals should have applied a
substantial evidence standard of review to the Commission's conclusions that other work was
"reasonably available" to Martinez and that he
could have performed the "essential functions" of a
fast-food employee. Consequently, we reverse the
court of appeals and remand for a determination under the appropriate standard of review. We also reverse the court of appeals1 allocation of the burden
of proof. We hold that under the plain language of
Utah Code section 34A-2-413(l), the employee
bears the burden of proving the four elements of
subsection (c).
% 56 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief
Justice WILKINS, Justice DURRANT, and Justice
NEHRING concur in Justice PARRISHPS opinion.
Utah,2007.
Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints
164 P.3d 384,578 Utah Adv. Rep. 20,2007 UT 42
END OF DOCUMENT
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
George M. OLSEN, Petitioner,
v.
LABOR COMMISSION, Employers1 Reinsurance
Fund, Utah Concrete Pipe Co., and Continental Insurance Co., Respondents.
No.20100163-CA.
March 10,2011.
Background: Workers' compensation claimant
sought permanent total disability benefits related to
an accident that occurred in 1963. The Labor Commission denied permanent total disability benefits.
Claimant appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Davis, PJ., held
that:
(1) the Commission's finding that claimant decided
to retire as a result of several factors was supported
by substantial evidence in the record, and
(2) evidence was insufficient to establish that
claimant was entitled to permanent and total disability benefits under die odd-lot doctrine.
Affirmed.
WestHeadnotes
[11 Workers' Compensation 413 €=^1939.3
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact,
Findings, and Verdict
413kl939 Review of Decision of Department, Commission, Board, Officer, or Arbitrator
413kl939.3 k. Conclusiveness of
administrative findings in general. Most Cited Cases
Whether the findings of fact in a worker's compensation case are adequate is a legal determination

that requires no deference to the Labor Commission.
[2] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 0 = >
796
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15Ak796 k. Law questions in general.
Most Cited Cases
The standard the Court of Appeals applies
when reviewing an agency's interpretation of general law including case law is a correction of error
standard, giving no deference to the agency's decision.
[3] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A € = >
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15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
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When an agency has discretion to apply its factual findings to the law, the Court of Appeals will
not disturb the agency's application unless its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness
and rationality.
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413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
413XVI(N)9 Amount and Period of Compensation
413kl627.1 Disability Benefits
413kl627.14 k. Maximum medical
improvement Most Cited Cases
Workers' Compensation 413 0=^1646.16
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413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
413XVI(N)9 Amount and Period of Compensation
413kl646.1 Scheduled and Other Particular Injuries
413kl646.16 k. Loss of, or injury
to, arm. Most Cited Cases
The Labor Commission's finding that workers'
compensation claimant experienced pain in his arm
after his accident but that the arm's condition had
been essentially stable was supported by substantial
evidence in the record.
[51 Workers' Compensation 413 C=>1939.1
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact,
Findings, and Verdict
413kl939 Review of Decision of Department, Commission, Board, Officer, or Arbitrator
413kl939.1 k. In general; questions
of law or fact. Most Cited Cases
The question of whether the Labor Commission's action constitutes arbitrary action for want of
adequate findings is governed by the Court of Appeals determination of whether the court is able to
conduct a meaningful review.
[6] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^1738
413 Workers1 Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XYI(P) Hearing or Trial
413XVI(P)6 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by Board, Commission, or Court
413kl737 Form, Contents, and Sufficiency
413kl738 k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
An inquiry into the adequacy of the factual

findings in a workers' compensation case may be
conducted by looking at the Labor Commission's
findings and conclusions on their face and determining whether the conclusions logically follow from
the factual findings or whether additional findings
are needed.
17] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^1627.17(12)
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
413XVI(N)9 Amount and Period of Compensation
413kl627.1 Disability Benefits
413kl627.17
Employment
and
Earning Capacity
413kl627.17(12) k. Departure
from position; withdrawal from workforce. Most
Cited Cases
The Labor Commission's finding that workers'
compensation claimant decided to retire as a result
of several factors, such as the stress associated with
his job, the travel associated with his job, his declining health, and the pain in his arm following his
accident, was supported by substantial evidence in
the record.
[81 Workers' Compensation 413 €=>1627.17(5)
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
413XV1(N)9 Amount and Period of Compensation
413U627.1 Disability Benefits
413kl627.17
Employment
and
Earning Capacity
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workers' compensation claimant was entitled to permanent and total disability benefits under the oddlot doctrine; claimant presented no evidence that he
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could not be rehabilitated to perform other work,
and the Labor Commission found that claimant's
decision to retire was not substantially motivated
by his industrial injury.
191 Workers1 Compensation 413 €=^880.13
413 Workers' Compensation
4 BIX Amount and Period of Compensation
413IX(B) Disability Benefits
413DC(B)8 Employment and Earning Capacity
413k880.9 Incapacity for Work or Employment
413k880.13 k. Odd lot. Most Cited
Cases
In applying the odd-lot doctrine, in a workers'
compensation case, it is not the extent of the employee's physical impairment that is at issue, but the
extent to which that impairment affects the employee's ability to return to fall employment
110] Workers' Compensation 413 €==>1377
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(L) Presumptions and Burden of Proof
413XVI(L)2 Particular Matters
413kl373 Amount and Period of Compensation
413kl377 k. Diminution of earning
capacity, and availability of suitable work. Most
Cited Cases
In attempting to demonstrate that he falls into
the odd-lot category, it is the burden of the workers'
compensation claimant to present a prima facie case
that no regular, dependable work is available to him
by presenting evidence that he can no longer perform the duties required in his occupation and that
he cannot be rehabilitated to perform some other
type of employment.
Ill] Workers' Compensation 413 €=>1377
413 Workers' Compensation

413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XV1(L) Presumptions and Burden of Proof
413XVI(L)2 Particular Matters
413kl373 Amount and Period of Compensation
413kl377 k. Diminution of earning
capacity, and availability of suitable work. Most
Cited Cases
Once the employee has presented a prima facie
case that he falls within the odd-lot category, in a
workers' compensation case, the burden shifts to the
employer to prove the existence of regular, steady
work that the employee can perform given the employee's individual circumstances.
[121 Workers1 Compensation 413 €=>880.10
413 Workers' Compensation
413IX Amount and Period of Compensation
4131X(B) Disability Benefits
413DC(B)8 Employment and Earning Capacity
413k880.9 Incapacity for Work or Employment
4I3k880.10 k. In general. Most
Cited Cases
Workers' Compensation 413 €=>880.14
413 Workers' Compensation
413EX Amount and Period of Compensation
413DC(B) Disability Benefits
413DC(B)8 Employment and Earning Capacity
413k880.9 Incapacity for Work or Employment
413k880.14 k. Inability to work
without pain. Most Cited Cases
The fact that an employee returned to work for
some period of time following his industrial injury
does not automatically preclude him from claiming
permanent total disability benefits at a later date if
he continues to suffer substantial pain throughout
the period of his continued employment or if his industrial injury worsens to the point that he is no
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longer able to maintain regular employment
[13] Workers' Compensation 413 €>=*880.20(2)
413 Workers' Compensation
413IX Amount and Period of Compensation
413IX(B) Disability Benefits
413IX(B)8 Employment and Earning Capacity
413k880.20 Efforts to Obtain Employment; Work Search
413k88020(2) k. Acceptance or rejection of job offer generally. Most Cited Cases
Under Utah law, a workers' compensation
claimant is not required to continue working merely
because someone is willing to hire him if he must
exert superhuman efforts to rise above his crippling
handicaps in order to do so.
[14] Workers' Compensation 413 C=*880.8
413 Workers' Compensation
413IX Amount and Period of Compensation
413DC(B) Disability Benefits
4131X(B)8 Employment and Earning Capacity
413k880.8 k. Acceptance of employment or amount of wages as affecting eligibility.
Most Cited Cases
While a workers' compensation claimant's return to work is one factor to be weighed in determining his disability, it must be considered in concert
with the condition under which the claimant continued his employment
[15] Workers' Compensation 413 €=>880.24
413 Workers' Compensation
413K Amount and Period of Compensation
413EX(B) Disability Benefits
413K(B)8 Employment and Earning Capacity
413k880.22 Departure from Position;
Withdrawal from Workforce
413k880.24 k. Voluntary departure;
retirement. Most Cited Cases

The fact that an employee continues working
until he is eligible to retire will not adversely affect
a determination of permanent total disability when
the employee has demonstrated that his disability
from the industrial injury significantly influenced
his decision to retire.
[16] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^880.24
413 Workers' Compensation
413IX Amount and Period of Compensation
413K(B) Disability Benefits
413DC(B)8 Employment and Earning Capacity
413k880.22 Departure from Position;
Withdrawal from Workforce
413k880.24 k. Voluntary departure;
retirement Most Cited Cases
The Court of Appeals will uphold a denial of
workers' compensation benefits based! on voluntary
retirement when a finding is made and supported by
evidence that the employee's retirement is not substantially motivated by his industrial injury, but is
due primarily to personal or other reasons,
[17] Workers' Compensation 413 €=>1856
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)5 Presentation and Reservation
Below of Grounds of Review
413U845 Necessity
413kl856 k. Award or judgment.
Most Cited Cases
Workers' compensation claimant failed to preserve for appellate review his claim that his due
process rights were violated by the Labor Commission's 38 month delay in issuing a decision, where
claimant failed to bring the issue to the Commission's attention. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14; West's
U.C.A.§63G-4-208(l).
*588 Aaron J. Prisbrey, St. George, for Petitioner.
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Robert D. Andreasen, Salt Lake City, for Respondent Employers* Reinsurance Fund.
Alan L. Hennebold, Salt Lake City, for Respondent
Labor Commission.
Thomas C. Sturdy, Salt Lake City, for Respondents
Utah Concrete Pipe Co. and Continental Insurance
Co.

Before Judges DAVIS, McHUGH, and VOROS.

OPINION
DAVIS, Presiding Judge:
1 1 George M. Olsen challenges the Utah Labor
Commission's (die Commission) denial of permanent total disability benefits relating to his 1963 industrial injury. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
% 2 On November 6, 1963, while working as a
supervisor at Utah Concrete Pipe Co. (Utah Concrete), Olsen's arm was caught in the mechanism of
a conveyor belt while he was attempting to clear
away some debris caught in one of the rollers.
Olsen's right arm was amputated below the elbow
in the accident, but he returned to work seven days
later. Olsen continued to work for Utah Concrete
until 1969. He then accepted a job in California doing the same type of woik. After six-and-one-half
years in California, Olsen was induced to return to
Utah Concrete, where he remained until his retirement in 1986 at the age of sixty-two.
% 3 In 2006, nearly twenty years after his retirement and forty-three years after the accident, Olsen
filed an application for hearing requesting permanent total disability benefits, claiming that his 1963
industrial injury had caused him to be unable to
work since the time of his retirement. Utah Concrete contested this claim, arguing that any disability Olsen may have had was not the result of his industrial accident, as evidenced by the fact that he
had continued to woik until retirement age following the accident.

^ 4 A hearing was held before an administrative law judge on September 15, 2006. Olsen testified that although he continued to work, his job was
more difficult after his accident. In particular, because he was right-handed and now had to write
with his left hand, it took him an additional two or
three hours each day to complete his production reports, increasing his work day from nine or ten
hours before the accident to twelve hours after the
accident. Additionally, although his supervisory job
did not regularly involve manual labor, he was responsible for training new employees, which required him to demonstrate a variety of physical
tasks and "had an impact on [his] arm." Olsen testified that he has a "constant pain in [his] right arm,"
which he rated as five on a scale from zero to ten,
and that his pain increases with activity. Olsen testified that the pain in his arm did not increase
between the time of the accident and the time he retired, stating that "ifs been a fairly constant tiling
from day one." He has also had periodic infections
in his arm that have cleared up with antibiotics. He
takes only Tylenol for pain, electing not to take the
more potent pain killers he has been prescribed because they have an "adverse effect" on him.
% 5 When Olsen took early retirement at age
sixty-two, he accepted lower Social Security and
company retirement benefits. He testified that his
reason for retiring was that he "was having a lot of
difficulty with [his right arm], with the stress, [and]
with the pain" and that he "was going downhill
physically." He also testified that it had been his
goal to make it to age sixty-two before retiring.
Two years prior to his retirement, Olsen discussed
his intention to retire with his manager, telling him
that he "was having constant problems with ... infection, right arm infection, and constant pain* constantfrustrations"and that he "wanted to get away
from it ... [and] couldnt deal with it" Six months
prior to his retirement, Olsen sent a letter to his
manager, formally giving *589 notice that he intended to take early retirement "due to some health
problems that were not responding to medical treatment." The letter did not specifically mention any
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problems with Olsen's arm.
% 6 Olsen testified that as he got older, it was
more difficult to work the high number of hours required of him. He also indicated that when Utah
Concrete began acquiring other companies, he was
required to travel throughout the country to evaluate the target businesses and that his work would
pile up while he was away because there was no
one else assigned to take care of it. He testified that
the supervisory job he held was so stressful that
<c
many superintendents [keeled] over with heart attacks and died" and that at the time of his retirement, he "was having to go to the doctor about a lot
of problems." Olsen had part of his thyroid removed in 1956, was diagnosed with a heart arrhythmia in 1981, and suffers from hypertension. In
the years following his retirement, Olsen was implanted with a pacemaker and was diagnosed with
prostate and colon cancer.
\ 7 Olsen testified that he was still capable of
doing his job at Utah Concrete at the time of his retirement, that he was never made aware of any
problems wfth his performance, and that Utah Concrete wanted him to come back to work for them.
However, he testified that he could not do his job
without pain. Following his retirement, Olsen was
hired as a consultant for Utah Concrete on two different occasions, once for six weeks and once for
three weeks. He has not had any other employment
since his retirement Olsen testified that after his retirement, he continued to do household chores and
served a one-year church mission with his wife. He
also traveled to Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, Korea,
Mexico, Germany, Belgium, Holland, France, and
Switzerland between 1983 and 1988.
t 8 In 2006, Olsen asked two doctors who
treated him in the years following his amputation,
Dr. Lewis and Dr. Hunter, to prepare "Summary of
Medical Record" forms indicating their opinion regarding the effect of his amputation on his ability to
work. Both doctors indicated that they believed
Olsen was permanently and totally disabled as a
result of the amputation.

K 9 The administrative law judge denied
Olsen's claim, and Olsen thereafter filed a motion
for review with the Commission. The Commission
found that despite Olsen's injury, he had achieved a
long and successful career and his skills continued
to be in demand following his retirement. The
Commission also found that the pain in Olsen's arm
was only one of a variety of factors influencing his
decision to retire. The Commission thus concluded
that Olsen failed to establish that there was no regular, dependable work available to him as a result of
his industrial accident Olsen now seeks review of
the Commission's decision.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1] f 10 Olsen first challenges the factual findings of the Commission. "Whether die findings [of
fact] are adequate is ... a legal determination that
requires no deference to die Commission." Adams
v. Board of Review of the Indus. Comm'n, 821 P.2d
1, 4 (Utah CtApp.1991). However, "we will
change a factual finding only if it is not supported
by substantial evidence when viewed in light of die
whole record before die court" King v. Industrial
Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah Ct.App.1993)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Utah
Code Ann. §63G-4-403(4)(g) (2008).
[2][3] J 11 Second, Olsen argues that the Commission erred in interpreting and applying the
"odd-lot" m i doctrine to the facts; of this case.
"The standard we apply when reviewing an
agency's interpretation of general law *590 including case law ... is a correction of error standard,
giving no deference to the agency's decision." Exxon Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2010 UT 16,
\ 6, 228 P.3d 1246 (internal quotation marks omitted). "When an agency has discretion to apply its
factual findings to the law, we will not disturb the
agency's application unless its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Smith v. Mity Lite, 939 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah
Ct.App.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
FN1. This somewhat " 'undignified
phrase,' " coined by Judge Moulton in the
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English case of Cardiff Corp. v. Hall,
(1911) 1 K.B. 1009, refers to the circumstance where, as a result of a worker's industrial accident, " 'the capacities for work
left to him fit him only for special uses and
do not, so to speak, make his powers of labour a merchantable article in some of the
well known lines of the labour market' "
Hoskings v. Industrial Comm'n, 918 ?2A
150, 154 n. 3 (Utah CtApp.1996) (quoting
Cardiff 1 K.B. at 1020-21). As such, his «
'labour [is] in the position of an *odd lot'
in the labour market, [and] the employer
must show that a customer can be found
who will take i f " Id (quoting Cardiff 1
K.B. at 1020-21).
% 12 Finally, Olsen argues that his due process
rights were violated when the Commission took
over thirty-eight months to issue a decision in his
case, despite language in the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act requiring agencies to issue decisions M[w]ithin a reasonable time after die hearing," Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-208(I) (2008).
Olsen is entitled to relief if the Commission "failed
to follow prescribed procedure" and he was
"substantially prejudiced" by that failure. Id §
63G-4-403(4),(4Xe).

;

:
!
:

;

ANALYSIS
I. The Commission's Factual Findings
[4][S][6] \ 13 Olsen argues that die Commissiotfs factual findings were inadequate to support
its conclusions. "The question of whether the Commission's action constitutes arbitrary action for
want of adequate findings is governed by our determination of whether this court is able to conduct
a meaningful review." Adams, 821 P.2d at 4. In order to be adequate, the findings must therefore be
"sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Id
(internal quotation marks omitted). An inquiry into
the adequacy of the factual findings may be conducted by looking at the Commission's findings and

conclusions on their face and determining whether
the conclusions logically follow from the factual
findings or whether additional findings are needed.
t 14 Olsen does not actually make any argument to support his assertion that the findings are
inadequate. Rather, he argues that the findings
ignored relevant and critical factual information"
regarding the difficulty he encountered in continuing to work and in accomplishing daily activities,
the reasons for his retirement, and the determinations of his physicians. This argument constitutes a
challenge to the accuracy of the factual findings
themselves, not the ability of the findings to adequately support the Commission's conclusion. The
Commission's factual findings, derived from its
weighing of the evidence, are entitled to some deference. We therefore consider these challenges by
determining whether the factual findings are
"supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record before the court" King,
850 ?M at 1285 (internal quotation marks omitted).
\ 15 While the Commission may have emphasized some facts in the record over others, its factual
findings were supported by substantial evidence. In
fact, the evidence Olsen claims the Commission
"ignored" was largely incorporated into the findings. The Commission specifically found,
The loss of his dominant lower right arm caused
Mr. Olsen difficulty in some aspects of his personal and work life. It was more difficult for Mr.
Olsen to attend to personal matters such as dressing, grooming, and the like. At work, it was time
consuming for Mr. Olsen to fill out required reports with his left hand.
However, the Commission found that these difficulties were mitigated by Olsen's development of
"adaptive techniques." The Commission found that
although "Olsen experienced chronic moderate pain
in his arm after his accident, the arm's condition has
been essentially stable and he has experienced relatively few medical complications from the injury."
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All of these findings are supported by substantial
evidence in the record.
[7] \ 16 As to the reasons for Olserfs retirement, the Commission found,
Mr. Olserfs decision to retire on December 31,
1986, stemmed from several factors. He knew of
others his age with similar work responsibilities
who he believed had died due to stress. He found
it difficult to hire and train new workers. Furthermore, at fee time [Utah Concrete] was acquiring
other operations throughout *591 the United
States and Mr. Olsen was required to travel to
those sites as well as perform his regular work
duties. He believed his health was declining. The
pain and functional limitations from his work injury added additional burdens. Although Mr.
Olsen continued to successfully perform his work
duties, over a period of several years he came to
the conclusion feat it would be prudent for him to
retire when he qualified for his company pension
and social security retirement benefits.
Mr. Olserfs non-work medical problems include the removal of his thyroid in 1956, several
years prior to his woik accident After his retirement at fee end of 1986, Mr. Olsen experienced
heart arrhythmia[ ^
and implantation of a
pacemaker, prostate cancer, left carpal tunnel
syndrome and ganglion cyst, arthritis, depression,
and colon polyps.
FN2. Olsen testified feat his heart arrhythmia was diagnosed in 1981, prior to
his retirement
;
i
i
i
.

Although fee Commission did not give as much
weight to Olserfs assertion feat he retired due to
pain in his arm as Olsen might have liked, fee Commission clearly did not ignore fee evidence that the
pain was a factor in Olserfs decision to retire, observing that a[t]he pain and functional limitations
from his work injury added additional burdens."
Although fee Commission explicitly acknowledged

fee difficulties faced by Olsen as a result of his industrial injury, it ultimately concluded that it was
"not persuaded" that the pain and challenges from
fee injury "motivated his decision to retire" The
Commission's findings regarding fee various reasons for Olserfs retirement are also supported by
substantial evidence infeerecord.
J 17 Although Olsen is correct feat fee Commission did not refer to fee statements of Dr. Lewis
and Dr. Hunter in its findings, fee value of these
statements in evaluating Olserfs ability to work at
fee time of his retirement was questionable, as
neither of these physicians had treated Olsen for
quite some time prior to his retirement Dr. Lewis
had not examined Olsen since 1972 or 1973, and
Dr. Hunter had not examined Olsen since 1964, six
months after fee amputation.00
FN3. To fee extent feat these doctors'
statements might have been relevant to determining whether Olserfs continued employment was fee result of superhuman efforts on his part, their exclusion from fee
Commission's factual findings was harmless. See infra f | 23-25.
II. Applicability of fee Odd-Lot Doctrine
[8][9] \ 18 Olsen next argues that he is entitled,
under fee facts of this case, to permanent total disability benefits by virtue of fee odd-lot doctrine,
which classifies employees as totally and permanently disabled when they "cannot be rehabilitated
and even though not in a state of abject helplessness can no longer perform fee duties ... required in
[their] occupation[s].w Marshall v. Industrial
Comm'n, 681 P2d 208, 212 (Utah 1984)
(alterations and omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). In applying fee odd-lot doctrine, it is not fee extent of fee employee's physical
impairment feat is at issue, but fee extent to which
feat impairment affects fee employee's ability to return to full employment See Smith v. Mity Lite, 939
P.2d 684,688 (Utah Ct.App.1997).
[10][111 % 19 In attempting to demonstrate that
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he falls into the odd-lot category, it is the burden of
the claimant to "present a prima facie case that no
regular, dependable work is available to him ... [by]
presenting] evidence that he can no longer perform
the duties required in his occupation and that he
cannot be rehabilitated to perform some other type
of employment" Peck v. Eimco Process Equip.
Co., 748 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Once the employee has
presented a prima facie case, the burden shifts to
the employer to prove the existence of regular,
steady work that the employee can perform" given
the employee's individual circumstances. Id This is
a fact-dependent inquiry that "must be assessed in
terms of the specific individual who has suffered a
work-related injury, taking into account such
factors as age, education, training, and mental capacity." Id at 574; see also Norton v. Industrial
Comm'n, 728 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah 1986) (per
curiam) (listing "age, sex, education, economic and
*592 social environment, ... [and] permanent
, impairment" as factors to be weighed (internal quotation marks omitted)).
[12][13][14] \ 20 The fact that an employee returned to work for some period of time following
his industrial injury does not automatically preclude
him from claiming permanent total disability benefits at a later date if he continues to suffer substantial pain throughout the period of his continued employment or if his industrial injury worsens to die
point that he is no longer able to maintain regular
i employment See Norton, 728 P.2d at 1027-28
I (holding that an employee who returned to work for
I six years following his work-related injury could
! nevertheless obtain permanent total disability bene; fits and observing that "[i]t may be years before the
| effect [of an injury] is felt*'). See generally HoskI ings v. Industrial Comm'n, 918 V2d 150, 156 n. 7
; (Utah Ct.App.1996) ("[CJourts are careful to avoid
penalizing or discouraging a claimant from attempting to rehabilitate himself...."). Under Utah law, a
claimant is not required to continue working merely
because someone is willing to hire him if he must
exert "superhuman efforts ... to rise above his crip-

pling handicaps" in order to do so. Norton, 728
P.2d at 1028. Thus, while a claimant's return to
work is "one factor to be weighed in determining
his disability," it must be considered in concert
with "the condition under which [the claimant] continued his employment" Id. at 1027-28.
[15][16] \ 21 Furthermore, the fact that an employee continues working until he is eligible to retire "will not adversely affect a determination of
permanent total disability when the employee has
demonstrated that his disability from the industrial
injury significantly influenced his decision to retire." Peck, 748 P.2d at 578. However, we will uphold a denial of benefits based on voluntary retirement "when a finding is made and supported by
evidence that die employee's retirement is not substantially motivated by his industrial injury, but is
due primarily to personal or other reasons." Id
\ 22 Olsen argues that the Commission misapplied the odd-lot doctrine (1) by failing to consider
die physical difficulties he faced in his job and the
pain he suffered in fulfilling his work duties after
losing his arm in evaluating whedier his injury precluded him from continuing to work; (2) by determining that he voluntarily retired due to factors apart
from his industrial injury; and (3) by failing to consider his disability in the context of "his age, mental capacity, social environment, and medical
impairment"
\ 23 We agree that in evaluating Olserfs ability
to continue in his employment die Commission
should have considered not only the success and
longevity of Olsetfs career following his industrial
accident, but also "the condition under which
[Olsen] continued his employment" "^ See
Norton, 728 P2d at 1028 (emphasis omitted). The
fact that Olsen "rose to die challenge" presented by
his industrial injury does not automatically preclude
him from seeking permanent total disability benefits, particularly if doing so required "superhuman
efforts" on his part.™5 See id at 1028 ("[The
claimant's] decision to return to work did not automatically disqualify him from receiving permanent
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total disability benefits, where the facts indicate
that throughout the remainder of his employ he was
not restored to health."). However, the Commission's failure to folly evaluate this factor was harmless because Olsen's claim was properly denied
based on his voluntary retirement. Additionally,
Olsen failed to make out a prima facie case that he
fell into the odd-lot category because he presented
no evidence that he could not be rehabilitated to
perform other work.
FN4. It is particularly necessary to consider the conditions of employment where
an employee's condition worsens over the
course of his continued employment Cf
Norton v. Industrial Comm'n, 728 P.2d
1025, 1026 (Utah 1986) (per curiam)
(reciting facts showing that employee's
symptoms worsened over the course of the
six years he continued to woik prior to his
retirement).
FN5. Nevertheless; the fact that Olsen continued to work in die same occupation for
twenty-three years following his industrial
accident may be weighed in evaluating
whether his injury was so crippling that he
could continue working only by exerting
superhuman efforts.
*593 \ 24 While there was certainly evidence
indicating that Olsen's pain was a major factor in
his decision to retire, there was also substantial
evidence, accurately recited in the Commission's
findings, supporting alternative motivations. The
factual findings made by the Commission are sufficiently detailed to provide "a logical and legal basis
for the ultimate conclusion^ ]" that Olsen's decision
to retire was not substantially motivated by his in; dustrial injury. See Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pub: lie Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986)
. The Commission's detailed findings discussing numerous factors affecting Olsen's decision to retire
; make it clear that the Commission's decision was
. not based merely on the fact that Olsen waited to
quit working until he was eligible to retire. Cf. Peck

v. Eimco Process Equip. Co., 748 P.2d 572, 579
(Utah 1987) (rejecting the Commission's denial of
permanent total disability benefits because it was
based solely on the Commission's finding that the
claimant was able to work effectively for a year following his accident and "just plain retired" after
turning sixty-five (internal quotation marks omitted)). Given the various factors listed in the Commission's findings, the Commission's conclusion
that it was "not persuaded" that Olsen's industrialk
injury "motivated his decision to retire" was not
beyond the realm of reasonableness and rationality.
The Commission's finding of voluntary retirement
motivated "primarily [by] personal or other reasons" is a sufficient basis for denying benefits under
the odd-lot doctrine. See id. at 578.
1 25 Additionally, although Olsen presented at
least some evidence that his injury kept him from
continuing with his job at Utah Concrete, he
presented no evidence indicating that he could not
be rehabilitated to perform a different job. See id. at
575 (stating the nile that it is the claimant's burden
to "present a prima facie case that no regular, dependable woik is available to him ... [by]
presenting] evidence that he can no longer perform
the duties required in his occupation and that he
cannot be rehabilitated to perform some other type
of employment" (emphasis added)); cf id at 574
(noting that the Division of Rehabilitation Services
had made a determination that claimant was not a
good candidate for rehabilitation); Norton v. Industrial Comm'n, 728 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah 1986)
(per curiam) (accepting an evaluation by the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation as prima facie
evidence that the claimant could not obtain other
employment). Olsen completed approximately three
years of college, and his position at Utah Concrete
was supervisory. The tasks he cited as causing him
pain or difficulty included filling out reports and
training new employees. However, it is conceivable
that Olsen could have been hired for a different job
that did not require him to fulfill such tasks. In fact,
Olsen testified that when he worked in California,
he had a secretary who filled out the reports for him
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and that he was not required to put in as many
hours at that job as he was at Utah Concrete. He
also testified that he was hired by Utah Concrete
for short periods after his retirement as a consultant, which included work designing a piece of
equipment. The Commission's finding that "Olsen
was a competent and sought-after management employee throughout the period of his active employment and afterwards during his retirement" is supported by the record and suggests that Olsen may
have been able to find less demanding employment.
In any case, because Olsen has presented no evidence to the contrary, he has not met his burden to
prove that he could not be rehabilitated. Having
failed to meet his burden of proof, Olsen could not
obtain permanent total disability benefits under the
odd-lot doctrine. This failure also obviated die need
for the Commission to consider additional contextual factors such as Olsen's "age, education, training, and mental capacity" affecting his ability to
continue woriring or to be rehabilitated, see Peck,
748P.2dat574.
III. Delay in Issuing Opinion
[17] 1 26 Finally, Olsen argues that the thirtyeight months it took for his appeal to be processed
by the Commission violated his due process rights.
Tlie Utah Administrative Procedures Act requires
that administrative agencies issue signed orders
"[w]ithin a reasonable time after the hearing." Utah
Code Ann. § 63G-4-208(l) (2008). This court has
previously upheld the grant of a petition for extraordinary relief compelling *594 the issuance of
an administrative decision following a seventeenmonth delay. See Rice v. Utah Sec, D/v., 2004 UT
App 215, W 2, 10, 95 P.3d 1169. While we agree
that a delay of thirty-eight months in issuing an administrative decision is unreasonable under the
facts of this case, Olsen never brought this issue to
the Commission's attention. Where he permitted the
Commission to delay its decision, without objection, for thirty-eight months, Olsen cannot now
claim on appeal that his due process rights were violated. See generally In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, % 62,
201 P.3d 985 ("P]n order to preserve an issue for

appeal [,] the issue must be presented to the trial
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." (second alteration
in original) (internal quotation marics omitted)); Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 74, \ 20,
34 P.3d 180 ("[P]arties must raise constitutional
claims in the first instance before the agency.").
Furthermore, Olsen was not prejudiced by die delay
because the Commission's decision appropriately
affirmed the decision of the administrative law
judge. See generally Utah Code Ann. §
63G-4-403(4) (2008) ("The appellate court shall
grant relief [for an agency's failure to follow prescribed procedure] only if, on die basis of the
agency's record, it determines that a person seeking
judicial review has been substantially prejudiced
...." (emphasis added)).
\ 27 Notwithstanding our conclusion that Olsen
is not entitled to relief due to agency delay, we are
concerned about the impact such an extensive time
for making a decision may have on a claimant who
has been erroneously denied benefits. The Workers*
Compensation Acf s purpose of providing a speedy
and inexpensive way for employees to be compensated for job-related injuries, offered in exchange for the forfeiture of the right to seek tort
damages, see Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(l)
(Supp.2010) (making recovery under die Workers'
Compensation Act the exclusive remedy for workrelated injuries), is not met in such circumstances.
See generally Merrill v. Utah Labor Comm'n, 2009
UT 26, % 24, 223 P.3d 1089 ("The Workers' Compensation Act was enacted to assure the injured employee and his family an income during die period
of his total disability as well as compensation for
any resulting permanent disability, to eliminate die
expenses, delay, and uncertainty of the employee
having to prove the employees negligence, and to
place the burden of industrial injuries on die industry." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Woldberg v. Industrial Comm'n, 74 Utah 309, 279 P.
609, 611 (1929) ("The whole purpose, plan and intent of the [Workers' Compensation] Act is to
provide a simple, adequate and speedy means to all
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applicants for compensation to have their applications heard and determined upon the merits, and to
have die acts of the Commission as speedily reviewed by this court by any interested party if he
thinks that the Commission has exceeded its powers
or has disregarded some provision of the statute."
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Rather, unless
individually motivated to make pre-decision payments, see, eg., Larsen Beverage v. Labor Comm'n,
2011 UT App 69, % 11 n. 4 (commending employer
for entering into a stipulation that permitted the employee to receive benefits while litigation was
pending), die employer can pay nothing for years
despite the employee's legally compensable claim
and current economic need.
CONCLUSION
% 28 The Commission's findings were adequate
to support its decision and were supported by substantial evidence. Because the Commission made a
specific finding that Olsen's retirement was primarily motivated by factors apart from his industrial injury and because Olsen failed to present a prima
facie case that he was unable to be rehabilitated for
alternative employment, the Commission did not
err in determining that he does not qualify for permanent total disability benefits under the odd-lot
doctrine. Finally, Olsen did not preserve his claim
that his due process lights were violated by the
Commission's delay in issuing a decision, and he
was not prejudiced by the delay. We therefore affirm.
% 29 WE CONCUR: CAROLYN B. McHUGH, Associate Presiding Judge and J. FREDERIC VOROS
JR., Judge.
UtahApp.,2011.
Olsen v. Labor Com'n
249 P.3d 586, 677 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 2011 UT
App 70
END OF DOCUMENT
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- Supreme Court of Utah.
PRICE RIVER COAL CO. and Insurance Co. of
North America, Employer-Carrier, Plaintiffs,
v.
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH and
Marie T. Mabbutt, widow of Fred C. Mabbutt, deceased, Defendants.
No. 20473.
Dec. 31,1986.
Industrial Commission allowed death benefits
for surviving spouse of employee, who died of
heart attack while working as miner. Employer
filed action for review. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that: (1) employee's heart attack
was "unexpected or unintended evenf' that caused
his death and, therefore, was "accident" within
meaning of statute, which allows compensation for
dependents of employee killed by accident arising
out of or in the course of employment; (2) establishing that employee's heart attack arose out of or
in the course of employment, rather than as result
of preexisting heart disease, required finding that
employment activities involved exertion or stress in
excess of normally expected level of nonemployment activity for persons in latter half of twentieth
century; and (3) remand was required for administrative law judge to make additional findings of fact
as to what employee was doing on day of heart attack.
Remanded.
Stewart, J., dissented and filed opinion joined
by Hall, CJ.
West Headnotes
[1] Workers' Compensation 413 €^>571
413 Workers' Compensation
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May

Be Had
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical
Harm
413VII1(A)5 Particular Injuries and Consequences
413k571 k. Injuries to heart. Most
Cited Cases
Employee's heart attack while working as belt
attendant in underground coal mine was
"unexpected or unintended evenf that caused his
death and, therefore, was "accident" within meaning of statute, which allows compensation for dependents of employee killed by accident arising out
of or in the course of employment U.C.A.1953,
35-1-1 etseq., 35-1-45.
[2] Workers' Compensation 413 €=>571
413 Workers' Compensation
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May
Be Had
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical
Harm
413VIII(A)5 Particular Injuries and Consequences
413k571 k. Injuries to heart. Most
Cited Cases
Establishing that employee's heart attack arose
"out of or in the course of employment", rather than
as result of preexisting heart disease, required finding that employment activities involved exertion or
stress in excess of normally expected level of
nonemployment activity for persons in latter half of
twentieth century. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-1 et seq.,
35-1-45.
[3] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^1949
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)13 Determination and Disposition of Proceeding
413kl949 k. Remand in general. Most
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Cited Cases
Inadequacy of administrative law judge's findings as to what employee's activities were on day of
death while working alone justified remand for
more detailed, resolution of conflicting testimony,
findings and determination whether activities
amounted to unusual or extraordinary exertion
causing heart attack that arose out of or in course of
employment U.C.A.1953,35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-45.
[4] Workers1 Compensation 413 €^1531.9(2)
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
413XVI(N)7 Accident or Injury and Consequences Thereof
413kl531.1 Particular Injuries and
Consequences
413kl531.9 Injuries to Heart
413kl531.9(2) k. Physical exertion or strain. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 413kl536)
Evidence that belt attendant job was sometimes
performed by women did not establish that job required less than extraordinary effort or strain and
that male employee's heart attack was caused by
preexisting heart disease, rather than course of employment.
[5] Workers' Compensation 413 C=*1949
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)13 Determination and Disposition of Proceeding
413kl949 k. Remand in general. Most
Cited Cases
Uncertainty as to whether administrative law
judge intended to apply correct legal standard when
it used words, "unusual exertion," in concluding
that employee's heart attack arose out of or in
course of employment justified remand for application of proper standard to determine legal cause.
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U.C.A.1953,35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-45.
[6] Workers' Compensation 413 €^>1730
413 Workers'Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial
413XVI(P)5 Reference
413kl730 k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
Medical panel, which served purpose of taking
facts as found by administrative law judge and assisting administrative law judge to decide whether
medical cause has been proven, does not serve role
of resolving conflicts in factual evidence with regard to injured party's activities. U.C.A.1953,
35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-45,35-1-85.
[71 Workers' Compensation 413 €=>1730
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial
413XVI(P)5 Reference
413kl730 k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
Administrative law judge permitting medical
panel to resolve factual disputes improperly abdicates function. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-45,
35-1-85.
*1080 James M. Elegante, Erie V. Boorman, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiffs.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Virginius Dabney,
Salt Lake City, for defendants.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
On December 20, 1984, the Industrial Commission through its administrative law judge issued
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order
allowing death benefits for applicant Marie J. Mabbutt, the widow of Fred C. Mabbutt, who died of a
heart attack while working as a miner for plaintiff
Price River Coal Co. ("PRC")- Mrs. Mabbutt's
claim for compensation was based upon the Work-
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ers1 Compensation Act, U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45
(1974 ed., Supp.1986), which allows compensation
to "the dependents of every such employee who is
killed, by accident arising out of or in the course of
his employment." PRCs motion for reconsideration
or review was denied by the Industrial Commission.
PRC *1081 thereupon filed this action for review.
We remand for additional findings of fact.
Fred C. Mabbutt was found dead on October
23, 1981, at the end of his eight-hour shift as a belt
attendant in PRCs underground coal mine in Helper, Utah. Mabbutt's job consisted of keeping certain
underground conveyor belts working and of keeping the belt rollers and the area surrounding these
belts free of coal dust and other materials which fall
from the belts or collect around them in the normal
course of their operation.
According to both parties, the crux of this case
is the question of whether there is substantial evidence to support the decision of the administrative
law judge that Fred Mabbutt's heart attack and subsequent death satisfies the requirement of section
35-1-45 that the death be "by accident arising out
of or in the course of his employment." However,
both sides disagree about the appropriate legal
standard to be applied in evaluating the evidence.
Therefore, we have two questions on appeal. The
first is, What constitutes a compensable "accident"?
The second question is whether the evidence of Mr.
Mabbutfs activities on the day of his death satisfies
the element of causation such that the accident, if
one did occur, was in fact related to his employment.
There is no need to dwell at length on the question of the appropriate legal standard. This issue
has just been dealt with extensively in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).
There we attempted to settle the meaning of the
term "by accident," which had become confused by
varying and inconsistent statements from this Court
over a long period of time. The Allen definition is
as follows: "Where either the cause of the injury or
the result of an exertion was different from what

would normally be expected to occur, the occurrence was unplanned, unforeseen, unintended and
therefore 'by accident.' " Id at 22 (emphasis in original). This definition follows the standard articulated in Carting v. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah
2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965), and in earlier decisions of this Court that can be traced back to
1922, including most notably Purity Biscuit Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961
(1949). This standard has been followed most recently in Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617
P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1980), and Kaiser Steel Corp.
v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 890-91 (Utah 1981).
[1] Under the Allen standard, it is fairly easy to
determine that Mr. Mabbutt did die "by accident"
on October 23, 1981. His heart attack was certainly
an "unexpected or unintended" event that resulted
in his death. Allen v. Industrial Commission, at 22.
However, the finding that the death was "by accident" does not complete the analysis of whether the
resulting injury is compensable. Under Allen, the
more difficult question involves the determination
of whether the injury had the requisite connection
with the employment duties-whether it arose "out
of or in the course of ... employment." U.C.A.,
1953, § 35-1-45 (1974 ed., Supp.1986); see Allen v.
Industrial Commission, at — .
Prior to Allen, the obvious need for a test to assure that there was a causal connection between the
injury and the employment duties of the injured
party was sometimes dealt with in our cases by requiring that the occurrence resulting in the injury be
shown to have involved "unusual exertion." Allen v.
Industrial Commission, at 23. This is the standard
apparently applied by the Commission in this case
and found to have been met.
However, Allen discarded the usual/unusual exertion distinction as a means for determining
whether the injury was the result of an "accident."
Instead, the Court dealt with the causation requirement in more candid terms that focus frankly on the
questions of legal and medical causation. It delineated the analysis as follows:
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Under the legal test, the law must define what
kind of exertion satisfies the test of "arising out
of the employment" ... [then] the doctors must
say whether die exertion (having been held legally sufficient* 1082 to support compensation) in
fact caused this [injury].
Id. at 25, citing Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 38.83(a), at 7-276 to -277 (1986).
In applying the Allen analysis to the present
case, then, the first question is whether legal cause
has been shown. Under Allen, a usual or ordinary
exertion, so long as it is an activity connected with
the employee's duties, will suffice to show legal
cause. However, if the claimant suffers from a preexisting condition, then he or she must show that
the employment activity involved some unusual or
extraordinary exertion over and above the "usual
wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment
life." Allen v. Industrial Commission, at 26. In appraising whether the employee's exertion would be
usual or ordinary in nonemployment life, an objective standard is to be applied that is based on the
nonemployment life of the average person, not the
nonemployment life of a particular worker. Id The
requirement of "unusual or extraordinary exertion"
is designed to screen out those injuries that result
from a personal condition which the worker brings
to the job, rather than from exertions required of the
employee in the workplace. Id. at 25.FNI
FN 1. As a practical matter, when the Allen
standard is being applied to cases which
may involve preexisting conditions, before
evidence is taken on the issue of legal
cause, the Commission would be welladvised to first make a determination of
whether or not the preexisting condition
does in fact exist. If a preexisting condition
exists, then the parties and the hearing officer will know that the "extraordinary exertion" test will be applied to the facts as
they are developed, and the evidence can
be appropriately prepared and marshalled
for presentation to the fact finder. If a

preexisting condition does not exist, the
hearing may be expedited because there
will be no need to show how hard the employee was or was not working, only that
the employment activity led to the injury.
Of course, even if a preexisting condition
is involved, if the Commission finds that
legal cause does exist, then it is still appropriate to refer the matter to a medical panel
to determine whether the facts, as determined at the legal cause hearing, are sufficient to establish medical causation.
In the present case, Mabbutt was suffering
from a preexisting condition which contributed
greatly to his heart attack. The evidence is uncontroverted that he had hypertensive cardiovascular
disease, atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, and
possibly diabetic cardiomyopathy. His hypertension
was exacerbated by his obesity and possibly a high
salt diet. He was a diabetic and had gout. The doctor on the medical panel to which this case was referred by the administrative law judge concluded
that there was no evidence that Mabbutt's work
"had any relationship to [his] development of
coronary artery disease."
[2] Since Mabbutt brought heart disease to the
workplace, before legal causation can be established, the Commission must find that his employment activities involved exertion or stress in excess
of the normally expected level of nonemployment
activity for men and women in the latter half of the
twentieth century. If such a finding is made, then
the requirement of legal cause is satisfied because it
is presumed that the employment increased the risk
of injury to which that worker was otherwise subject in his nonemployment life. At that point, the
inquiry shifts to medical cause, Le., whether the injured party's work-related activities were, in fact,
causally linked to the injury. Allen v. Industrial
Commission, at 26.
The question of whether the employment activities of a given employee are sufficient to satisfy
the legal standard of unusual or extraordinary effort
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involves two steps. First, the agency must determine as a matter of fact exactly what were the employment-related activities of the injured employee.
Second, the agency must decide whether those
activities amounted to unusual or extraordinary exertion. This second determination is a mixed question of law and fact.
[3] Because die whole legal cause determination hinges upon die agency's findings as to what
the injured worker's job-related activities were, our
review of die Commission's decision must begin
with those findings. In the present case, we are
*1083 unable to affirm the Commission's ruling because of the inadequacy of these findings. In his
job, Mabbutt worked alone in die mine, and he encountered only one person while working on the
day of his death. For that reason, it was necessary
to infer what Mabbutt*s activities were from die
conflicting evidence adduced at die hearing before
die administrative law judge. The company brought
in an expert to describe his understanding of die exertion required to perform that particular job. His
testimony would support a conclusion (hat no unusual or extraordinary effort was required On die
other hand, Mabbutt's widow introduced testimony
from a fellow worker who described how she had
seen Mabbutt perform die work, testimony that
might support a conclusion that the effort required
was unusual. This testimony was disputed by the
company.
Unfortunately, die administrative law judge's
findings do not resolve die conflicts in die testimony and do not indicate tiiat he made a finding as
to exactly what Mabbutt's activities were on the day
of his death. Absent such findings, it is impossible
for us to take die next step and determine whether
Mabbutt's work-related activities, as found by the
Commission, rose to die level necessary to satisfy
the "unusual or extraordinary" exertion threshold
established by Allen for injured employees with
preexisting problems.
The administrative law judge found that
"Mabbutt died as the result of an accident in the

course of his employment... resulting from unusual
exertion and stress connected with his employment" It may be argued that this is a sufficient
finding of legal cause to warrant our affirming die
Commission on this point However, die "finding"
of unusual exertion and stress is notiiing more than
a conclusion. It is not supported by anytiiing that
could be construed as a finding as to precisely what
Mabbutt was doing on the day of his death. We
cannot affirm such a mixed conclusion of fact and
law when its necessary premises are not evident
[4][5] There is an added problem here. The
Commission decided this case under prv-Allen law.
We cannot determine whedier the administrative
law judge used die words "unusual exertion" in die
same sense as diey have been defined by Allen. A
talismanic incantation of "unusual or extraordinary
exertion" is not a substitute for careful analysis by
die Commission of whedier the actual job-related
activities in question exceed die normally expected
level of activity for men and women in die latter
half of die twentietfi century.1*2 In die present
case, we are uncertain of die standard applied by
die Commission and cannot tell how die stated conclusion was reached. For that reason, we must reverse and remand die matter to die Commission so
that proper findings of fact can be entered and die
Allen standard can be applied to diem to determine
legal cause.
FN2. We reject, categorically, die suggestion advanced by the company that because
the belt-attendant job is sometimes performed by women, it must necessarily^ involve less than extraordinary efifort or
strain. We take judicial notice of the fact
that women, as a group, tend to be smaller
in size and have less physical strength than
do men, as a group. However, with respect
to size and strength, individual men and
women are arrayed over a continuum from
one extreme to the other. No generalization
can be made tiiat because a woman performs a certain job it necessarily involves
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strength and exertion requirements at the
lower end of the spectrum, and the contrary is, of course, true of a job performed
by a man. Each jobs demands must be
evaluated on their own; they cannot be categorized as requiring "usual" or "unusual"
exertion simply because they are normally
done by women or men, respectively.
A word about the issue of medical cause. As
noted, the administrative law judge did not resolve
conflicts in the testimony about Mabbutfs work
activities. However, he did adopt the findings of the
medical panel, which contained a doctor's assumptions about what Mabbutt was actually doing on the
day in question, and which then relied on those factual assumptions in finding a causal link between
fiie work and his death. The factual recitation in the
panel report was derived from the conflicting evidence presented at die hearing and inferences drawn
from that evidence. In a number of *1084 respects,
as fiie company demonstrated at the hearing on its
objections to the medical panel report and in its
brief on appeal, the panel was confrised as to some
of fiie basic duties of Mabbutfs job and made assumptions about his actual activities which are unsupported by the evidence.
[6][7] It is not the role of the medical panel to
resolve conflicts in the factual evidence regarding
fiie injured party's activities. Section 35-1-85 of the
Code places that responsibility solely on fiie Commission. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-85 (1974 ed.). Under
Allen, as before, the medical panel is only to take
fiie facts as found by fiie administrative law judge
and consider them in light of its medical expertise
to assist fiie administrative law judge in deciding
whether medical cause has been proven. The medical panel strays beyond its province when it attempts to resolve factual disputes, and the administrative law judge improperly abdicates his function
if he permits the panel to so act. IGA Food Fair v.
Martin, 584 P.2d 828,830 (Utah 1978).
We acknowledge that during the adjudication
of this matter, the Commission was laboring under

the confusing and conflicting state of the law as it
had developed prior to Allen, The issues presented
by this and similar cases should be easier to resolve
in the future. However, questions of some subtlety
will remain in cases involving claims for internal
failure where the worker has a preexisting condition
that contributes to the injury and where a determination must be made as to whether a specific work
activity amounts to "unusual or extraordinary" exertion. The concept of "unusual or extraordinary"
exertion remains to be fleshed out over time. Of necessity, fiie process of pouring specific content into
that concept will rely heavily upon the Commission's expertise in and familiarity with the woik environment
This case is remanded to fiie Industrial Commission for findings of fact as to what Mabbutfs
activities actually were on the day of his death*
Based upon those findings and upon a review of Allen, the Commission may then adhere to or abandon
its conclusion that those activities amounted to extraordinary exertion. Because the determination of
medical cause must be based upon die Commission's findings as to fiie actual activities of the
woiker, and because fiie panel's report in the
present case rested upon fiie medical panel's improper assumptions as to fiie facts, fiie Commission
should resubmit the question of medical causation
to fiie panel after it has made the appropriate factual
findings.
HOWE and DURHAM, JL, concur.
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice (dissenting):
I dissent In one of the first important tests of
the rules laid down in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), the majority reverses and remands to "resubmit the question of
medical causations to the panel." But the medical
panel has already addressed that exact question, and
the administrative law judge found that the decedent's death was caused by his job-related activities on the day that the fatal accident occurred. What
more the court expects than has been done by the
Commission is not explained by the majority. The
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administrative law judge was correct in his ruling,
the Commission so found, and I agree.

HALL, C.J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of
STEWART, Associate C J.

It is precisely this kind of case that demonstrates that our newly formulated methods of analysis will inevitably draw the Commission off into
pathways that are bound, I believe, to lead to error.
The Court's unfortunate requirement that, since
Mabbutt had a preexisting condition, the Commission must find "that his employment activities involved exertion or stress in excess of the normally
expected level of activity for men and women in the
latter of the twentieth century," is precisely the discriminatory application of workers' compensation
laws to workers with a preexisting condition, which
I referred to in my dissent in Allen.

Utah,1986.
Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Com'n of Utah
731 P.2d 1079
END OF DOCUMENT

I would affirm on the authority of Pittsburgh
Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367 (Utah
1983), and *\0S5Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi,
631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981). Like Pittsburgh Testing
and Monfredi, the decedent's preexisting coronary
condition was clearly aggravated in this case. The
administrative law judge made that clear in his
findings:
[T]here is no way of knowing exactly how long
before the hour of 4:20 p.m. the applicant first
felt the effects of that stress or at what time he
actually died but it could have been some hours
before 4:20 p.m. We are not called upon to speculate as to those times or as to the excessive
stress or exertion later in the afternoon in view of
the fact that two fine cardiologists have agreed
that the evidence is sufficient to convince them
that the death was industrially related.
The Administrative Law Judge finds that Mr.
Mabbutt died as the result of an accident in the
course of his employment on October 23, 1981
resulting from unusual exertion and stress connected with his employment on that fateful afternoon.
I would affirm. The Commission has found the
necessary facts, and it is not for us to ignore them.
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, Petitioner,
v.
LABOR COMMISSION and John Wisner, Respondents.
No. 20080265-CA.
April 30,2009.
Background: County petitioned for judicial review
of a determination by the Labor Commission that
county was not entitled to a 15 percent reduction in
the workers' compensation benefits owed to injured
county employee.
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that
Labor Commission's determination that employee
did not willfully violate a lifting restriction was
reasonable.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A C^>
754.1
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(D) Scope of Review in General
15Ak754 Discretion of Administrative
Agency
15Ak754.1 k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
The applicable standard of review for agency
decisions turns on whether the legislature has statutorily granted the agency discretion.
[2] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A £^>
754.1
15A Administrative Law and Procedure

15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(D) Scope of Review in General
15Ak754 Discretion of Administrative
Agency
15Ak754.1 k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
Administrative Law and Procedure 15A €=^763
15 A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(D) Scope of Review in General
15Ak763 k. Arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious action; illegality. Most Cited Cases
Statutes 361 €=^219(4)
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k213 Extrinsic Aids to Construction
361k219 Executive Construction
361k219(4) k. Erroneous construction; conflict with statute. Most Cited Cases
When the legislature has granted an agency discretion to determine an issue, Court of Appeals reviews the agency's action for reasonableness; absent a grant of discretion, Court of Appeals uses a
correction-of-error standard in reviewing an
agency's interpretation or application of a statutory term.
[3] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^1939.11(9)
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact,
Findings, and Verdict
413kl939 Review of Decision of Department, Commission, Board, Officer, or Arbitrator
413kl939.11 Particular Findings
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413kl939.11(9) k. Amount and
period of compensation. Most Cited Cases
Court of Appeals would review Labor Commission's determination that injured county employee's violation of a lifting restriction was not
willful, such that county was not entitled to a 15
percent reduction in the amount of workers1 compensation benefits owed to employee, for reasonableness, where legislature granted Commission decisional discretion. West's U.CA. §§ 34A-1-301,
34A-2-302(3XaXii).

doctor-imposed restriction on the amount of weight
he could lift was reasonable, and thus county was
not entitled to a 15 percent reduction in the amount
of workers' compensation benefits owed to employee; employee did not subjectively consider his actions to constitute "lifting," and employee thought
he could install the pump without violating his lifting restriction because he did not have to physically
lift the pump. West's U.CA. § 34A-2-302(3XaXii).
*1088 David H.T. Wayment, Salt Lake City, for
Petitioner.

[4] Workers' Compensation 413 0 ^ 9 4 5
413 Workers' Compensation
4 BIX Amount and Period of Compensation
413IX(G) Increase or Reduction of Compensation
413DC(G)1 Misconduct in General (Prior
to Injury)
413k945 k. Employee's misconduct.
Most Cited Cases
The term "willful," in statute entitling an employer to a 15 percent reduction in workers' compensation benefits owed to a worker whose injury is
caused by the willful failure to use a safety device
or obey a safety rule, implies something in addition
to mere negligence; accordingly, negligence alone
or even gross negligence is not sufficient to constitute "willful failure." West's U.CA. § 34A-2-302

OXa).
[5] Workers1 Compensation 413 C=*945
413 Workers' Compensation
4 BIX Amount and Period of Compensation
413EX(G) Increase or Reduction of Compensation
4131X(G)1 Misconduct in General (Prior
to Injury)
413k945 k. Employee's misconduct.
Most Cited Cases
Labor Commission's determination that
county employee who reinjured his back while attempting to physically maneuver into place a heavy
pump he was installing did not willftilly violate a

Gary E. Atkin, Marsha Atkin, and Alan L. Hennebold, Salt Lake City, for Respondents.
Before Judges THORNE, ORME, and McHUGH.
OPINION
ORME, Judge:
% 1 Salt Lake County challenges the Utah
Labor Commission's determination that the
County was not entitled to a 15% reduction in compensation benefits it owed to John Wisner
(Employee). As we determine that the Commission
did not exceed its discretion in concluding that Employee did not willfully disobey any lifting restriction put in place by the County, we conclude that
the County was not entitled to the 15% reduction.
BACKGROUND™
FN1. Unless otherwise noted, our recitation of the facts is based on the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact in her
August 27, 2007 order, which were adopted by the Commission in its March 4,
2008 order, and on the Commission's discussion of the relevant facts in its March 4,
2008 order.
% 2 On July 2, 2002, while working as a swimming pool maintenance specialist for the County,
Employee was injured "by accident," Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-2-401(l) (2005), when he was recon-
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necting a chlorine line. To perform this task, Employee had to crawl into a pit that contained a 1500
gallon chlorine tank and move it When
"[Employee] put his back against the wall for leverage and shoved and twisted the tank with his arms,"
u
[he] felt pain in the middle of his back at waist
height and an immediate shock through his back
down his right leg which went dead."
% 3 The July 2002 injury was determined to
have arisen during the course of Employee's employment with the County, see id, even though
Employee had previously undergone a L4-5 microdiscectomy during August of 1995, "because
[Employee had] engaged in [an] unusual exertion
greater than average non-industrial life." Employee's doctor determined that the July 2002 accident
"caused a recurrent disc herniation," which was "a
new injury ... requiring surgery." Following surgery
in November 2002, Employee's doctor placed Employee on "permanent work restrictions ... [with] no
lifting over 50 pounds." Further, Employee "was
assigned a 12% whole person impairment rating under the Commission's impairment guides," with
10% of his impairment attributed to his 1995 injury
and 2% of his impairment attributed to his 2002 injury. As a result of the July 2002 injury, Employee
was entitled to compensation benefits at a maximum rate of $478 per week.
% 4 When Petitioner returned to work as a
swimming pool maintenance specialist with the
County, he was able to perform the required work,
occasionally taking pain medication. However, on
May 6, 2005, Employee suffered another workplace
injury while installing a 250 to 300 pound circulation pump. During the installation, Employee first
used a crane to remove the pump from the truck and
then used a dolly to transport the pump to the pool.
At the pool, "[Employee] had to manually manipulate the pump into place," which "required [him] to
straddle the pump and bend over [to] jerk it upwards to line it up for the installation." When Employee jerked up on the pump, "[he] felt immediate
pain in the middle of his back at waist level."

^ 5 Employee specifically testified:
I didn't have to lift it at all. I took it off the truck
with a crane, put it on the dolly, rolled it in there,
and then pried it up on the stand.
But I had to jump it to line it up with the coupling on the thing. It's a 15-horsepower motor,
probably weighed, I don't know, 250, 300
pounds. But it wasn't, you know, you weren't lifting it, you were just jockeying it around. And I...
straddled it..., and I just jerked up on it to line it
up. And, you know, once you've done that to your
back....
Employee emphasized that "[he] didn't lift a
200- or 300-pound pump." Instead, "[he] grabbed it
and ... jerked it around." When asked at the hearing,
Employee was unable to estimate how much weight
he effectively *1089 lifted while maneuvering and
jerking up on the pump. He testified that he made
an effort to comply with the work restrictions imposed by his doctor and that, "[t]o the best of [his]
knowledge," he did comply with those restrictions.
J 6 The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the May 2005 injury arose during the
course of his employment with the County; that the
injury was accidental; and that, because the injury
was "a subsequent injury with the same employer,"
Employee only needed to prove ordinary exertion
although "his injury would meet either a usual or
unusual exertion." Employee's doctor "opined [that
he] suffered an aggravation of his chronic low back
pain" as a result of the May 2005 accident but that
"[he] was medically stable." The doctor placed Employee on "new, permanent work restrictions of no
prolonged walking or standing[;] no prolonged sitting[;] no repeated bending, stooping, lifting or
twisting[;] ... lifting restrictions of 10-25 pounds
maximum[;] no divingf;] and no driving while taking narcotic medications." Employee was not assigned a different impairment rating as a result of
the May 2005 injury. At the time the ALJ's order
was issued, Employee had not worked since
September 2005. His job with the County required
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lifting more than 25 pounds, and although he
sought other employment, he was not hired.
% 7 While indicating that Employee exceeded
the lifting restrictions imposed by his doctor after
the July 2002 injury, the ALJ determined that
"there is no evidence that such activity was a failure to obey an order or a written safety policy of
the [County]." The ALJ further determined that imposing a 15% penalty on Employee was not required because Employee's conduct had not been in
willful disobedience of any safety order of the
County. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-302(3XaXii)
(2005). The ALJ concluded that Employee sustained a permanent, total disability "as the result of
the May 6, 2005 industrial injury" and that Employee was "entitled to ... compensation at the rate of
$501 per week."

FN2

The applicable standard of review for agency
decisions turns on whether the Legislature has statutorily granted the agency discretion. See AE Clevite, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT App 35, % 6,
996 P.2d 1072, cert, denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah
2000). "When the Legislature has granted an
agency discretion to determine an issue, we review
the agency's action for reasonableness. Absent a
grant of discretion, we use a correction-of-error
standard in reviewing an agency's interpretation or
application of a statutory term." Id. (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
FN2. The County also raises the issue of
whether it adopted as a safety policy the
work restrictions imposed by Employee's
doctor. We need not reach this issue as we
determine that Employee's actions were
not willful.

% 8 The County appealed the ALTs decision to
the Labor Commission, arguing, inter alia, that the
County was entitled to a 15% reduction in the rate
of compensation owed to Employee because Employee willfully disobeyed a safety order from the
County when he was maneuvering the pump. According to the County, the work restrictions recommended by Employee's doctor constituted a safety
rule or order imposed by the County. The Commission adopted the ALTs findings of facts and affirmed the ALTs decision. The Commission specifically determined that "[Employee]^ efforts to
perform his work duties [could not] be fairly characterized as a 'willful' failure to comply with his
lifting restrictions." The Commission "d[id] not
view the physician's restrictions as having been
'adopted' by [the County]." The County then
sought judicial review of the Commission's final order.

[3] % 10 The Legislature has statutorily granted
the Commission decisional discretion. See *1090
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 (2005) ("The
[Commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and
apply the law in this chapter or any other title or
chapter it administers."). Thus, we review the Commission's decision that Employee's conduct was not
willful, for purposes of section 34A-2-302(3XaXiO>
for reasonableness and will only overturn the Commission if its "determination exceeds the bounds of
reasonableness and rationality so as to constitute an
abuse
of
discretion
under
section
63-46b-16[(4)](hXi) of the [Utah Administrative
Procedures Act]." AE Clevite, Inc.f 2000 UT App
35, % 7, 996 P.2d 1072. See Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-16(4)(hXi) (2004) (current version at Utah
Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(hXi) (2008)).

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
DIP] ^ 9 The pivotal issue before the court is
whether the Commission properly determined that
Employee's actions were not willful under Utah
Code section 34A-2-302(3)(aXii), and that the
County is therefore not entitled to a 15% reduction
in the compensation benefits it owed Employee.

ANALYSIS
[4] % 11 Under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, an employer is entitled to a 15% reduction
in the compensation it owes to an employee when
the employee's injury does not "resultf ] in death"
and the "injury is caused by the willful failure of
the employee: (i) to use safety devices when
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provided by the employer or (ii) to obey any order
or reasonable rule adopted by the employer for the
safety of the employee." Utah Code Ann. §
34A-2-302(3)(a) (2005). The term " 'willful' implied] something in addition to mere negligence."
Van Waters & Rogers v. Workman, 700 P.2d 1096,
1098 (Utah 1985). Accordingly, "negligence alone
or even gross negligence is not sufficient to constitute 'willful failure.' " Id In Van Waters & Rogers
v. Workman, 700 P.2d 1096 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court outlined a "workable formula" for
"distinguishing willful failure from less culpable
conduct," stating:
"[T]he general rule [is] that the deliberate defiance of a reasonable rule laid down to prevent
serious bodily harm to the employee will usually
be held to constitute willful misconduct, in the
absence of a showing of... specific excuses[.]

If the employee had some plausible purpose to
explain his violation of a rule, the defenses of violation of safety rules or willful misconduct are
inapplicable, even though the judgment of the
employee might have been faulty or his conduct
rash[.]"
Id at 1099 (quoting 1A A. Larson, Workmen's
Compensation §§ 32.30, 33.40 (1982)) (omissions
in original).
% 12 In Van Waters, the Supreme Court held
that the employee's conduct in failing to wear safety
goggles as required by the employer was not willful
because the employee did not act in total disregard
of the requirement but instead tried to complete the
required work wearing goggles, only removing
them after they kept fogging up and preventing him
from safely completing his task. See id at 1097,
1099. See also City of Las Animas v. Maupin, 804
P.2d 285, 286 (Colo.Ct.App. 1990) (determining,
under a similar Colorado statute, that the "evidence
could support a finding that" the employee's action
in removing a safety glove was not willfiil when the

employee removed the glove so he could "push a
lever that would not stay down" and "believed that
he could not operate certain equipment with the
glove on and that pushing the lever with his bare
hand would, under normal conditions, pose no
safety threat"); Smit v. Geyer Detective Agency,
Inc., 130 So.2d 882, 884 (Fla.1961) (concluding
that the commission erred in determining that the
employee's action in crossing the double line while
driving was willful because "[rjather than infer[ring] willfulness from this fact, it [wa]s equally
as reasonable to conclude that the [employee] may
have seen the truck ahead of him just prior to the
accident, and that he instinctively swerved to the
left in a vain attempt to avoid the collision"). But
see McCulloch v. Industrial Comm'n, 109 Colo.
123, 123 P.2d 414, 415-16 (1942) (determining that
an employee willfiilly failed to follow safety rule
when employee, who was apprised of rule to wear
goggles, intentionally chose not to wear goggles
until he "deemed [it] necessary," and therefore
"acted upon his own judgment ... about the use of
goggles") (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted) (omission in original).
% 13 In this case, the evidence shows that Employee, while in the course of his work duties, tried
to install a very heavy pump by physically maneuvering it into place. This task did not require that
Employee physically*1091 lift the pump but required that he use a certain amount of force to maneuver it and jockey it into place. Employee testified
that he could not "lift 250, 300 pounds" and stated
that he tried to comply with his doctor's lifting restrictions while carrying out his work duties..
[5] ^ 14 The County argues that "[b]ecause
[Employee] should have recognized the probable
consequences of lifting outside his restriction, his
violation was willful." It further asserts that because both the ALJ and the Commission found that
Employee violated his doctor's restriction when he
jerked up on the pump, and because Employee
denied "lifting" outside his restrictions, he provided
no reasonable explanation for violating his doctor's
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restrictions as required under Van Waters. See 700
P.2d at 1098-99. We disagree.
K 15 Even though Employee did not specifically address why he violated his doctor's restriction,
Employee's testimony as a whole explains his actions. He stated that he did not think he would violate the lifting restriction while maneuvering the
pump because he never had to "physically ... lift
that pump." Moreover, his testimony indicates that
he tried to comply with his doctor's restrictions.
Based on Employee's testimony and the other evidence of record, the ALJ and the Commission determined that although, technically speaking, Employee's jerking up on the pump violated his doctor's lifting restriction, Employee did not subjectively consider his actions as "lifting" and his attempt to maneuver and install the pump was not in
willful disregard of his lifting restriction. While in
hindsight Employee's decision to maneuver the 250
to 300 pound pump without assistance may well
have been careless, we conclude that the determination his conduct was not willful under Utah Code
section 34A-2-302(3XaXii) does not "exceed[ ] the
bounds of reasonableness and rationality so as to
constitute an abuse of discretion." AE Clevite, Inc.
v. Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT App 35, \ 7, 996 P.2d
1072, cert, denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). As
correctly argued by the Commission in the case before us, if Employee's conduct was negligent or
even grossly negligent, it does not necessarily follow that he acted in willful disregard of any safety
rule or policy adopted or set forth by the County.
™ See Van Waters, 700 P.2d at 1098-99.

he was complying with his doctor's lifting
restrictions and thought he could maneuver
the pump without assistance.
CONCLUSION
% 16 The Commission's determination that Employee did not willfully disregard his doctor's lifting restriction is reasonable because Employee's attempt to move the pump by himself appears to have
been a negligent act rather than a willfol act. We
accordingly affirm the Commission's decision to
not offset, by 15%, the compensation owed to Employee.
1 17 WE CONCUR: WILLIAM A. THORNE JR.,
Associate Presiding Judge, CAROLYN B.
McHUGH, Judge.
UtahApp.,2009.
Salt Lake County v. Labor Com'n
208 P.3d 1087, 629 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 2009 UT
App 112
END OF DOCUMENT

FN3. The County also discusses a statement Employee made, citing to Employee's
medical records, which indicated that Employee did not seek help when maneuvering the pump because he does not like to
ask for help. Even if Employee does not
like to ask for help, Employee's decision to
move the pump by himself can still be considered negligent rather than willful when
the evidence shows that Employee thought
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[2] Workers1 Compensation 413 €=>1691
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Linda C. SPEIRS, Petitioner,
v.
SOUTHERN UTAH UNIVERSITY and/or Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, Respondents.
No.20010374-CA.
Nov. 21,2002.

413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial
413XVI(P)1 In General
413kl691 k. Scope and Extent; Matters and Evidence Considered. Most Cited Cases
Workers' Compensation 413 €>^>1733

Workers' compensation claimant appealed from
order of the Labor Commission denying in part
and granting in part her request for benefits based
on knee and ankle injuries. The Court of Appeals,
Thorne, J., held that administrative law judge (ALJ)
properly discharged his duty to make findings of
fact and did not abdicate his responsibility to medical panel.
Affirmed.
Gregory K. Orme, J., dissented and filed opinion.
West Headnotes
[11 Workers1 Compensation 413 €=^>19393
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact,
Findings, and Verdict
413k 1939 Review of Decision of Department, Commission, Board, Officer, or Arbitrator
413kl939.3 k. Conclusiveness of
Administrative Findings in General. Most Cited
Cases
Court of Appeals must uphold Labor Commission's determination in workers' compensation proceeding unless that determination exceeds bounds
of reasonableness and rationality.

413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial
413XVI(P)6 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by Board, Commission, or Court
413kl732 Necessity
413kl733 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Administrative law judge (ALJ) properly discharged his duty to make findings of fact and did
not abdicate his responsibility to medical panel;
ALJ provided medical panel with set of stipulated
facts and questions, medical panel conducted examination of claimant and her medical history and
used this information to answer questions, and ALJ
reviewed medical panel's report and other medical
opinions in record and issued findings.
[3] Workers* Compensation 413 ©=^515
413 Workers' Compensation
413 VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May
Be Had
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical
Harm
413VIII(A)1 In General
413k515 k. What Are Accidental Injuries in General. Most Cited Cases
To award workers' compensation benefits,
Labor Commission must determine that accident
has occurred and that there is causal connection
between accident and injury claimed; this requires
that Commission make findings of fact and draw
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conclusions of law.

[71 Administrative Law and Procedure 15A € = ?
669.1

[4J Workers' Compensation 413 €^>1416
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
413XVI(N)1 In General
413kl415 Opinion Evidence
413kl416 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
In difficult workers' compensation cases, opinions of medical panel may be of assistance to
Labor Commission in determining whether benefits should be awarded because medical panel
provides Commission with benefit of its medical
expertise.
[51 Workers' Compensation 413 €^=>1704
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial
413XVI(P)3 Questions of Law and Fact
413kl704 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Even when medical panel is convened, administrative law judge (ALJ)/ Labor Commission is
always ultimate fact finder in workers' compensation proceeding.
16] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^1847
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)5 Presentation and Reservation
Below of Grounds of Review
413kl845 Necessity
413kl847 k. Theory of Claim or
Defense. Most Cited Cases
Court of Appeals was precluded from addressing workers' compensation claimant's due process
claim, where claimant failed to raise claim before
Labor Commission.

15 A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(A) In General
15Ak669 Preservation of Questions Before Administrative Agency
15Ak669.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Issues not raised in proceedings before administrative agencies are not subject to judicial review
except under exceptional circumstances.
[8J Workers1 Compensation 413 €=^>1939.6
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact,
Findings, and Verdict
413kl939 Review of Decision of Department, Commission, Board, Officer, or Arbitrator
413kl939.6 k. Weight of Evidence
and Credibility of Witnesses. Most Cited Cases
Workers' Compensation 413 C^>1939.7
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact,
Findings, and Verdict
413kl939 Review of Decision of Department, Commission, Board, Officer, or Arbitrator
413kl939.7 k. Inferences or ConclusionsfromFacts Proved. Most Cited Cases
It is not role of Court of Appeals to reweigh
evidence in workers' compensation proceeding and
substitute its conclusion for that of Labor Commission; instead, Court defers to Commission's
findings because, when reasonably conflicting
views arise, it is Commission's province to draw in-
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ferences and resolve these conflicts.
*42 Aaron J. Prisbrey, St. George, for Petitioner.
James R. Black, Salt Lake City, for Respondents.
Before BILLINGS, Associate P.J., ORME, and
THORNE,JJ.
OPINION
THORNE, Judge.
% 1 Linda C. Speirs appeals from an order of
the Utah Labor Commission (Commission),*43
denying in part and granting in part her request for
workers' compensation. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
% 2 On April 30, 1998, Speirs slipped and fell
fracturing her nose and injuring her right ankle and
left knee while waitressing on the Southern Utah
University campus in Cedar City, Utah. Initially,
Speirs received workers' compensation benefits.
However, after paying Speirs's medical costs related to the accident, her employer, through its
workers' compensation insurer, denied Speirs's request for permanent partial disability benefits or future medical benefits. Speirs appealed to the Commission. An administrative law judge (ALT) convened a medical panel to render a medical opinion
in Speirs's case prior to making any finding or
drawing any conclusions. The parties submitted
stipulated facts to the medical panel and the ALJ
asked the medical panel to opine on the following
questions:
(1) What is [Speirs's] total physical impairment,
if any, for injuries sustained to her knee, ankle,
nose and face, respectively? Please explain as necessary.
(2) What future medical treatment will be required as a result of the April 30, 1998, accident
described above?

ment for [Speirs's] nose and face, ankle, and knee
and specifically Dr. Marsden's request for a neurological consultation and whether the current prescription for Guaifenesin [is] necessary as a result of the industrial accident.
K 3 The medical panel examined Speirs, reviewed Speirs's medical records, and then issued a
one-hundred page detailed report that contained
both the panel's medical opinion and the material to
support that opinion. In this report, the medical
panel opined that: (1) based upon a reasonable
medical probability, Speirs's total permanent physical impairment attributable to her knee injury was
zero percent; (2) the total permanent physical
impairment attributable to her face and nose injury
was zero percent; and (3) Speirs suffered a four
percent permanent physical impairment attributable
to her ankle injury. The medical panel further
opined that Speirs's injuries required no future medical treatment.
% 4 Speirs objected to the medical panel's report and asked the ALJ to strike the report, or, in
the alternative, provide Speirs with the opportunity
to cross-examine the medical panel. The AU
denied both of Speirs's requests.
% 5 The ALJ then found, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that Speirs suffered no permanent
partial impairment from her left knee, headaches,
nasal problems, or other facial injuries. The ALJ
further found a four percent whole body impairment attributable to Speirs's ankle injury, and awarded Speirs a total of $915.16 in permanent partial
disability compensation. The ALJ also denied
Speirs any compensation for future medical treatment for her knee, headaches, nasal problems, or
other facial injuries. The ALJ supported his conclusion by reference to both the medical panel's report
and other evidence in the record.
\ 6 Speirs appealed the ALJ's decision to the
Commission arguing that (1) the medical panel had
usurped the ALJ's authority, (2) the medical panel
was biased against her, and (3) the medical panel's

(3) Please address the following medical treat-
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conclusions lacked analysis and foundation. The
Commission affirmed the ALJ and further found
that the medical panel had properly performed the
purposes assigned it pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
34A-2-601 (2002) ™, in that the underlying evidence sufficiently supported the medical panel's report, and that the medical panel's report was consistent with other medical opinions in the record.
Speirs appeals.
FN1. We refer to the most recent version
of the statute because, excepted as specifically noted herein, any changes are not
material.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] ^ 7 Speirs argues that the medical panel
usurped the Commission's authority by making
findings of fact.™ " '[T]he Legislature*44 has
granted the Commission discretion to determine the
facts and apply the law to the facts in all cases coming before it.' " McKesson Corp. v. Labor Comm'n,
2002 UT App 10,K 11, 41 P.3d 468 (quoting Ae
Clevite, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT App 35,K
7, 996 P.2d 1072Xalteration original). " 'As such,
we must uphold the Commission's determination ...
unless the determination exceeds the bounds of
reasonableness and rationality....' " Id. (alterations
original).
FN2. Speirs presented fee following arguments on appeal: (1) Did the medical panel
usurp the authority of the Administrative
Law Judge by disregarding the stipulation
that was submitted to the panel?; (2) was
the medical panel biased?; and (3) was
there competent evidence to support the
medical panel's determination? We have
summarized and restated Speirs's arguments to more concisely address them.
ANALYSIS
[2] \ 8 Speirs challenges the Commission's
denial of her claim for additional workers' compensation benefits. Speirs asserts that the medical
panel usurped the authority of the ALJ and made

findings of fact relating to Speirs's medical history.
[3][4] \ 9 "[T]o award compensation, the Commission must determine that an accident has occurred and that there is a causal connection between
the accident and the injury claimed." Pittsburgh
Testing Lab. v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367, 1370 (Utah
1983). This requires that the Commission make
findings of fact and draw conclusions of law. See,
e.g., id In difficult cases, the opinions of a medical
panel may be of assistance to the Commission in
determining whether benefits should be awarded
because the medical panel provides the Commission with the benefit of its medical expertise. See
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., v. Industrial
Comm'n, 839 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah CtApp.1992);
Keller, 657 P.2d at 1370; IGA Food Fair v. Martin,
584 P.2d 828, 830 (Utah 1978). The medical panel
is empowered to study, take X-rays, and perform
tests as it may determine necessary or desirable in
rendering its opinion. See Utah Code Ann. §
34A-2-601(2Xa) (Supp.2002).
[5] % 10 However, even when a medical panel
is convened, the ALJ/Commission is always the ultimate fact finder. See Whitear v. Labor Comm'n,
973 P.2d 982, 986 (Utah Ct.App.1998); accord IGA
Food Fair, 584 P.2d at 830. Thus, while fee ALJ/
Commission may convene a medical panel to review applicants' medical condition, fee ALJ/
Commission may not abdicate its fact-finding responsibility to fee medical panel. See Price River
Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 731 VIA 1079,
1084 (Utah 1986).
% 11 Here, after reviewing fee proffered conflicting medical opinions, the ALJ convened fee
medical panel to examine Speirs's medical condition. The ALJ provided the panel wife a set of stipulated facts and three questions feat fee ALJ desired fee panel to answer. The medical panel accepted the stipulated facts,™3 however, after determining that the stipulated facts were insufficient to
properly answer fee proffered questions, fee medical panel conducted a thorough examination of
Speirs, and a thorough review of her medical his-
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tory. The medical panel then used this information
to answer each of the ALJ's proffered questions.
The ALJ, after receiving the medical panel's opinion, then examined the record as a whole and issued
findings and conclusions awarding Speirs a four
percent permanent partial impairment.
FN3. Speirs also argues that the medical
panel ignored the stipulated findings of
fact, but this claim is unpersuasive because
the medical panel incorporated the stipulated facts into its report.
[6][7] % 12 We have examined the record and
conclude that the ALJ's finding can be supported
without reference to the medical panel's opinion.
FN4
We further conclude that the ALJ properly discharged his duty to make findings of fact and nothing in the record supports Speirs's claim that the
ALJ abdicated this responsibility. Thus, any error
*45 Speirs attributes to the medical panel's conduct
has no bearing on the benefits awarded her.™5
FN4. For example, Dr. Knoebel opined
that he saw no objective evidence of any
permanent impairment or problems secondary to the industrial accident. He
opined that Speirs needed no further medical treatment. Dr. Marsden noted that
Speirs had minimal nasal obstruction and
normal sinuses. Dr. Kumar also provided a
comprehensive medical history and opined
that Speirs's headaches were caused by
"mixed vascular tension." Other medical
records contained information about her
shoulder injury, a car accident, and her
lower back pain, each of which either predated the industrial accident or exacerbated
Speirs's existing medical ailments.
FN5. Speirs also argues that the ALJ/
Commission should not have relied upon
the medical panel's findings of fact, for
they were not supported by sufficient evidence, and that her due process rights were
violated because the medical panel was

biased against her. Here, the ALJ/
Commission, not the medical panel, made
the findings of fact, thus, a sufficiency of
the evidence argument does not apply to
the medical panel. Furthermore, even if
relevant, we are precluded from addressing
Speirs's due process claim because she
failed to raise this issue before the Commission. Issues not raised in proceedings
before administrative agencies are not subject to judicial review except under exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., Brown &
Root Indus, Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n,
947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997) (refusing to
address issues not raised before the Commission).
[8] % 13 The ALJ reviewed the medical panel's
report and other medical opinions contained in the
record and concluded that Speirs suffered a four
percent permanent partial impairment. The Commission affirmed the ALJ's findings on appeal. It is
not the role of this court to reweigh the evidence
and substitute our conclusion for that of the Commission. See VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Comm%
901 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah Ct.App.1995). " 'Instead,
we defer to the Commission's findings because,
when reasonably conflicting views arise, it is the
Commission's province to draw inferences and resolve these conflicts/ " Id. (citations omitted). Under the circumstances presented here, the Commission did not exceed the bounds of reasonableness or
rationality in affirming the ALJ's decision. See
McKesson, 2002 UT App lOat^ 11,41 P.3d468.
CONCLUSION
\ 14 We conclude that the medical panel properly performed its function and did not usurp die
Commission's authority. Furthermore, we conclude
that there is sufficient evidence in the record, independent of the medical panel's report, to support the
Commission's award. We therefore affirm.
K 15 I CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge.
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ORME, Judge (dissenting):
% 16 I respectfully disagree with my colleagues.
The medical panel was provided with seventeen
stipulated facts, and three specific questions were
put to it. Four months after receiving its relatively
simple charge, the medical panel submitted its 100
page report, which amounts to a life history of petitioner laden with irrelevant personal details.
% 17 The articulated basis for this peculiar foray is that the medical panel determined the stipulated facts were insufficient to properly answer the
questions posed. Given the intention of the parties
to have the matter resolved on stipulated facts, in
conjunction only with 'the deposition of Petitioner
herein" and a medical record and report attached to
the stipulation, once the medical panel ascertained
it could not answer the three questions on the basis
of the stipulated information, it should simply have
so reported to the administrative law judge.
% 18 Once the judge informed the parties of this
turn of events, they could then have considered supplementing the stipulation, undertaking additional
discovery, proceeding to adjudication, etc. But for
the medical panel to simply go its merry way-and
for the administrative law judge to endorse this
self-authorized adventure-was at odds with the expectation of the parties, as reflected in their stipulation.
T[ 19 I would remand the case to the Industrial
Commission, with instructions to set aside the ineffectual stipulation and give petitioner an opportunity to pursue her claim in any alternative way properly available to her.
Utah App.,2002.
Speirs v. Southern Utah University
60 P.3d 42,461 Utah Adv. Rep. 9,2002 UT App 389
END OF DOCUMENT
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 34A. Utah Labor Code (Refs & Annos)
*g Chapter 2. Workers' Compensation Act (Refs & Annos)
*g Part 6. Medical Evaluations
_•§ 34A-2-601. Medical panel, director, or consultant—Findings and reports
— Objections to report—Hearing—Expenses
(1) (a) The Division of Adjudication may refer the medical aspects of a case described in this Subsection (1) (a) to a medical panel appointed by an administrative law judge:
(i) upon the filing of a claim for compensation arising out of and in the
course of employment for:
(A) disability by accident;
(B) death by accident;

or

and

(ii) if the employer or the employer's insurance carrier denies liability.
(b) An administrative law judge may appoint a medical panel upon the filing of a
claim for compensation based upon disability or death due to an occupational
disease.
(c) A medical panel appointed under this section shall consist of one or more
physicians specializing in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in
the claim.
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation of the
medical aspects of a controverted case, the division may employ a medical director or one or more medical consultants:
(i) on a full-time or part-time basis;

and

(ii) for the purpose of:
(A) evaluating medical evidence;

and

(B) advising an administrative law judge with respect to the administrative
law judge's ultimate fact-finding responsibility.
(e) If all parties agree to the use of a medical director or one or more medical
consultants, the medical director or one or more medical consultants is allowed
to function in the same manner and under the same procedures as required of a
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medical panel.
(2) (a) A medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant may do the following to the extent the medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant determines that it is necessary or desirable:
(i) conduct a study;
(ii) take an x-ray;
(iii) perform a test;

or

(iv) if authorized by an administrative law judge, conduct a post-mortem examination.
(b) A medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant shall make:
(i) a report in writing to the administrative law judge in a form prescribed by
the Division of Adjudication; and
(ii) additional findings as the administrative law judge may require.
(c) In an occupational disease case, in addition to the requirements of Subsection (2)(b), a medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant shall certify to the administrative law judge:
(i) the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from performing work
for remuneration or profit;
(ii) whether the sole cause of the disability or death, in the opinion of the
medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant results from the occupational disease; and
(iii) (A) whether any other cause aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any
way contributed to the disability or death; and
(B) if another cause contributed to the disability or death, the extent in
percentage to which the other cause contributed to the disability or death.
(d) (i) An administrative law judge shall promptly distribute full copies of a
report submitted to the administrative law judge under this Subsection (2) by
mail to:
(A) the applicant;
(B) the employer;
(C) the employer's insurance carrier ;

and
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(D) an attorney employed by a person listed in Subsections (2) (d) (i) (A)
through (C) .
(ii) Within 20 days after the report described in Subsection (2) (d) (i) is deposited in the United States post office, the following may file with the administrative law judge a written objection to the report:
(A) the applicant;
(B) the employer;

or

(C) the employer's insurance carrier.
(iii) If no written objection is filed within the period described in Subsection (2) (d) (ii), the report is considered admitted in evidence.
(e) (i) An administrative law judge may base the administrative law judge's finding and decision on the report of:
(A) a medical panel;
(B) the medical director;

or

(C) one or more medical consultants.
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2) (e) (i) , an administrative law judge is not
bound by a report described in Subsection (2) (e) (i) if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a contrary finding.
(f) (i) If a written objection to a report is filed under Subsection (2) (d), the
administrative law judge may set the case for hearing to determine the facts and
issues involved.
(ii) At a hearing held pursuant to this Subsection (2) (f), any party may request the administrative law judge to have any of the following present at the
hearing for examination and cross-examination:
(A) the chair of the medical panel;
(B) the medical director;

or

(C) the one or more medical consultants.
(iii) For good cause shown, an administrative law judge may order the following
to be present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination:
(A) a member of a medical panel, with or without the chair of the medical panel;
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(B) the medical director;

or

(C) a medical consultant.
(g) (i) A written report of a medical panel, medical director, or one or more
medical consultants may be received as an exhibit at a hearing described in Subsection (2)(f) .
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2) (g)(i), a report received as an exhibit under Subsection (2) (g) (i) may not be considered as evidence in the case except
as far as the report is sustained by the testimony admitted.
(h) For a claim referred under Subsection (1) to a medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant before July 1, 1997, the commission shall pay out
of the Employers 1 Reinsurance Fund established in Section 34A-2-702:
(i) expenses of a study or report of the medical panel, medical director, or
medical consultant; and
(ii) the expenses of the medical panel's, medical director's, or medical consultant's appearance before an administrative law judge.
(i) (i) For a claim referred under Subsection (1) to a medical panel, medical
director, or medical consultant on or after July 1, 1997, the commission shall
pay out of the Uninsured Employers' Fund established in Section 34A-2-704 the
expenses of:
(A) a study or report of the medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant; and
(B) the medical panel's, medical director's, or medical consultant's appearance before an administrative law judge.
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 34A-2-704, the expenses described in Subsection
(2) (i) (i) shall be paid from the Uninsured Employers' Fund whether or not the
employment relationship during which the industrial accident or occupational
disease occurred is localized in Utah as described in Subsection 34A-2-704(20) .
CREDIT (S)
Laws 1951, c. 52, § 1; Laws 1955, c. 57, § 1; Laws 1969, c. 86, § 9; Laws 1979,
c. 138,.§ 6; Laws 1982, c. 41, § 1; Laws 1988, c. 116, § 7; Laws 1991, c. 136,
§ 13; Laws 1994, c. 224, § 7; Laws 1996, c. 240, § 173, eff. July 1, 1997; Laws
1997, c. 375, §§ 138, 329(9), eff. July 1, 1997; Laws 2000, c. 183, § 1, eff. July
.1, 2000; Laws 2002, c. 303, § 1, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2009, c. 215, § 1, eff.
May 12, 2009.
Codifications C. 1943, Supp., § 42-1-71.10;

C. 1953, §§ 35-1-77, 35A-3-601.
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R602-2-2. Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel.
Pursuant to Section 34A-2-601, the Commission adopts the following guidelines
in determining the necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge where one or more
significant medical issues may be involved. Generally a significant medical issue
must be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant medical issues are involved
when there are:
1. Conflicting medical opinions related to causation of the injury or disease;
2. Conflicting medical opinion of permanent physical impairment which vary
more than 5% of the whole person,
3. Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total cutoff date which vary
more than 90 days;
4. Conflicting medical opinions related to a claim of permanent total disability,
and/or
5. Medical expenses in controversy amounting to more than $10,000.
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be scheduled if there is a
proffer of conflicting medical testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel
report. Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting medical evidence, the
Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a hearing, re-submit the new evidence to
the panel for consideration and clarification.
C. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical panel or medical consultant
and of their appearance at a hearing, as well as any expenses for further medical
examination or evaluation, as directed by the Administrative Law Judge, shall be
paid from the Uninsured Employers1 Fund, as directed by Section 34A-2-601.
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Laws 1988, c. 73, § 1.
Laws 1988, c. 210, § 141.
Laws 1988, c. 248, § 8*
Laws 1990, c. 80, 5 5.
Laws 1990, c. 224, § 3.
Laws 1991, c. 268, § 22.
Laws 1992, c. 127, § 12.
Laws 1994, c. 13, S 45.
Laws 1995, c. 299, S 47.
Laws 1996, c. 159, 5 19.
Laws 1996, c. 198, § 49.
Laws 2001, c. 255, § 20.
Laws 2001, c. 302, S 2.
C. 1953, § 78-2a-3.
U.C.A. 1953 S 78A-4-103, UT ST S 78A-4-103
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(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first
degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including,
but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court;

and

(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges
of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and
determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter
4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings .
CREDIT (S)
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 350, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2210, eff. May 5,
2008; Laws 2009, c. 344, § 42, eff. May 12, 2009.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1476, provides:
"Section 1476. Coordinating H.B. 78 with H.B. 63—Superseding amendments.
"If this H.B. 78 and H.B. 63, Recodification of Title 63 State Affairs in General,
both pass, it is the intent of the Legislature that the amendments in this H.B. 78
supersede the amendments to the same sections in H.B. 63, except that the section
renumbering and internal cross references to Title 63 in H.B. 63 supersede and
shall replace the section numbering and references to Title 63 in H.B. 78 when the
Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel prepares the Utah Code database
for publication."
Composite section by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel of
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 350 and Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2210.
Prior Laws:
Laws 1986, c. 47, § 46.
Laws 1987, c. 161, § 304•
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Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-2a-3
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78A. Judiciary and Judicial Administration (Refs & Annos)
*g Chapter 4. Court of Appeals
^ S 78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to
issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees;

or

(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings
of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State
Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division
of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of
the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the
state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state
or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except
those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons
who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions
constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree
or capital felony;
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